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If you represent Title VII plaintiffs and the right-to-sue letter arrives in the mail on a Monday, you might want to filed the lawsuit in federal court by Friday. OK, maybe not that quickly, but there is little time to waste. Title VII only gives you 90 days to file that lawsuit, and if you file it on the 91st day, the case will be dismissed and your client will wonder why you did not act any sooner. All this plays out in a recent decision by the Court of Appeals.
The case is Tiberio v. Allergy Asthma Immunology, decided on December 20. The EEOC charge alleged that plaintiff was the victim of disability discrimination. The right-to-sue letter (which closes out the EEOC investigation and allows you to file the lawsuit) was mailed on November 24, 2010. The law presumes that you will get that letter within 3 days, so the Court of Appeals (Cabranes, Miner and Wesley) assumes that plaintiff got it on November 27, 2010. But plaintiff's lawyer got the letter on November 29, 2010. The lawsuit was filed on February 28, 2011. Plaintiff says the filing in federal court was timely because fell within 90 days of her lawyer's receipt of the right-to-sue (not including the weekend immediately preceding the filing date, which doesn't count under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6). So what's the problem?
The problem is that plaintiff was presumed to receive the right-to-sue letter three days after it was mailed, and a few days before her lawyer actually did receive it. If the deadline starts to run when plaintiff got the letter, then the lawsuit is untimely (by only 3 days, but still untimely). It is timely if the operative date is when her lawyer got the letter (a few days later, enough to bring the lawsuit within the 90-day deadline). Since plaintiff and counsel got the letter on different dates, the Court of Appeals has to decide what is the operative date in this case. While notice to the attorney usually qualifies as notice to the client, "the general principle of constructive notice does not affect, much less vitiate, the operative presumptions regarding the receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue latter by the claimant herself." In other words, if the plaintiff got the letter before the lawyer did, then the deadline starts to run when the plaintiff got the letter, not when the lawyer got it. Otherwise, the Second Circuit says, the plaintiff gets an unfair extension of time if her lawyer got the letter after she did.
So here's the rule, set forth by the Court of Appeals for the first time: "we now hold that the 90-day limitations period set forth in [Title VII] begins to run on the date that a right-to-sue letter is first received either by the claimant or by counsel, whichever is earlier." As the lawsuit was filed 93 days after she got the letter, this new rule kills plaintiff's case..
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Monday, January 30, 2012
You can't walk into a restuarant with an exposed handgun
Here's an easy one for the Court of Appeals. It finds that police officers are entitled to summary judgment in a false arrest and illegal search case where the plaintiff was walking around in a Chili's restaurant with an exposed gun.
The case is Goldberg v. Town of Glastonbury, a summary order decided on December 13. Goldberg was arrested for breach of the peace. Someone at Chili's called 911 because they saw a guy in the building with a gun. When the police arrived, they saw Goldberg with a holstered handgun visible on his hip. The police had reasonable suspicion to stop Goldberg without a warrant. We call this a Terry stop, after a Supreme Court ruling from 1968.
Goldberg also sued for false arrest. No dice for Goldberg. The police had arguable probable cause, a concept that fleshes out the qualified immunity test and makes it difficult to win these cases as law enforcement has an extra layer of protection against liability. The Second Circuit (Newman, Winter and Katzmann) says,
The case is Goldberg v. Town of Glastonbury, a summary order decided on December 13. Goldberg was arrested for breach of the peace. Someone at Chili's called 911 because they saw a guy in the building with a gun. When the police arrived, they saw Goldberg with a holstered handgun visible on his hip. The police had reasonable suspicion to stop Goldberg without a warrant. We call this a Terry stop, after a Supreme Court ruling from 1968.
Goldberg also sued for false arrest. No dice for Goldberg. The police had arguable probable cause, a concept that fleshes out the qualified immunity test and makes it difficult to win these cases as law enforcement has an extra layer of protection against liability. The Second Circuit (Newman, Winter and Katzmann) says,
Prior to his arrest, plaintiff had entered the Chili’s restaurant wearing an exposed firearm, which the officers observed upon their arrival in response to the 911 call. Defendant Furlong observed that the manager, Laura Smith, appeared to be nervous, and she reported that she was alarmed over the handgun and had cleared the area as a result. On these facts, and given the lack of settled Connecticut law on the issue, we conclude that reasonable officers could, at minimum, disagree on whether there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff for breach of the peace in the second degree.Maybe Goldberg knew his chances on appeal were slim. He raised for the first time on appeal an argument under the Second Amendment, you know, the one that says you have the right to bear arms in a public restaurant. The Amendment actually says nothing about public buildings, but ever since the Supreme Court breathed life in the Second Amendment a few years ago, I am sure that half the people with firearms-related convictions are saying that the Constitution protects their behavior. Who knows if Goldberg has a decent argument here. The Court of Appeals will not consider it because he did not raise it in the district court. The argument is waived.
Wednesday, January 25, 2012
A Fourth Amendment for the modern age
The Supreme Court finds that the Fourth Amendment is implicated when the police stick a GPS device on your car without your consent. This significant case requires the Justices to apply the Fourth Amendment -- adopted in the 18th Century -- to the modern age.
The case is U.S. v. Jones, decided on January 23. This case got a lot of attention because it seems to strike everyone as too intrusive for the police to stick a GPS on your car without a warrant and without your knowledge. Of course, cases like this usually nail people on drug-trafficking charges, but the Fourth Amendment is often developed from cases involving people we would not touch with a 10-foot pole. The Court unanimously sides with Fourth Amendment principles here and rejects lower court cases that essentially allowed the police to damned well do what they wanted. What makes the case confusing for Court junkies is that all the Justices find that GPS monitoring is a search under Fourth Amendment, but a 5-4 split disagrees on the reasoning, with a lone concurrence from Justice Sotomayor. Also, informed commentary says that the Court did not in this case actually say the government needs a warrant for these searches, only that the installation of the GPS was a Fourth Amendment “search.” But my guess is that, to be on the safe side, the government will probably try to get a warrant next time it tries this on people, and the lower courts might now require a warrant in these cases.
Justice Scalia writes for five Justices (including the conservative block) in noting that Fourth Amendment cases draw from two separate theories: the trespass theory (taken from 18th Century England) and the "reasonable expectation of privacy" theory (taken from a 1967 Supreme Court ruling). Both theories are alive and well, Scalia says. Both could apply here, in that the police have to trespass on your private property to stick a GPS under your car and you also have a reasonable expectation that your private comings and goings around town (and God knows where else) will remain private without a warrant. For now, the five-vote majority sticks with the trespass theory.
In siding with the defendant in this case, Scalia threads the needle by distinguishing two older Supreme Court cases that allowed the police to monitor (without a warrant) a beeper placed in a container being transported by the defendant. Beepers were the electronic gizmos of the 1980s. In one of those cases, the beeper was placed in the container when it belonged to someone else, and the original owner consented to the surveillance. In the other case, while the beeper was placed in a container that the defendant transported all over the place, the information seized by the police -- the defendant's itinerary -- "had been voluntarily conveyed to the public" as he had driven on public roads. The defendant in that case had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his public travel. The GPS case is different from the beeper cases because it involves an old-fashioned trespass, prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
Writing for the four Justices who sided with the Fourth Amendment for different reasons, Justice Alito (and three liberals) says that the "reasonable expectation of privacy" theory is much more persuasive than the trespass theory. Alito says that short-term surveillance might not violate the Fourth Amendment, but long-term surveillance from GPS monitoring does implicate that Amendment because your privacy interests are placed in greater jeopardy. The general public is going to like Alito's privacy-related reasoning better than Scalia's relatively archaic trespass reasoning. While no one wants the police to touch your car without consent, most people would shudder at the thought that the government would closely monitor all of your whereabouts for a lengthy period of time without your knowledge.
Finally, a word about Justice Sotomayor, who concurs in Scalia's opinion but writes separately by articulating the real-world concerns about extended governmental surveillance in a way that normal people can understand, and by suggesting that the Court reconsider its precedents that give the police greater leeway when its monitors property owned by someone else. She writes, "it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. ... This approach is ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. ... I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year." It's Justice Sotomayor who wants to bring the Fourth Amendment into the modern age.
The case is U.S. v. Jones, decided on January 23. This case got a lot of attention because it seems to strike everyone as too intrusive for the police to stick a GPS on your car without a warrant and without your knowledge. Of course, cases like this usually nail people on drug-trafficking charges, but the Fourth Amendment is often developed from cases involving people we would not touch with a 10-foot pole. The Court unanimously sides with Fourth Amendment principles here and rejects lower court cases that essentially allowed the police to damned well do what they wanted. What makes the case confusing for Court junkies is that all the Justices find that GPS monitoring is a search under Fourth Amendment, but a 5-4 split disagrees on the reasoning, with a lone concurrence from Justice Sotomayor. Also, informed commentary says that the Court did not in this case actually say the government needs a warrant for these searches, only that the installation of the GPS was a Fourth Amendment “search.” But my guess is that, to be on the safe side, the government will probably try to get a warrant next time it tries this on people, and the lower courts might now require a warrant in these cases.
Justice Scalia writes for five Justices (including the conservative block) in noting that Fourth Amendment cases draw from two separate theories: the trespass theory (taken from 18th Century England) and the "reasonable expectation of privacy" theory (taken from a 1967 Supreme Court ruling). Both theories are alive and well, Scalia says. Both could apply here, in that the police have to trespass on your private property to stick a GPS under your car and you also have a reasonable expectation that your private comings and goings around town (and God knows where else) will remain private without a warrant. For now, the five-vote majority sticks with the trespass theory.
In siding with the defendant in this case, Scalia threads the needle by distinguishing two older Supreme Court cases that allowed the police to monitor (without a warrant) a beeper placed in a container being transported by the defendant. Beepers were the electronic gizmos of the 1980s. In one of those cases, the beeper was placed in the container when it belonged to someone else, and the original owner consented to the surveillance. In the other case, while the beeper was placed in a container that the defendant transported all over the place, the information seized by the police -- the defendant's itinerary -- "had been voluntarily conveyed to the public" as he had driven on public roads. The defendant in that case had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his public travel. The GPS case is different from the beeper cases because it involves an old-fashioned trespass, prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
Writing for the four Justices who sided with the Fourth Amendment for different reasons, Justice Alito (and three liberals) says that the "reasonable expectation of privacy" theory is much more persuasive than the trespass theory. Alito says that short-term surveillance might not violate the Fourth Amendment, but long-term surveillance from GPS monitoring does implicate that Amendment because your privacy interests are placed in greater jeopardy. The general public is going to like Alito's privacy-related reasoning better than Scalia's relatively archaic trespass reasoning. While no one wants the police to touch your car without consent, most people would shudder at the thought that the government would closely monitor all of your whereabouts for a lengthy period of time without your knowledge.
Finally, a word about Justice Sotomayor, who concurs in Scalia's opinion but writes separately by articulating the real-world concerns about extended governmental surveillance in a way that normal people can understand, and by suggesting that the Court reconsider its precedents that give the police greater leeway when its monitors property owned by someone else. She writes, "it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. ... This approach is ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. ... I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year." It's Justice Sotomayor who wants to bring the Fourth Amendment into the modern age.
Tuesday, January 24, 2012
Easy come, easy go, for habeas victory
In August 2011, the Second Circuit granted a habeas petition filed by an inmate who shot his estranged wife in the head point-blank. The Court ruled that the criminal conviction violated the U.S. Constitution because the jury found him guilty of depraved indifference murder and not intentional murder. This may sound outrageous, but the Court of Appeals actually had a reason for doing this. That decision has now been taken back. The Second Circuit has reversed itself in that case and reinstated the conviction.
The case is Rivera v. Cuomo, decided on December 16. The prosecutor tried the case as an intentional murder case, that Rivera simply pointed the gun at her head and pulled the trigger. In 1997, the jury convicted Rivera of depraved indifference murder. Here's how I wrote up the decision when it came down in August 2011:
See, there was a distinction between depraved indifference murder and intentional murder. You could not be convicted of depraved indifference murder when the only basis to convict was intentional murder. That was then, all those months ago in August 2011. After the State lost the appeal in this case, it asked the Second Circuit to rehear the case. Most of these petitions for rehearing are rejected without comment. Not this one. Fortunately for the State, the Supreme Court in 2011 decided Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2 (2011), which reaffirms that under modern habeas law, federal courts have to give state courts great deference in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. Say what you want about the notion that state courts have latitude to interpret the Constitution as they please so long as those interpretation are not "unreasonable." On reconsideration, the Second Circuit (Pooler. McLaughlin and Parker) now upholds the conviction, though not in ringing terms:
The case is Rivera v. Cuomo, decided on December 16. The prosecutor tried the case as an intentional murder case, that Rivera simply pointed the gun at her head and pulled the trigger. In 1997, the jury convicted Rivera of depraved indifference murder. Here's how I wrote up the decision when it came down in August 2011:
In 2003, the New York Court of Appeals decided that intentional murder cases cannot lead to a conviction for depraved indifference murder. As the Second Circuit notes, "certain murders are so 'quintessentially intentional' that they cannot properly be categorized as depraved indifference murder." Depraved indifference usually involves a conduct such as firing a gun into a crowd or throwing a cinder block off a building during lunch hour in New York City. Intentional murder is ... intentional murder: laying in wait and pointing the gun at the victim with intent to kill.
When Rivera was convicted in 1997, the New York Court of Appeals had not yet said that depraved indifference murders cannot support an intentional murder conviction. So while Rivera's conviction back then may have been solid under New York law, it became quite shaky in 2003, when the New York Court of Appeals reinterpreted the Penal Law. In 2004, when Rivera had exhausted (and lost) all his state court appeals, the New York Court of Appeals said that "defendant's act of shooting his victim at close range could not be depraved indifference murder." Instead, it's intentional murder. The Second Circuit adds, "under any reasonable view of the evidence adduced at trial, Rivera's point-blank shooting ... -- which was either undoubtedly intentional or accidental in the course of a struggle -- could not support a depraved indifference murder conviction."
As the Second Circuit says that we must apply the law as it stood in 2004 and not in 1997, this means that the Second Circuit grants Rivera's habeas corpus petition. The depraved indifference conviction is vacated.
See, there was a distinction between depraved indifference murder and intentional murder. You could not be convicted of depraved indifference murder when the only basis to convict was intentional murder. That was then, all those months ago in August 2011. After the State lost the appeal in this case, it asked the Second Circuit to rehear the case. Most of these petitions for rehearing are rejected without comment. Not this one. Fortunately for the State, the Supreme Court in 2011 decided Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2 (2011), which reaffirms that under modern habeas law, federal courts have to give state courts great deference in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. Say what you want about the notion that state courts have latitude to interpret the Constitution as they please so long as those interpretation are not "unreasonable." On reconsideration, the Second Circuit (Pooler. McLaughlin and Parker) now upholds the conviction, though not in ringing terms:
After much reflection, we now reverse course. Applying the law as it existed after Rivera’s conviction became final in July 2004, we find that although evidence of “significantly heightened recklessness” was slim, at best, giving the state courts and the jury the utmost deference, we cannot find that the evidence was so completely lacking that no rational jury could have found Rivera guilty of depraved indifference murder. Therefore, we have no choice but to uphold the decision of the state court.
Friday, January 20, 2012
Inmate wins reasonable accommodation claim at the Court of Appeals
An inmate wins his Second Circuit appeal claiming that a state correctional facility denied his rights under federal disability law. It looks like his lawyer won the case by writing a good brief.
The case is Shaw v. New York Department of Correctional Services, a summary order decided on December 15. Shaw is dyslexic. He wanted to take his GED exam. But he could not take the test because of his disability, so he asked the jail for assistance in proving that he has a cognizable disability so that he could get a reasonable accommodation in taking the exam. The jail denied the request.
The rule governing a case like this is that a demand for "reasonable accommodations to assure access to an existing program is cognizable, but a demand for additional or different substantive benefits is not." The district court denied Shaw's claim because it thought that he was requesting additional or different substantive benefits. Shaw is now represented by counsel on appeal, and the Second Circuit sees it differently. Folks, this is one reason why counseled cases fare better than pro se cases. Counsel told the Second Circuit (Newman, Hall and Gardephe [D.J.]) that the complaint, in referring to a failure to accommodate, can refer to "a number of possible accommodations, including oral examinations, recorded lectures, and providing Plaintiff lecture notes. Other possibilities that might be especially suitable for a person afflicted with dyslexia are additional time for test-taking and allowing the student to dictate answers to essay questions." Seen in this light, the case states a claim for relief after all. Would Shaw have been able to articulate this theory of the case on his own? Probably not. His lawyer was able to do so, saving the case.
The Court of Appeals says that the jail should more fully review Shaw's request for accommodation through the prison grievance system. Counsel for the State is expected to make sure that appropriate prison officials promptly review Shaw's administrative request at the jail.
The case is Shaw v. New York Department of Correctional Services, a summary order decided on December 15. Shaw is dyslexic. He wanted to take his GED exam. But he could not take the test because of his disability, so he asked the jail for assistance in proving that he has a cognizable disability so that he could get a reasonable accommodation in taking the exam. The jail denied the request.
The rule governing a case like this is that a demand for "reasonable accommodations to assure access to an existing program is cognizable, but a demand for additional or different substantive benefits is not." The district court denied Shaw's claim because it thought that he was requesting additional or different substantive benefits. Shaw is now represented by counsel on appeal, and the Second Circuit sees it differently. Folks, this is one reason why counseled cases fare better than pro se cases. Counsel told the Second Circuit (Newman, Hall and Gardephe [D.J.]) that the complaint, in referring to a failure to accommodate, can refer to "a number of possible accommodations, including oral examinations, recorded lectures, and providing Plaintiff lecture notes. Other possibilities that might be especially suitable for a person afflicted with dyslexia are additional time for test-taking and allowing the student to dictate answers to essay questions." Seen in this light, the case states a claim for relief after all. Would Shaw have been able to articulate this theory of the case on his own? Probably not. His lawyer was able to do so, saving the case.
The Court of Appeals says that the jail should more fully review Shaw's request for accommodation through the prison grievance system. Counsel for the State is expected to make sure that appropriate prison officials promptly review Shaw's administrative request at the jail.
Tuesday, January 17, 2012
Abortion clinic protester's sentence might violate First Amendment
You don't see too much in the way of Seventh Amendment litigation these days. Here's one involving an anti-abortion protester who was convicted after a bench trial of violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE). He says that he deserved a jury trial. The Second Circuit disagrees. But it says the punishment might violate the First Amendment because the defendant has to stay 1,000 feet from abortion clinics.
The case is U.S. v. Dugan, decided on December 5. The Supreme Court says that under the Seventh Amendment, criminal cases get a jury trial if the defendant is charged with a "serious" and not a "petty" offense. The difference is that any offense that carries a maximum term of six months or less is presumed to be petty. You can overcome that presumption if additional penalties, such as a large fine, reflect a legislative determination that the offense is serious under the Seventh Amendment.
As the potential sentence for Dugan was six months, he can only win the appeal and get a jury trial if the fine is high enough under the Seventh Amendment. Although he faced a maximum penalty of $10,000, two other circuits hold that "FACE Act offenses like this one, i.e., nonviolent, first-time offenses, are not 'serious' and thus do not require a jury trial." The Court of Appeals agrees with those decisions and says that Dugan was not entitled to a jury trial.
For some reason, the Court of Appeals issues two decisions in this case. The jury trial issue gets a published opinion. The propriety of Dugan's sentence, though, gets a summary order. All the more strange since the summary order is a little more interesting, and the Court of Appeals says the punishment might violate the First Amendment. The district court ordered that Dugan cannot come within 1,000 feet of an abortion clinic. He was found guilty of blocking access to a clinic. "The testimony of the clinic’s security guard established that Puckett kneeled intentionally in front of the door to block it. ... The security guard testified that Puckett 'was kneeling directly in front of the door so the door could not have opened.' The security guard then indicated that the police arrested Puckett after he refused to move and that '[a]fter the police removed him . . . both staff and patients were able to enter into the clinic.'” OK, so Dugan is guilty. Is the penalty (stay away more than 1,000 feet from reproductive health facilities) excessive?
It might be. The Court wants the trial court to consider "whether the condition is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Dugan had no prior notice that the condition might be imposed because it first was suggested in the government’s sentencing letter, submitted to the district court a day before the hearing and not copied to Dugan, who was proceeding pro se. On remand, the district court must determine whether the substantial limit on Dugan’s freedom of movement is 'reasonably related' to the government’s interest in deterring future violations of the FACE Act and in protecting the patients and staff of reproductive health facilities."
The Second Circuit also wants the district court to "consider Dugan’s history of protesting at reproductive health clinics, his First Amendment interests in free speech, as well as his statements that he has a 'duty' to prevent abortions. In addition, the district court must consider whether a stay-away distance of 1,000 feet (more than the length of three football fields) is narrowly tailored to the government interest where Dugan’s offense arose from the non-violent obstruction of a clinic entrance, and where, particularly in urban areas, the condition could significantly impede Dugan’s freedom of movement."
The case is U.S. v. Dugan, decided on December 5. The Supreme Court says that under the Seventh Amendment, criminal cases get a jury trial if the defendant is charged with a "serious" and not a "petty" offense. The difference is that any offense that carries a maximum term of six months or less is presumed to be petty. You can overcome that presumption if additional penalties, such as a large fine, reflect a legislative determination that the offense is serious under the Seventh Amendment.
As the potential sentence for Dugan was six months, he can only win the appeal and get a jury trial if the fine is high enough under the Seventh Amendment. Although he faced a maximum penalty of $10,000, two other circuits hold that "FACE Act offenses like this one, i.e., nonviolent, first-time offenses, are not 'serious' and thus do not require a jury trial." The Court of Appeals agrees with those decisions and says that Dugan was not entitled to a jury trial.
For some reason, the Court of Appeals issues two decisions in this case. The jury trial issue gets a published opinion. The propriety of Dugan's sentence, though, gets a summary order. All the more strange since the summary order is a little more interesting, and the Court of Appeals says the punishment might violate the First Amendment. The district court ordered that Dugan cannot come within 1,000 feet of an abortion clinic. He was found guilty of blocking access to a clinic. "The testimony of the clinic’s security guard established that Puckett kneeled intentionally in front of the door to block it. ... The security guard testified that Puckett 'was kneeling directly in front of the door so the door could not have opened.' The security guard then indicated that the police arrested Puckett after he refused to move and that '[a]fter the police removed him . . . both staff and patients were able to enter into the clinic.'” OK, so Dugan is guilty. Is the penalty (stay away more than 1,000 feet from reproductive health facilities) excessive?
It might be. The Court wants the trial court to consider "whether the condition is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Dugan had no prior notice that the condition might be imposed because it first was suggested in the government’s sentencing letter, submitted to the district court a day before the hearing and not copied to Dugan, who was proceeding pro se. On remand, the district court must determine whether the substantial limit on Dugan’s freedom of movement is 'reasonably related' to the government’s interest in deterring future violations of the FACE Act and in protecting the patients and staff of reproductive health facilities."
The Second Circuit also wants the district court to "consider Dugan’s history of protesting at reproductive health clinics, his First Amendment interests in free speech, as well as his statements that he has a 'duty' to prevent abortions. In addition, the district court must consider whether a stay-away distance of 1,000 feet (more than the length of three football fields) is narrowly tailored to the government interest where Dugan’s offense arose from the non-violent obstruction of a clinic entrance, and where, particularly in urban areas, the condition could significantly impede Dugan’s freedom of movement."
Friday, January 13, 2012
Supreme Court adopts "ministerial exception" to civil rights laws
The Supreme Court had a choice. It could honor Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination and retaliation, or it could honor the First Amendment, which prohibits government interference in the management of religious institutions. The Court unanimously goes with the First Amendment, identifying for the first time a ministerial exception to Title VII which prevents courts from resolving certain lawsuits against religious organizations.
The case is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, decided on January 11. The plaintiff taught at a school that offered Christian-centered education, but her responsibilities include certain ministerial functions. After a dispute with her superiors over whether she could work despite her disability (narcolepsy), she threatened to sue for retaliation under Title VII. The Supreme Court says she can't do it under the ministerial exception. (The Second Circuit in 2008 adopted this exception in Rweyemamu v. Cole, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008)).
The Supreme Court has never had a case like this before, so it looks to the original intent of the Establishment Clause by drawing from decisions made by James Madison when he was both Secretary of State and President. Madison said that the government cannot tell religious organizations how to run their internal affairs. Older Supreme Court cases also hint at this in the context of disputes over church property. Chief Judge Roberts says that "[o]ur decisions in that area confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church' determination of who can act as its ministers." So here is the Court's holding in this case:
Now, the plaintiff in this case was not technically a minister, but she did take on some ministerial responsibilities, like "conveying the Church's message and carrying out its mission," i.e., "leading others toward Christian maturity and teaching faithfully the Word of God, the Sacred Scriptures, in its truth and purity and as set forth in all the symbolical books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church." She was also "held out as a minister, with a role distinct from that of most of [the Church's] members." As plaintiff is a minister as defined by the Court, her calls falls under the ministerial exception, and she cannot proceed with the case.
So where does this leave us? What about church employees who are not ministers? Can they sue? The Supreme Court does not tell us, though it seems to broadly define who is a "minister" in defining the plaintiff's role. But the holding in this case is narrow; the Court says:
The case is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, decided on January 11. The plaintiff taught at a school that offered Christian-centered education, but her responsibilities include certain ministerial functions. After a dispute with her superiors over whether she could work despite her disability (narcolepsy), she threatened to sue for retaliation under Title VII. The Supreme Court says she can't do it under the ministerial exception. (The Second Circuit in 2008 adopted this exception in Rweyemamu v. Cole, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008)).
The Supreme Court has never had a case like this before, so it looks to the original intent of the Establishment Clause by drawing from decisions made by James Madison when he was both Secretary of State and President. Madison said that the government cannot tell religious organizations how to run their internal affairs. Older Supreme Court cases also hint at this in the context of disputes over church property. Chief Judge Roberts says that "[o]ur decisions in that area confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church' determination of who can act as its ministers." So here is the Court's holding in this case:
The members of a religious group put their faith in the handsof their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.
Now, the plaintiff in this case was not technically a minister, but she did take on some ministerial responsibilities, like "conveying the Church's message and carrying out its mission," i.e., "leading others toward Christian maturity and teaching faithfully the Word of God, the Sacred Scriptures, in its truth and purity and as set forth in all the symbolical books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church." She was also "held out as a minister, with a role distinct from that of most of [the Church's] members." As plaintiff is a minister as defined by the Court, her calls falls under the ministerial exception, and she cannot proceed with the case.
So where does this leave us? What about church employees who are not ministers? Can they sue? The Supreme Court does not tell us, though it seems to broadly define who is a "minister" in defining the plaintiff's role. But the holding in this case is narrow; the Court says:
The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.
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