Courthouse argument leads to misdemeanor conviction

Mens rea is a Latin phrase that normally arises in criminal cases. It means the defendant's mental state contributed to the criminal or unlawful conduct. In this case, the Court of Appeals explores mens rea in a case where a woman showed up to the federal courthouse in Binghamton looking for a fight. She got one, and she got convicted.

The case is United States v. Wasylyshyn, issued on November 3. Defendant showed up at the courthouse, which also houses the IRS, claiming she wanted to visit that agency. The guards told her she needed to make an appointment. She said she only wanted to pick up some tax forms. The guards told her "this is how it is done." Next thing you know, an argument broke out. Defendant said she was a doctor and that the guards were public servants who paid her salaries (public officials hate when you say this). The shouting got loud. In the end, defendant was charged with disorderly conduct in violation of federal noise regulations. The U.S. Magistrate Judge tried the case without a jury and ruled against defendant, who challenges her conviction on appeal.

The appellate argument is that the federal regulation does not articulate a mens rea element and that she did not have the mens rea for the violation because she did not know her conduct was wrongful. This is an interesting argument, but the Court of Appeals (Carney, Livingston and Berman [D.J.]) rejects it. Criminal statutes are presumed to contain a mens rea element. "We apply a canon of statutory interpretation to read criminal statutes that are silent or ambiguous as to the required standard of mens rea[] to demand knowledge of enough facts to distinguish conduct that is likely culpable from conduct that is entirely innocent.”

The Court reads into the federal regulation "only a general intent requirement, i.e., that the defendant possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime." Actus reus is another Latin phrase, sort of the brother of mens rea, which means the defendant committed the act that leads to the criminal violation. Under this principle, the court will "focus on 'knowledge of wrongdoing,' which, we have explained, 'requires knowledge only of facts that in a reasonable person would create an expectation that his conduct was likely subject to strict regulation.'”

The Court finds that defendant must have known she was doing wrong when she raised her voice at the courthouse. The Court puts it this way:

Courthouses are formal spaces where solemn government business takes place; a reasonable person would understand that shouting at security officers in a courthouse is a “non-innocent act,” likely subject to some form of regulation. Hence, a general intent requirement suffices to distinguish “likely culpable” from “entirely innocent” conduct. To convict Wasylyshyn of violating the Noise Regulation, the government had to prove that she had knowledge she was creating a “loud or unusual noise or a nuisance” on federal property, 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390(a), not that she knew of a specific regulation proscribing her conduct.

Since the trial judge created the security officers' testimony that defendant was shouting at them and her voice could be heard 40 to 45 feet away, and she did not stop shouting after they told her to calm down, the court was able to find that she knowingly created a loud noise or a nuisance.

By the way, it took over a year for the Court of Appeals to resolve this appeal, as it raised complicated issues, including the mens rea question. All to address a misdemeanor conviction that carried a $50 fine and $30 processing fee. There was no jail time.