Court of Appeals upholds $1.5 million police misconduct verdict

The Second Circuit holds that a jury properly awarded more than $1.5 million in damages against two Syracuse police officers who threw a man to the ground in the course of his arrest, causing significant physical injuries.

The case is Grant v. Lockett, a summary order issued on December 8. I was co-counsel to the plaintiffs on appeal, which we argued in May 2020, making this the longest wait for a summary order that I've seen in the Second Circuit. I will cover this ruling in two parts. This installment looks at the evidentiary rulings that the officers challenged on appeal. As it happens, the Court of Appeals (Livingston, Kearse and Sack) ruled the trial court made significant errors in admitting certain evidence against the police officers, but that these errors do not warrant a new trial because the errors were harmless in light of the strength of the case and other factors.

As this is a summary order, we don't have a full statement of facts. For that, you have to read the district court ruling that affirmed the verdict post-trial. Here is how the Northern District of New York summarized the trial evidence:

On June 28, 2014, plaintiffs resided at 105 Hudson Street in the City of Syracuse with their youngest son, Alonzo Grant, Jr. In the early evening while a family barbeque was occurring, Mr. Grant got in an argument with his daughter Alyssa and requested she leave the home. After she left, she proceeded to get in an argument with a neighbor prompting Mr. Grant to call 911 and request police assistance. Officers Lockett and Montalto arrived at the Grant home soon thereafter and were advised by plaintiffs that their assistance was not needed as Alyssa had left. 

However, Officers Lockett and Montalto testified that Mr. Grant was yelling at an person in the residence and they were concerned about a domestic situation. Officer Lockett entered the residence and testified that Mr. Grant was flailing his arms violently and was still upset with the female occupant of the home. Officer Lockett then asked Mr. Grant to exit his house and speak with Officer Montalto. While exiting the home, Mr. Grant shoved the front door, causing it to hit against an iron rail on the front porch. Officer Lockett testified that he decided to place handcuffs on Mr. Grant to permit him to calm down and for the safety of Mr. Grant and those around him. He testified that he attempted to do this while on the front stairs to the home and that Mr. Grant turned around and bear hugged him, necessitating Officer Lockett to grab Mr. Grant and strike him at least ten times in the head and torso.
In contrast, plaintiffs testified that their argument had ceased by the time Officers Lockett and Montalto arrived. Plaintiffs testified that Mr. Grant spoke loudly while inside the home but did not act violently. Mr. Grant testified that after exiting the home, Officer Lockett grabbed him from behind, throwing him over the railing on the front porch. Plaintiffs testified that while on the ground, both Officers Lockett and Montalto repeatedly kicked and punched Mr. Grant. Eventually, the officers handcuffed Mr. Grant. Following the incident, Mr. Grant received medical attention from paramedics and was transported to the hospital.

Alonzo Grant was charged with harassment in the second degree, domestic disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest. These charges were later dropped. Grant's lawsuit alleges excessive force and false arrest, and his wife sought damages for loss of consortium.

At trial, Judge Hurd allowed plaintiffs' lawyers to introduce records from the Citizen Review Board, a city entity that investigated the incident separate and apart from the lawsuit. These records credited plaintiffs' version of events. The Court of Appeals notes these hearsay records might be admissible under the business records exception, but they do not qualify because the records were not made contemporaneous with the incident and they do not concern the kind of regularly-conducted activity contemplated by this exception. But this evidentiary error was harmless, the Court of Appeals says, because plaintiffs had a particularly strong case against the defendant officers in that, apart from plaintiff, five other eyewitnesses corroborated his story (the incident took place in front of the neighbors) and the officers had no such corroborators and, in addition, their testimony had significant inconsistencies. Also, the officers admitted to punching plaintiff  dozen times. Video evidence also supports Alonzo's account. Further informing the harmless error analysis is that plaintiffs' lawyer barely mentioned the CRB records in summation,  and the city's own investigation into the incident found the excessive force allegations were unsubstantiated (balancing out the CRB records).

The Court of Appeals identified another evidentiary error: Judge Hurd allowed the Onondaga County District Attorney to testify that he had dropped the charges against Alonzo, and it admitted the DA's letter to that effect into evidence. The DA said the charges against Alonzo were not legally viable, suggesting he was vouching for Alonzo's credibility. The DA should not have testified, the Court of Appeals says, because jurors may be unduly swayed by testimony from such a high-ranking and neutral public official, and some of his testimony "opined on an issue closely related to the central questions left for the jury," that is, the viability of the criminal charges against Alonzo. But this evidence, too, was harmless, the Court of Appeals says, not only because plaintiffs had a strong case with independent corroborating witnesses, but because the DA also testified that he was not expressing an opinion on the officers' credibility and had not determined whether they had probable cause to arrest Alonzo.

The next trial issue is whether the district court properly had the jury determine whether the officers had qualified immunity. That immunity allows public officials, including police officers, to avoid liability if they acted reasonably under the circumstances. Courts regard qualified immunity as a quasi-legal/factual inquiry. The jury tells the judge what happened by answering special interrogatories, and the judge then decides if those facts violated clearly-established law. For this reason, allowing the jury to determine the qualified immunity issue on its own was an abuse of discretion, the Second Circuit says. But that does not warrant a new trial because "even if the district court had properly reserved the ultimate legal decision for itself, the facts the jury necessarily found in rendering its decision foreclosed any argument that it was objectively reasonable for Defendants to believe that their actions did not violate Alonzo's rights."

That's a lot of evidentiary and trial-related rulings that the Court of Appeals held were an abuse of discretion. But this ruling tells us that even challengeable evidentiary rulings at trial do not necessarily warrant a new trial, as the harmless error standard allows the appellate court to determine if the errors really made a difference in the outcome.