Connecticut's prohibition against pornography in the prisons does not violate First Amendment

The State of Connecticut in 2012 overhauled its policies guiding when inmates can possess sexually-explicit materials. The corrections people issued guidelines which First Amendment advocates then challenged in court. The Court of Appeals holds these guidelines do not violate the First Amendment.

The case is Reynolds v. Quiros, issued on February 3. Prior to these guidelines, inmates had all sorts of pornography in their cells, which caused discipline and other problems in the jails, what the Second Circuit calls a "very sexually charged environment." Under the new rules, enacted after considerable deliberation and study, there is a total ban on pictorial depictions of sexual activity and nudity. But you can possess sexual images if the material, taken as a whole, has literary, artistic, educational, or scientific value. Written material can be banned if it poses a threat to security, good order, or discipline, or it facilitates criminal activity.

The trial court held a lengthy hearing on how these new rules were implemented. It held the rules do not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirms. Yes, inmates have some First Amendment rights, but they are limited to ensure security and order in the jails. Courts will defer to the judgment of prison officials in making these determinations. The ultimate test is "reasonableness," which gives these officials the benefit of the doubt and usually means the plaintiffs lose, as "reasonableness" is the lowest level of constitutional review, as per Supreme Court case law.

The Second Circuit (Bianco, Kearse and Cabranes) agrees with the district court, finding that (1) the corrections system had a legitimate need to restrict sexually-charged materials to avoid a hostile work environment for the staff (the evidence on this point is pretty disgusting); (2) these restrictions prevent fights among inmates and reduce inmate aggression overall; (3) these restrictions help in rehabilitating sex offenders; (4) the new rules are sufficiently neutral to satisfy Supreme Court standards (such as in Turner v. Safley (1987), still the go-to case on inmate speech issues; (5) and the standards are not too vague to be unenforceable.