EEOC right-to-sue issue is mooted by plaintiff's second lawsuit

This appeal had potential to clarify the law guiding when you can bring a lawsuit when the EEOC issues an early Right-to-Sue letter. But it ends with the Court of Appeals finding the case is moot, and the Court does not reach the EEOC issue.

The case is Stidhum v. 161-10 Hillside Auto Ave, LLC, a summary order issued on April 12. Under the rules, you cannot bring a Title VII employment discrimination case without first filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is authorized to investigate the charge of discrimination and attempt to settle the case. After six months, the EEOC will issue a Right-to-Sue Letter that allows you to file the lawsuit in court. The question is, what happens when the EEOC issues the Letter prior to the six months. Is the lawsuit legitimate? 

In this case, the EEOC terminated its investigation prior to the six-month deadline because it determined that it was unlikely it could complete the administrative processing. Hence the federal lawsuit, filed less than six-months after the charge was filed.

Within the last 10 years, some courts have said an early RTS letter is illegitimate and the federal lawsuit that follows must be dismissed. The Second Circuit has not addressed this issue. This appeal presented that issue, but the Court of Appeals (Bianco, Lohier and Robinson) does not resolve it because it finds the case is actually moot and that there is no appellate jurisdiction because plaintiff filed the same lawsuit again after the EEOC issued a new RTS letter, based on the same facts as the first lawsuit that yielded the premature RTS letter. She did this to get her Title VII dispute moving once and for all. "However, this appeal is resolved, Stidhum will be left in substantially the same position as she is now with the benefit of the new suit." As such, the Court of Appeals cannot give plaintiff any "effectual relief" from this appeal. As mootness is a jurisdictional issue, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.

What this means is the district court's ruling is vacated. That ruling said the lawsuit was premature because it was filed less than 180 days after the EEOC charge was filed. While the district observed that some courts have allowed such premature lawsuits, the court disagrees, reasoning, "permitting the agency to create an exception to the 180-day rule based on its perceived workload would diminish pressure on the agency to efficiently investigate and conciliate cases. And it would create incentives for the agency 'shift a large part of its workload to federal courts' at plaintiffs’ request. Ultimately, the statutory framework favored by either plaintiff or defendants would be a coherent one, but the statutory language makes clear that it is defendants’ framework that Congress chose." That reasoning is now vacated as per the Second Circuit's ruling in this case.