Pro se disability discrimination plaintiff wins appeal

This pro se plaintiff alleged that he suffered disability discrimination and then retaliation for requesting a reasonable accommodation. He lost on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) but takes up an appeal. We have ourselves the rare case where a pro se appellant wins the appeal against an established law firm, as the Court of Appeals finds he can win the retaliation claim.

The case is Ibela v. Allied Universal, a summary order issued on May 5. Plaintiff alleged he is bipolar. But the Court of Appeals (Cabranes, Lee and Bianco) rejects the underlying disability discrimination claim arising from his bipolar disorder because "A diagnosis alone is insufficient to establish disability under the statute." The Circuit cites Toyota Mfg v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), for that proposition. Plaintiff did not establish that his disorder impacted or substantially limited a major life activity, so that claim is gone.

But that does not mean plaintiff cannot win his retaliation claim. You can bring such a claim if you suffered an adverse action following a request for a reasonable accommodation provided you have a good faith belief that you suffered a disability. This rule ensures that no one will suffer retaliation unless their request for an accommodation was made in bad faith. Sort of a safety valve for employees in case they were wrong about their disability. The district court said that since plaintiff did not sufficiently allege he suffers a disability under the ADA, he cannot win his retaliation claim. But that is not the law, the Second Circuit says. What matters is you had a good faith belief that you did have a disability. Then you can sue for retaliation if something bad happens to you after requesting the reasonable accommodation.

Plaintiff has a retaliation case. Here is the Second Circuit's reasoning:

Ibela alleged that Nicholas began denying him work, reducing his hours, and denying him overtime after he requested a reasonable accommodation due to his bipolar disorder. These adverse actions occurred within two months of Ibela’s June 2019 reasonable accommodation request. 

 That two-month gap is enough to permit an inference of retaliation. The Court cites Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-Op  Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001), for that proposition. Gorman-Bakos states, “[A] plaintiff can indirectly establish a causal connection to support a discrimination or retaliation claim by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse employment action.”