Circuit takes up political-campaign employment discrimination case

This case raises two issues of interest: constructive discharge, and an obscure New York law that makes it illegal to fire someone because of their outside political activities. The plaintiff's case was dismissed in the district court, but the Court of Appeals rules in his favor, reviving the lawsuit.

The case is Truitt v. Salisbury Bank and Trust Company, issued on October 27. Plaintiff worked as a full-time mortgage officer. He wanted to run for the New York State Assembly as a Republican. When plaintiff told management that he wanted to run for office, management calculated that plaintiff could not perform his duties as a loan officer and serve in the State Legislature at the same time, as holding public office would require 65 days a year in Albany. Plaintiff was given a choice: continue employment with the bank or run for office. Plaintiff opted to run for office, telling management that he wanted to serve his community tie Teddy Roosevelt as the youngest Republican member of the State Assembly. Management ultimately told plaintiff that his employment with the bank "would not be continued" if he ran for office. (Plaintiff did run for office but lost the election).

State Labor Law 201-d makes it illegal to fail to hire, discharge or discriminate against anyone for engaging in political or legal recreational activities that take place outside of working hours. That includes running for political office. In resolving this case, the Court of Appeals uses the McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting model: plaintiff must make out a prima facie case and, if so, management must articulate a neutral reason for the adverse action. If that happens, plaintiff has to show that reason is false and that discrimination is the real reason. This is the first time the Second Circuit has used that familiar evidentiary model (normally used in Title VII and other discrimination cases) in a Labor Law discrimination case. 

First, plaintiff has demonstrated an adverse action because he was impermissibly forced to choose between his job and his run for political office. This kind of choice can constitute an adverse employment action. The Court of Appeals cites cases from around the country for this proposition, and it is now the law in the Second Circuit, which concludes, "a reasonable jury could find that the Bank subjected Truitt to an adverse employment action when it forced an ultimatum upon him "because of" his political activities. A reasonable jury could also find that, in requiring Truitt to abandon his campaign as a condition of retaining his employment, the Bank "'discriminate[d]' against him in the
conditions of his employment, in violation of the terms of the statute."

Nor did the bank advance a legitimate reason for this choice between working at the bank and running for office. While it's true that the Bank determined that holding public office in Albany would interfere with plaintiff's duties, the Court says that, regardless of whether plaintiff could hold both positions at the same time, "the record does not include evidence that the Bank had any reason to believe that Truitt's campaign would cause such interference" with his bank duties. In other words, the question is not whether holding office would interfere with the bank's operations, but whether his campaign would cause such interference.