Catholic school teacher cannot sue union for discrimination

The plaintiff was a theology teacher at the Notre Dame Academy in Staten Island, a Catholic school with a unionized workforce and a union contract that prohibited employment discrimination. Plaintiff was fired after he gave a lecture on "Racism as Sin." He sues the union because it would not, in the course of his grievance proceeding, claim that this discipline violated Title VII. That makes this a duty of fair representation claim under the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor-Management Relations Act. The question is whether plaintiff can litigate such a claim against the union as a parochial school teacher.

The case is Justino v. Federation of Catholic Teachers, Inc., issued on November 23. In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop (1979), the Supreme Court held that the NLRA does not allow teachers in church-operated schools to sue for unfair labor practices. The idea was that resolving such claims on the merits would require the courts to interfere with the First Amendment's religion clauses, as judges might have to second-guess religious principles in determining whether the plaintiff has a legitimate labor relations case. The question in this case is whether Catholic Bishop must be interpreted to prevent teachers in Catholic schools from also suing their labor unions in a DFR claim. 

Catholic Bishop bars plaintiff from proceeding with this claim. The reasoning in Catholic Bishop applies equally to DFR claims against labor unions representing parochial school teachers, holds the Court of Appeals (Sullivan, Lynch and Calabresi [who dissents because the case is time-barred and there was no need to decide this case on the merits]). Here is the reasoning:

since NLRA claims brought on behalf of parochial-school teachers would “in many instances” prompt their parochial-school employers to “respond[] that their challenged actions were mandated by their religious creeds,” the ALJs’ “resolution” of such claims would “necessarily involve [their] inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy- administrators and its relationship to the school’s religious mission.” That reasoning applies with no less force where – as here – an Article III court (rather than an ALJ) is “called upon” to “resolve” an NLRA claim brought directly by a parochial-school teacher (rather than by the NLRB on behalf of such teachers).

Put another way, even a discrimination claim against a labor union in the Catholic school context would require a judge to scrutinize the employer's justification in a manner that would delve into religious doctrine. The First Amendment prohibits such an inquiry, and the Supreme Court has reinforced this principle in the ministerial exception cases, which hold that the First Amendment prohibits most wrongful discharge suits against religious schools if the plaintiff took on certain certain religious duties in the workplace. While plaintiff insists that Catholic Bishop is no longer good law, the majority disagrees. And I can assure you that if this case ever reaches the Supreme Court, plaintiff will lose, as the Court is receptive to the analysis that Judge Sullivan advances here.