Pro se inmate wins civil rights appeal

You'd be surprised how many pro se inmates win their appeals in the Second Circuit. Many district courts will grant motions for summary judgment on these claims, and perhaps the inmates don't know what they are doing at that stage of the case and the case is easily dismissed, or the district courts are prematurely judging the cases. This action involves excessive force and First Amendment retaliation, and the case will proceed to trial unless it settles.

The case is Gunn v. Beschler, a summary order issued on April 5. Here are the rules for inmate excessive force cases: The plaintiff must show the defendant acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” and that “the conduct was objectively harmful enough . . . to reach constitutional dimensions.”  Plaintiff must also show the force was not "used in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline," but it was instead used "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”  That standard derives from Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir. 2003).  In addition, “de minimis uses of physical force” are insufficient to support a constitutional claim, “provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” That language is from Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). These standards give correction officers some leeway to maintain discipline in the prisons. 

But the Court of Appeals (Pooler, Merriam and Nardini) says a jury must sort this one out. "There is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Corrections Officer Beschler intentionally kicked Gunn hard in the shin with a booted foot, while Gunn was complying with an order to return to his cell in an uncrowded hall, resulting in pain for hours. Beschler denies that the kick took place." The district court did note that "a reasonable jury could conclude that the kick occurred and that it was 'unprovoked and unnecessary.'”  Yet the case was dismissed anyway. The Second Circuit finds the jury must determine whether "Beschler kicked Gunn for the sole purpose of humiliating or causing pain to him, and whether this use of force was of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind."

Plaintiff also has a First Amendment retaliation claim against Officer Perry. Plaintiff filed a grievance against Officer Perry, who then subjected plaintiff to a pat frisk a few months later. These grievances qualify as free speech. "A jury could infer the requisite causation here by finding that Officer Perry knew Gunn had filed a grievance against him and that June 11, 2013, was the first opportunity Perry had to retaliate against Gunn. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find a causal connection between Gunn’s  grievance relating to the March 29, 2013, pat frisk and the June 11, 2013, pat frisk." Another First Amendment retaliation claim will proceed against Officer Scheiber, who allegedly made retaliatory visits to Gunn's cell in January-February 2014 and presumably knew about Gunn's grievances in the jail. As the Court of Appeals notes, "the record contains evidence that Gunn was known by officers generally as an inmate who filed grievances." Yes, Gunn was a grievance-filer.

The fact that plaintiff wins the appeal does not mean he win the trial. Jurors may give the correction officers the benefit of the doubt and rule in their favor. Or maybe plaintiff has medical records to prove he was injured during the officer-kick. Juries are hard to predict. This is why most cases that survive summary judgment settle.