City Council may retrict political signs at public meetings

The plaintiffs showed up at a City Council meeting with signs and placards to protest the City's planned purchase of a military-style police vehicle. The front door at City Hall said they could not enter with any signs. The plaintiffs then filed a First Amendment lawsuit, claiming the signs and placards would not have disrupted the meeting. The Court of Appeals said there is no First Amendment violation.

The case is Tyler v. City of Kingston, issued on July 18. I represented the plaintiffs in this case and argued the appeal. Unlike parks and sidewalks, which are full public forums, City Council meetings are limited public forums, which means the government can restrict the content of your speech if the restrictions are reasonable. What is "reasonable" under the First Amendment? The cases hold that reasonableness in this context does not equate to the kind of deference that courts afford to the government in other contexts, such as the rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause. At least that's what I thought the cases held. Plaintiffs argued that, in the Rule 12 context, it is too early to credit the City's defense that the signs might disrupt the meetings, as there was no evidence that plaintiffs intended to interfere with the City's business.

The Court of Appeals holds, in its first case involving the prohibition of signs at public meetings, that the City Council is able to restrict signs because it has authority to regulate how public speech is delivered. That means the Council can have public comment sessions but prohibit quiet signage. While the signs may relate to matters on that meeting's agenda, the Court of Appeals holds, the signs may "still undermine the purpose for which the forum is created." Meaningful discourse at the public meetings may be undermined when constituents are holding signs. 

What about the reasonableness element of the limited public forum analysis" The Court says the sign restriction is reasonable because it will prevent any possibility that the signs and placards might turn the meetings into a picketing session. While the Complaint alleges plaintiffs had no intention of causing any such disruption, the Court says that "the reasonableness of a restriction may also be determined with reference to the disruption or distraction that would result if all groups like the group at issue sought access." Under what the Court deems a "common sense" approach to this issue, "preventing disruptive activity is a legitimate and common-sense government interest taht can justify restrictions on speech in limited public fora."