Court expansively interprets attorneys' fees provision in student disability law

A lesser-known civil rights law is the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, which has been on the books for decades but is mostly known to attorneys who challenge the educational placements of their special-needs children in public schools. If the parents and the school disagree about that placement, they undergo a process (which may include an evidentiary hearing), and if the parents win, they can recover attorneys' fees. This case is about the attorneys' fees.

The case is J.S. v. New York State Dept. of Corrections and Community Supervision, issued on August 3. Plaintiff has a learning disability. He was an inmate in New York who, as a 20-year-old, won his administrative proceeding against DOCCS, which had denied him an appropriate education. He then sought approximately $72,000 in attorneys' fees and costs in federal court, which denied his motion because J.S. was not a "parent" under the IDEA and thus not eligible to recover fees. J.S. appeals to the Second Circuit (Carney, Cabranes and Robinson), which reverses, and in this case of first impression, awards J.S. his attorneys' fees.

Under the statute, "a prevailing party who is a parent of a child with a disability" may sue in federal court to recover attorneys' fees. The statutory definition of "parent of a child with a disability" does not expressly include a child with a disability. On the other hand, the Court finds that "parent" under the IDEA does not have the same meaning as a dictionary definition. So we have a case of statutory interpretation. The Court finds that the statute does allow children, over the age of 18 who act on their own behalf and assume responsibilities for their own welfare, including their educational rights, may qualify for fees under the IDEA.

The Court writes, that, while J.S. was still a "child with a disability" under the IDEA, he was no longer a "minor" under state law and was responsible for his own welfare. "To vindicate his rights under the IDEA, J.S. was legally entitled to retain and direct his own attorneys if he did not appear pro se. He could bring the administrative proceeding and this lawsuit in his own name." 

Conclusion: 

the operative phrase in the IDEA—“an individual who is legally responsible for the child’s welfare”—must be read to include any such individual, including an individual who is a “child with a disability” and who is responsible under state law for their own welfare. Were it not so, individuals with disabilities who are between the ages of 18 and 21, inclusive, and not the subject of an incapacity determination, could be entitled to educational services under the IDEA but, paradoxically, hobbled in any effort to vindicate their rights. Such a result, we believe, is neither required by the IDEA’s text, intended by Congress, nor consistent with its purposes.