Port Authority might be on the hook for Bridgegate legal expenses

Remember "Bridgegate"? That was a New Jersey scandal when Governor Chris Christie was accused of shutting down traffic around the George Washington Bridge to punish the mayor of Fort Lee for not supporting Christine's campaign for governor. That shutdown caused great havoc in Fort Lee. Various public officials, including the plaintiff in this case, were prosecuted over this scandal, but his conviction was overturned, and he sued the Port Authority for indemnification covering his roughly $4 million in legal expenses he incurred in defending himself. Is Port Authority on the hook for these legal expenses? 

The case is Baroni v. Port Authority, issued on December 2. Plaintiff was the deputy executive director of the Port Authority. As the Court of Appeals (Walker, Carney and Menashi) describes the genesis of this case:

While serving in that position in September 2013, Baroni approved a plan to modify the deployment of traffic cones in the New Jersey approaches to the George Washington Bridge. The plan substantially increased traffic for residents of Fort Lee, New Jersey. It was reported in the press that the plan aimed to retaliate against the mayor of Fort Lee, who had refused to endorse then-Governor Chris Christie for re-election. The resulting political scandal was known as “Bridgegate.” Baroni became a subject of investigations by the New Jersey Legislature and the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey.

Baroni went through the wringer in this case, having to respond to legislative subpoenas and criminal charges. But Port Authority would not indemnify him for the legal expenses in fighting off the legislative and criminal charges. Baroni was convicted in criminal court, but he was ultimately exonerated after the U.S. Supreme Court held that the fraud counts were not actionable under federal law. Yet, while plaintiff is a free man with a clean record, he spent millions of dollars in defending himself, and public officials, including those who work for the Port Authority, usually do not have this kind of money. Port Authority refused to indemnify plaintiff, who sued Port Authority in federal court for reimbursement of his legal fees.

This is not an easy case because Port Authority argued that it has sovereign immunity, meaning it cannot be sued under the Eleventh Amendment, which says you cannot sue the state unless the state has waived such immunity. But the Supreme Court has already addressed this issue, in Hess v. Port Authority, 513 U.S. 30 (1994), holding that Port Authority "is not cloaked with the Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court." Bi-state entitles like Port Authority, which regulate services in New York and New Jersey, do not resemble the sovereign states that are normally protected under the Eleventh Amendment. The reason this remains in dispute for plaintiff is that the Second Circuit, in Caceres v. Port Authority, 631 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 2011), made incorrect assumptions in interpreting Hess that supported the Port Authority in this case. Hess remains the primary authority for plaintiff. The complexity of this issue is one reason why it took nearly two years for the Court of Appeals to decide this case following oral argument.

What it means for plaintiff is the case cannot be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties will continue to fight over whether Port Authority must reimburse him for the approximately $4 million in legal fees. The case is also remanded so that plaintiff can amend his complaint to address another issue that was held against him in the district court: whether he complied with certain notice-of-claims filing requirements in order to maintain this lawsuit against Port Authority. 

How does Muldrow affect sexual harassment "severe or pervasive" cases?

In 2024, the Supreme Court changed the rules guiding adverse employment actions under Title VII, holding that plaintiffs can sue over personnel decisions that inflict "some harm" even if the harm is not "material," such as termination, demotion, or docked pay. That case, Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), rejected the Second Circuit's materiality test and made it easier for plaintiffs to win their cases. The question is now whether Muldrow has any effect on the "severe or pervasive" test governing hostile work environment cases.

In Ziparo v. CSX Transportation, issued on November 25, the Second Circuit (Sack, Nardini and Perez) addresses this issue in a footnote. The Court did not have squarely resolve this question because it was not central to Ziparo's case. But it does show this issue is on the Second Circuit's radar. Look at it this way: the existence of a hostile work environment in a sexual or racial harassment case is the adverse action over which the plaintiff is bringing the lawsuit. Is the "severe or pervasive" standard guiding whether the plaintiff suffered a hostile work environment affected by Muldrow? The Second Circuit addresses this in a footnote:

The effect of Muldrow on discriminatory hostile work environment claims is still unclear: Post-Muldrow, the Sixth Circuit has held that Muldrow applies to such claims and no longer requires “plaintiffs to show ‘significant’ harm.” McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, 117 F.4th 887, 904 (6th Cir. 2024). But see Dike v. Columbia Hosp. Corp. of Bay Area, No. 24-40058, 2025 WL 315126, at *5 n.25 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025) (summary order) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Muldrow changed the severe-or-pervasive test). We have not yet opined on Muldrow’s impact on discriminatory hostile work environment claims,

and the question is not before us here.

This footnote is an invitation for plaintiffs' lawyers to attack the "severe or pervasive" test -- regarded as a burdensome legal standard for plaintiffs -- has having been implicitly repudiated by Muldrow. 

Plaintiff recovers damages under Title VII despite adverse Section 1983 holding on summary judgment -- Krause v. Kelahan, Part II

This sex discrimination verdict spent 2.5 years under review by the Second Circuit, which sustained the plaintiff's win but resolved a slew of evidentiary and trial rulings along the way, making this among the more complicated Title VII cases in the Court of Appeals in recent years. At this link, I discuss the evidence that supported the jury's finding that the defendant Superintendent of Schools orchestrated the plaintiff's termination as high school principal. This time, I discuss an interesting issue relating to the plaintiff's entitlement to damages.

The case is Krause v. Kelahan, issued on December 3. I briefed the appeal, which was argued by A.J. Bosman, who tried the case. My write-up on the sex discrimination ruling is here. 

The lawsuit originally asserted two related claims in support of plaintiff's position that she was fired because of her sex. She sued under Title VII and also under Section 1983, which enforces the Equal Protection Clause, which protects those who work for public (but not private) employers. 

On the summary judgment motion, the trial court split the baby: it held that plaintiff can prevail on her Title VII claim but cannot prevail under Section 1983. The reason for this is the different burdens of proof guiding both claims. Under Title VII, the plaintiff can win if discrimination was a motivating factor, even if it is not a determinative factor. If discrimination plays a substantial role in the termination, then the defendant has violated Title VII. But under Section 1983, to win, the plaintiff has to show that sex discrimination played a determinative, or but-for, role in the personnel decision. The discrimination must have made the difference in the plaintiff's termination. The jury may not pay much attention to these distinctions, but courts do. On summary judgment, the district court said that plaintiff can, at best, prove that sex discrimination was the motivating factor in her termination but not the determinative factor. The court reached this decision in the belief that management had some decent reasons to fire plaintiff, even if those reasons were not fully dispositive on paper. 

Taking things a step further, if the plaintiff wins under Title VII, the jury has to decide if the defendant would have fired her even without the discriminatory intent. If so, then the discriminatory intent is not enough to win any damages (though she can still win injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and declaratory relief). On appeal, having lost at trial on the Title VII claim, defendant argued that, since the trial court on summary judgment found that discrimination was not the but-for cause of the plaintiff's termination, that finding necessarily means that the school district would have fired plaintiff even without the discriminatory intent, and the jury's finding that the district violated Title VII does not entitle her to any damages at all. In other words, defendant used the Section 1983 holding on the summary judgment motion in an effort to deprive the plaintiff of any damages on her successful Title VII claim. This argument would have deprived plaintiff of the $400,000+ in damages awarded by the jury.

The Court of Appeals (Carney, Lee and Sullivan [dissenting]) rejected the school district's argument, noting that under Title VII, the defendant has the burden of proving it would have fired plaintiff even without the discriminatory intent, and under Section 1983, plaintiff has the burden of proving that discriminatory intent was the determinative factor in her termination. The Court of Appeals reasons:

At summary judgment, the District Court never considered the question that would be required to find in Defendants’ favor on this defense: whether, with the burden of proof resting on Defendants, they had established that they would have inevitably terminated Krause for non-discriminatory reasons. Nor should the District Court have decided this issue, given that Defendants never raised a same-decision defense in their summary judgment briefing. They cannot now claim that the District Court erred in failing to reach an issue that they did not squarely present.

In a footnote, the Court of Appeals expands this holding further, noting that "even if the District Court should in some way have reached this issue at the summary judgment stage, this Court will not ordinarily hear a post-trial challenge to a district court’s summary judgment ruling. Instead, the Court considers whether the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence." As the jury concluded that Defendants had not “established by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have made the same decision [to terminate Krause] in the absence of gender discrimination,” and that verdict was supported by substantial evidence, defendants' argument, though creative, must fail. In other words, the jury's verdict takes precedence over anything the trial court said on the summary judgment motion.

This issue is the first time I have seen any federal court address whether a defendant's favorable result under Section 1983 on summary judgment can deprive the plaintiff of any damages upon a successful Title VII verdict at trial. One reason this is a new issue is that the courts, only in the last 15 years or so, have held that most civil rights statutes carry the "but-for" causation test, unlike Title VII, which permits a trial victory if the plaintiff merely proves that discrimination was a motivating factor in the adverse personnel action.

2d Circuit sustains sex discrimination verdict -- Krause v. Kehahan, Part I

The Court of Appeals has upheld a sex discrimination verdict against the Superintendent of Schools in Central New York who orchestrated the termination of a high school principal for pretextual reasons after making disparaging remarks about women generally treating them with hostility in the workplace.

The case is Krause v. Kelahan, issued on December 3, more than 20 months after oral argument. I briefed the appeal on plaintiff's behalf, which was argued by the plaintiff's trial counsel, A.J. Bosman. This case raises multiple issues, as evidenced by the lengthy period of time for the Second Circuit (Carney, Lee and Sullivan [dissenting]) to resolve the case. This blog entry covers the issue of whether there was enough evidence of defendant's intent to discriminate on the basis of sex, which yielded a damages award in excess of $400,000.

The majority notes "Kelahan's disrespectful and demeaning behavior towards the women with whom he worked," as follows: (1) plaintiff saw him scream at a female BOCES employee during a phone call with a "level of viciousness and [a] level of hostility" as he looked squarely at plaintiff during this tirade; (2) he threatened to fire plaintiff at the end of her first year on the job, once using a vulgarity in making this clear ("if you fuck this up, I will fire you, but good luck and have fun"); (3) disparaging plaintiff's office decorations as "very girly" and frequently making sarcastic and condescending comments about her parenting skills; (4) attacking plaintiff's need to leave work early to care for her injured daughter by stating, "That's why I hate working with women so much. They are always so emotional"; (5) frequently commenting on the clothing choices of his female staff;  and (6) developing better and friendlier relationships with his male employees than with plaintiff. Other witnesses corroborated some of this evidence, i.e., plaintiff's work mentor testified that plaintiff mentioned Kelahan's objection about working with "emotional" women. Other witnesses recalled that Keagan treated plaintiff worse than male faculty and staff, and a member of the Board of Education warned the Board about Kelahan's bullying behavior. Not only did this evidence support the wrongful discharge claim but the hostile work environment verdict, which defendants did not appeal.

This evidence supports the finding that gender animus motivated Kelahan to treat plaintiff badly and ultimately push for plaintiffs termination.  Note that the record contains limited evidence of Kelahan's expressly sexist behavior toward plaintiff but additional evidence of the harsh way that he treated women in general in the workplace. The jury was allowed to find that all this evidence demonstrated hostility toward women.

The appeal included numerous evidentiary and trial issues, including the trial judge's comment during trial about a legal principle that arguably did not apply to this case and which favored plaintiff's position. The Court of Appeals finds these issues either fell within the trial court's discretion or were harmless error that did not warrant a new trial. The Second Circuit also held the jury was able to reject the defendants' claim that plaintiff was fired for sex-neutral reasons relating to job performance. Future blog posts will cover these issues. 

Pro-life organization wins First Amendment injunction against State of New York

An anti-abortion organization sued the State of New York to prevent the Attorney General from proceeding against groups who wish to speak out against the use of abortion pills. The state has gone after similar groups who publicly criticized the abortion pills, claiming these public statements violate the state's anti-fraud laws. The plaintiffs in this case do not want similar enforcement actions against them. Hence, this First Amendment lawsuit claiming their speech is protected under the Constitution and cannot be the subject of the state's fraud lawsuits. The plaintiffs win.

The case is National Institution of Family and Life Advocates v. James, issued on December 1. The other anti-abortion groups said on websites and elsewhere that the abortion pill has serious health consequences for women. But the State of New York sued them under the General Business Law on the basis that these public statements misrepresented the efficacy and safety of abortion pill reversal drugs, also known as APR. 

The district court held, and the Court of Appeals (Bianco, Nathan and Lee) agrees, that the plaintiffs' speech in this case is protected under the First Amendment as noncommercial speech, and the state is unable to advance a compelling reason to restrict speech like this. The content-based speech restrictions that the state has pursued against other anti-abortion organizations, the Second Circuit says, is not commercial speech, which carries fewer constitutional protections than political, moral, or religious speech. The informational speech advocated by plaintiffs does not propose a commercial transaction and instead covers their anti-abortion, moral and religious advocacy, as well as womens' health concerns. "To hold otherwise could potentially subject a sweeping range of non-profits to regulation of their speech for providing the public with information and resources concerning critical services," the Court writes. 

Once the Court of Appeals finds the plaintiffs here will prevail on the merits of their constitutional challenge, the remaining elements of their preliminary injunction application are less complicated. The loss of constitutional freedoms constitutes irreparable harm. Such harm is not speculative here, as the state has gone after similar organizations for the speech that plaintiffs want to express in this case.  

Railroad whistleblower will get his retaliation trial

The Court of Appeals has reinstated a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit filed by a railroad employee who claims he suffered the consequences after he opposed their efforts to falsify railroad safety logs. This ruling clarifies the standards guiding such cases under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), which provides a more plaintiff-friendly burden of proof.

The case is Ziparo v. CSX Transportation, Inc., issued on November 25. This case last reached the Court of Appeals in 2023, when it held that plaintiff had engaged in protected activity in objecting that the work-order falsification requests were creating an unsafe work environment by placing too much stress on the plaintiff who was therefore unable to properly perform his duties, thus further imperiling railroad safety. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that plaintiff's other acts were not protected under the statute and he could not prove a causal connection between his protected activity and the termination of his employment.

The record shows that plaintiff's supervisors stood to gain financially if he falsified the safety records: they would earn higher bonuses. But railroad safety is nothing to play games with. This pressure caused plaintiff to lose focus, and after plaintiff complained to his supervisors about this, they selectively wrote him up for discipline, micromanaged his job performance, threatened to fire him and, after plaintiff reported all of this to the company's ethics hotline, they fired him after he misaligned a train switch, which could have caused a derailment, even though only 6 of the 17 employees who had previously committed similar misconduct were not fired. 

Wow have a lot of legal issues here. First. the Court of Appeals (Sack, Nardini and Perez) holds that, under the Supreme Court's ruling in Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, 601 U.S. 23 (2024), which involved the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), the comparable FRSA only requires the plaintiff to show the protected activity was merely a contributing factor to the adverse employment, unlike other civil rights statutes, which carry a less plaintiff-friendly but-for causation model. If the plaintiff makes out that prima facie case, to prevail, the employer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision even without the whistleblowing activity. Again, this contrasts with Title VII, where the employer need only articulate a neutral reason for the termination and the plaintiff must prove that reason was a pretext for retaliation. Under the clear and convincing evidence test, the employer must show "the truth of its factual contentions are highly probable." You just don't see language like this in other employment laws, owing to the importance Congress placed on the rights of railroad whistleblowers whose speech may be matters of life and death.

This analysis leads the Second Circuit to overrule the contrary Tompkins v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., 983 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2020), decided prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Murray which said, contrary to Tompkins, that the plaintiff need not prove retaliatory intent under SOX and, in turn, the FRSA. And, while Tompkins held that the retaliation plaintiff most prove more than a temporal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action, since Murray does not require the plaintiff to prove retaliatory animus or motive, the temporal proximity test in Tompkins is no longer good law, and the plaintiff need only show temporal proximity without the heightened burden of proof commanded by Tomkins. Still, the temporal proximity must be close enough to permit an inference of retaliation, and the Court of Appeals approvingly cites employment discrimination cases holding that up to 5 months may be enough. As the Court of Appeals sums up:

An FRSA plaintiff can therefore withstand summary judgment on causation so long as they proffer sufficient evidence—direct or circumstantial, including evidence of temporal proximity—from which a reasonable jury could infer that the plaintiff’s protected activity contributed, in any way, to the challenged adverse action.

All of this helps plaintiff win the appeal, reversing summary judgment and remanding the case for trial. Here is what the Court of Appeals did:

1. Plaintiff's formal and informal complaints were protected under the statute. So long as plaintiff reasonably believed the demands imposed on him by supervisors were creating an unsafe working environment, causing him to become stressed and distracted and unable to focus on his safety-related duties, he could not suffer retaliation for his complaints about this kind of supervisory abuse.

2. A retaliatory hostile work environment is actionable under the statute. The statute prohibits "discharging, demoting, suspending, reprimanding, or in any other way discriminating against an employee" for engaging in protected activity. That language necessarily prohibits a retaliatory hostile work environment. While Title VII imposes a high burden on plaintiffs to prove a hostile work environment ("severe or pervasive"), the Title VII retaliation cases, including Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), which prohibits any retaliation that would dissuade a reasonable employee from speaking out, allows plaintiffs in these cases to merely show that any form of retaliatory harassment that would dissuade the plaintiff is actionable, such as increased scrutiny, selective discipline and screaming at the plaintiff on a daily basis. 

3. The jury may find that the whistleblowing was a contributing factor (even if only played a "small role") in plaintiff's discipline, including termination, due to tight temporal proximity between the two events, the supervisors' admissions that they exhibited hostility or antagonism toward him, particularly after he blew the whistle. The court writes, "had Ziparo not repeatedly made unheeded safety complaints, perhaps his protected activity would not have created escalating 'tension and animosity' that culminated in" his supervisors' threats to fire him. 

4. The jury may find that CSX cannot prove its affirmative defense that it would have fired the plaintiff even without the whistleblowing. While defendant further argued it would have fired plaintiff in any event because he screwed up a track switch and might have caused a derailment, under the clear and convincing evidence framework, we don't ask what management could have done in isolation but what it would have done without the whistleblowing. Since defendant only fired 6 of the 17 employees who engaged similar misconduct, the jury may find it was "highly probable or reasonably certain" that CSX would not have fired plaintiff without the whistleblowing. "In other words, CSX usually retains employees who erred as Ziparo did."

Murder conviction sustained despite claim that jurors made racist remarks during trial

The New York Court of Appeals has sustained murder verdict, rejecting the defendant's arguments that a racially-biased jury tainted the process. 

The case is State v. Wiggins, issued on November 26. The defendant was charged with murder in Buffalo. Witnesses said the shooter wore a cream-colored or beige shirt with a certain pattern, and white pants. Surveillance video showed three people firing weapons but it was impossible to make out their faces. Another surveillance video showed the defendant about 12 hours prior to the shooting wearing the same clothing. An expert linked the gun that fired the fatal shot to the person wearing the white pants and light-colored shirt in the video. This was a true circumstantial evidence case.

During trial, a juror told the judge that someone on the jury made a racist statement, that all Black people look the same at night. The judge and trial counsel then interviewed the juror who wrote the note (juror no. 5) and the juror who allegedly made the racist comment (juror no. 10). In these interviews, juror no. 5 said six jurors in total made racist statements in deliberations but that they had "changed their mind" a day later and had apologized for their comments after juror no. 5 had confronted them. After juror no. 10 denied making the statement.The trial court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial, and the Appellate Division agreed.

Over a dissent from Judge Rivera, the Court of Appeals, after noting that mistrials are warranted when the defendant is judged by racially-biased jury, holds that the trial court in this case handled this issue conscientiously and satisfied itself that the jury could be fair and impartial. The Court writes:

 As the Appellate Division noted, the trial judge "was effectively tasked with determining whether the answers elicited [from the jurors] provided evidence of racial bias potentially affecting jury deliberations or instead supported the conclusion that, following an initial rushed session, there was a frank discussion among the jurors about racial bias (and the appearance thereof) that prompted a closer look at the evidence." The mere fact that race entered the jury's deliberations does not establish that racial bias infected their verdict. Jurors discussing identification evidence—particularly the difficulty of identifying individuals in nighttime, black and white video footage—may necessarily touch upon physical characteristics including race without harboring or expressing racial animus. Here, the record indicates that the discussion at issue arose in the specific context of evaluating the crime scene surveillance video and whether the grainy nighttime footage could support any identification beyond linking the shooter's distinctive clothing to defendant.

Here, the judge was aware of the conduct of the jurors throughout the proceedings, observed the demeanor of the jurors as they were questioned on the issue of racial bias, evaluated their responses, and reasonably concluded on this record that what Juror 5 perceived as racial bias was in fact a discussion about the identification evidence, some of which, as the court noted in its post-trial decision denying the motion to set aside the verdict, may have been misinterpreted. As to the other unidentified jurors allegedly harboring some form of racial bias, defense counsel declined to request that the court question them individually (and, indeed, argued that the court should not do so), and therefore "the only asserted error preserved for appellate review was the denial of the motion for a mistrial" Our role is not to substitute our judgment as to the appropriate remedy for that of the trial judge.

Second Amendment does not prohibit serial number obliteration prosecution

When the Supreme Court in 2008 ruled that the Second Amendment recognizes a personal right of gun ownership, it not only opened the door to lawsuits challenging gun-control regulations. We've seen that share of cases reach the Second Circuit. This case, however, is a criminal manner in which the defendant was charged with a gun-related offense. He was found guilty but now challenges the judgment under the Second Amendment.

The case is United States v, Gomez, issued on November 17. Defendant was charged with possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number. He argues now that the Supreme Court's recent Second Amendment ruling, New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), many gun regulations are subject to review because the Supreme Court will strike them down unless similar laws were on the books when the Bill of Rights were adopted in 1791. Since the constitutional framers did not anticipate every problem that might have arisen over 200 years later, many gun laws will be stricken under Bruen.

But not this one. The statute here makes it illegal to remove or tamper with the serial number on a gun that may enter interstate commerce. Was there anything like this on the books when the Constitution was drafted all those years ago? The Court of Appeals (Kearse, Jacobs and Lohier) notes that individual self defense is the central right promoted under the Second Amendment. The issue, then, is whether this statute infringes on the right of self defense. It does not. Protecting the integrity of the serial number "merely regulates a nonfunctional feature: the serial number." The defendant was able to defend himself without removing or altering the serial number.

Free speech retaliation claim fails as speculative

The plaintiff sued his employer, the Onondaga County Sheriff's Department, under the First Amendment, claiming he was disciplined for speaking out: that another officer was having a sexual relationship with a confidential informant. He also claimed he was disciplined for acting on an assault report that another officer had ignored, But the courts say he has no case.

The case is Murphy v. Onondaga County, a summary order issued on November 18. Even if plaintiff spoke out on matters of public concern (a necessary prerequisite to bringing a speech retaliation claim), he cannot prove causation, that is, he cannot link his speech with the discipline.

First, his appellate brief does not challenge the trial court's causation analysis. That is waiver. But even if he did not waive this argument, summary judgment was proper because, as the district court stated, "“[a] span of over two years between [this supposedly protected activity and adverse action] is far too attenuated to create a jury question on causation.” 

The Court of Appeals has been all over the place on how long is too long to draw an inference of causation in retaliation cases. Unless you have direct evidence (such as the decisionmaker's admission somewhere in the record that he took action against the plaintiff because of his protected activity), these cases are usually won and lost on circumstantial evidence. A close-in-time adverse action following the protected speech may support a finding of causation, but courts review these arguments on a case-by-case basis. Sometimes three months is too long, and sometimes eight months is not too long. But two years is always too long in these cases. We may hold grudges for that long in real life, but a two year gap in the courtroom is speculative, and judges do not want to hold people, especially public officials, liable based on speculation. There is no bright line in these cases, but two years will exceed any line that the Court of Appeals (Parker, Carney and Livingston) is willing to draw.
  

Circuit Court rejects proportionality in sizing up attorneys' fees under Vermont law

This case is a lesson for attorneys, but also for clients. This whistleblower claim in Vermont went to trial, and the jury awarded the plaintiff over $3.2 million in damages. The court ordered a new trial, and a second jury awarded only $55,000 in damages. That's the lesson for clients: you never know with a jury. The lesson for attorneys is how to award attorneys' fees when they greatly outweigh the damages.

The case is Cole v. Foxmar, Inc., issued on November 12. Vermont has its own occupational safety and health act, and it allows prevailing parties to recover their attorneys' fees. Since the case went to trial twice, the fees are quite high: plaintiff's lawyer requested over $240,000 in fees and another $18,000 in costs. But the trial court reduced the overall award by 30 percent because such downward adjustment was appropriate "based on Cole's overall success." In other words, the judge reduced the fees because they were out of proportion with the damages.

Federal fee-shifting statutes prohibit this kind of downward departure on proportionality grounds. The policy is that many civil rights cases do not yield large damages awards, but we still need to attract good lawyers to bring the cases. So we often see the fees outnumber the damages. Does that policy guide cases brought under Vermont law? That's the question before the Second Circuit (Raggi, Wesley and Perez), which holds that the policy does in fact apply and we can't reduce the attorneys' fees simply because they greatly outweigh the damage award.

While Vermont law permits trial courts to consider the litigation results obtained by the prevailing plaintiff in calculating attorneys' fees, "proportionality -- i.e., the mathematical relationship between a plaintiff's damages award and the plaintiff's attorneys' fees award -- is not a permissible measure of a plaintiff's degree of success under Vermont law." The Second Circuit cites Vermont cases for this proposition. This ruling aligns Vermont law with federal law. The case returns to the trial court to recalculate the attorneys' fees.

Million dollar personal injury verdict is affirmed on appeal

This personal injury case against BMW went to trial in federal court. The plaintiff lost part of his thumb because the car automatically shuts the door under its "sort close" feature when the door is six millimeters from being closed. The lawsuit was filed under the General Business Law, which prohibits consumer fraud, and general personal injury principles. The Court of Appeals upholds the verdict.

The case is Boateng v. BMW, a summary order issued on November 10. The "soft close" feature is one of those bells and whistles that automobile manufacturers put into the car that only cause more problems later on, and when they stop working you have to pay a fortune to have it fixed. 

BMW argued that plaintiff should not have won the trial because "(1) it is a matter of common sense that fingers and body parts should not be put in the path of closing doors, (2) warnings in the car’s owner’s manual adequately warned of the risk of amputation-like injuries, (3) and even though BMW had received numerous customer reports of injuries from soft close doors, there was no omission of material information because soft close doors are supposedly statistically no more dangerous than normal doors and the number of customer complaints was relatively small." 

The jury was able to reject these defenses, the Court of Appeals (Lynch, Nardini and Menashi) holds, because the evidence shows that soft close doors are designed to exert substantially more force (134.885 to 224.809 pounds) than the amount of force required to fracture a thumb (95 to 100 pounds), and that the doors would stop for certain obstructions—like a steel bar—but not a finger.  The jury was also able to find that the "common sense" argument fails because a reasonable consumer would not know there was any risk of amputation upon accident activation of the soft close doors. And the jury was also able to find that the soft-related warning in the owner's manual, which warned of a "danger of pinching," was not enough to put someone on notice that they might risk amputation. 

The jury awarded plaintiff more than $250,00 in lost wages. That amount is fair, the Court says, in light of plaintiff's salary, the extent of his work week, and losing 56 weeks of work. 

As for pain and suffering, the jury awarded him $800,000 for past pain and suffering, and $850,000 in future pain and suffering. Under New York law, these amounts do not significantly deviate from prior awards in similar cases. The trial court, in reaching the same result, noted there are different kinds of amputation injuries: there is the sharp injury and there is the crush injury, like plaintiffs. And the less said about these injuries, the better. You also don't want to know about the cases summaries in this opinion that the Second Circuit cited in upholding plaintiff's damages awards. Suffice to say, these cases are brutal. Bottom line is that plaintiff's damages award is in line with the crush injury verdicts. 

2d Circuit returns Stormy Daniels/Trump payoff case to SDNY for further review

The Court of Appeals has revived an effort by Donald Trump to remove his New York City criminal case from state court to federal court. Although a jury has already convicted Trump of fraud relating to his $130,000 payout to an adult film star, the federal court will now have to decide how the Supreme Court's recent presidential immunity might impact the conviction.

The case is Trump v. State of New York, issued on November 6. You know this case: it started when Stormy Daniels said she had a one-night stand with Trump many years ago and threatened to publicize the rendezvous prior to the 2016 election. It was believed, at least at that time, that this kind of pre-election revelation might make a difference. Trump's appeal from that conviction is pending in the state appellate courts. But this case, asserting presidential immunity, is another way to attack that conviction.

The case might be suitable for review by a federal court if the evidence at trial touched upon presidential immunity issues. I am sure that paying off Stormy Daniels, by itself, does not qualify as a core presidential function for which the president has complete immunity. There is nothing in the Constitution that speaks to paying hush money to a former lover. But in the immunity decision from July 2024, the Supreme Court also said that even evidence of a president's immunized officials is inadmissible at trial. That means that if the criminal charge does not arise from a core presidential action, i.e., overseeing foreign policy, evidence in support of the criminal charge cannot draw from an official act. 

The Trump legal team argues that the Stormy Daniels conviction incorporated "official acts" evidence: (1) Trump allegedly told his attorney-fixer, Stephen Cohen, that a Federal Election Commission inquiry would be taken care of by the Attorney General, (2) testimony from Trump's Communications Director about private conversations with Trump about Cohen and his activities, and (3) evidence of Trump's official statements in 2018 via Twitter. The jury heard this evidence. Was this evidence enough to upset the criminal conviction? Would the conviction overturned simply because the jury heard this evidence? Nobody knows the answer to these questions.

While the district court in this case rejected Trump's argument that this criminal case should be handled in federal court, the Court of Appeals (Lohier, Carney and Perez) says the district court did not provide a sufficiently comprehensive analysis of this issue. The case thus returns to the Southern District of New York for that analysis. If the trial court again rules against Trump, this case will return to the Second Circuit (unless the state appellate courts throw out the conviction altogether) and if that effort fails, it will proceed to the Supreme Court.

These cases are all taking forever to resolve because we have never had a president who faced criminal charges after leaving office. This unprecedented circumstance has required the state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court, to articulate new legal standards and shoehorn these cases into old legal standards. That process takes time. My guess is it will take a few years for the Stormy Daniels payoff case will not be fully resolved, and if issues like this reach the Supreme Court, how the Justices deal with them is anyone's guess.  

Lawsuit among musicians shows the difficulties in winning a defamation case in New York

This is a complex defamation claim in which a woman publicly claimed her former mentor subjected her to sexual harassment. The mentor claims this was untrue and he sued her for defamation. The Court of Appeals holds there is no actionable defamation because the woman's statements were protected opinion. Since opinion is distinct from factual statements, there is no case.

The case is Coleman v. Grand, issued on November 3. A few preliminaries: first, this case was argued in May 2022 but then on hold because the New York Court of Appeals was considering whether the anti-SLAPP law (prohibiting strategic lawsuits against public participation) had retroactive effect, which would have impacted this case. Turns out the State Court of Appeals held the law was not retroactive. Second, the parties in this case are musicians: the plaintiff mentored the defendant on saxophone. 

In 2017, defendant circulated a letter to about 40 friends and colleagues in the music industry, claiming she had an intermittent quid quo quo sexual relationship with plaintiff, a prominent musician who was 35 years her senior. In the letter, defendant said the plaintiff pressured her into a sexual relationship in exchange for his training and mentorship, and that he routinely pressured her to be intimate with him, made her share a hotel room with him when they traveled for work, would not take "no" for an answer, and once got into bed with her and kissed her after she told him she did not want to sleep with him. She described these incidents as sexual harassment.

Under New York law, unflattering but false facts are defamation. Opinion is not defamation. The Court of Appeals (Sullivan, Chin and Menashi [in dissent]) holds as follows:

(1) claiming that plaintiff "convinced" her to be intimate is not defamation because we don't have enough facts to suggest anything beyond her regrets at this intimacy, and the more reasonable interpretation is that plaintiff merely persuaded defendant to become intimate. This portion of defendant's letter instead describes her "subjective feelings about their relationship," or her nonactionable opinion.

(2) her claim that plaintiff sexually harassed her is also nonactionable because "sexual harassment" "is often a subjective inquiry that permits differing opinions among those involved in, or aware of, the alleged conduct." New York courts hold that allegations of harassment are not defamation because "harassment" is an imprecise term. While the defendant claimed the harassment consisted of getting angry when she refused him sex, photographing her while sleeping, and woke her up half-naked and kissing her on the lips, the Court holds that any conclusion that this amounted to sexual harassment is subjective and provides no basis for a defamation claim. 

(3) defendant's claim that the harassment began after she ended the relationship is also not defamatory because her statement that she no longer wanted a relationship with plaintiff does not expose him to shame or public ridicule, only discomfort. Defamation requires public contempt, not discomfort. As for the harassment allegation, for the reasons outlined above, that is not defamatory.

 

(4) the allegation that defendant was forced to go to plaintiff's room is not actionable, either, as plaintiff takes the defendant's statement out of context; her own letter states she "agreed" to share the room with plaintiff, and nothing in the letter implies that plaintiff physically forced her into the room with him.

 

This case proves how difficult it is to win a defamation case in New York. It is hard to distinguish between nonactionable opinion and actionable false facts. The lengthy factual/opinion analysis in this case highlights the plaintiff's hurdle in bringing these cases to trial. The dissent further shows the complexities of the case. 

 

The dissent from Judge Menashi summarizes defendant's letter this way:

 

 In a letter to friends and colleagues, Maria Grand accused Steven Coleman of sexually harassing her during their professional relationship as musicians. According to Grand, Coleman started the relationship by telling her—when she was seventeen-years old—that he wanted to have sex with her. As Grand’s saxophone teacher, Coleman told Grand “many, many times that the best thing” she could do to learn music was to have sex with male musicians. He even told her “not to contact him [if] [she] didn’t plan on having sex with him.” After Coleman “convinced [Grand] to be intimate with him,” Coleman “started hiring [her] to work with him too.” But when he gave her work, he would “get angry and tell [her] not to finish the work, because [she] wouldn’t sleep with him.” And “[w]henever he offered [her] more work, he would wait until [she] actually slept with him to solidify the dates.” 
 

While on tour, Grand “would have to sleep with [Coleman] at the end of the day” or he would “be absolutely angry and sometimes refuse to rehearse.” “He would relentlessly ask [her] to have sex with him.” He allegedly told Grand that she “owed him ‘a lifetime of pussy’ for what he had taught [her].” After a workshop, Grand and Coleman stayed in the same room together, but despite Grand’s insistence that she would not have sex with Coleman, she woke up to him “half-naked, kissing [her] on the lips.” When Grand’s boyfriend showed up at a concert, Coleman became “extremely angry” and told Grand that “he didn’t want [her] to play on some other gigs he had previously asked [her] to sit in on.”  When Grand refused to have a threesome with Coleman and another woman, Coleman “became furious at [her] for saying no and told [her] not to come to the show that day.” As Grand summarized the relationship, “when I stopped agreeing to sleep with him he stopped granting me access to his knowledge, and he made my professional life with him a complete nightmare.”

This, Menashi says, is actionable defamation. He chides the majority: "The majority might not consider me a right-thinking person, but I would have a negative opinion of someone who behaved the way that Grand described. And it seems to me that her account is either true or false."

 

 

 

A cautionary tale on drafting and filing the notice of appeal

This is a cautionary tale about how to file a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals holds the notice of appeal was defective because it did not clarify what issues the appellant wanted to raise. It was also untimely.

The case is Coker v. Goldberg & Associates, a summary order issued on October 28. Here's the thing about notices of appeal in the federal system: its requirements are jurisdictional, which means failure to comply with the rules is death. It is very difficult to get more time to file a late notice of appeal, and a defective notice of appeal will not be lightly excused. 

The context is that plaintiff worked for a law firm and was denied overtime pay. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of nearly $5,000. The court also granted plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs for approximately $45,000. It is not unusual for the fees to greatly exceed the damages. That is what happened here. The law firm wants to appeal from both the summary judgment and attorneys' fees order.

We have two problems: first the notice of appeal says the appellant wanted to appeal from the district court's ruling, dated May 21, 2024, which covered attorneys' fees. But the defendant's notice of appeal did not make reference to the district court's order, dated March 1, 2024, which granted summary judgment on the plaintiff's wage-and-hour claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, "a notice of appeal must designate the judgment ... from which the appeal is taken." Unfortunately for defendant-appellant, since the notice of appeal did not refer to the March 1, 2024 FLSA judgment, that issue was not preserved for appeal.

The second problem is timing. The notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the March 1, 2024 judgment granting summary judgment on the FLSA claim. The pendency of the plaintiff's attorneys' fees motion did not extend the deadline to appeal the summary judgment decision. Under Second Circuit law, "a decision on the merits is a final decision [under the final judgment statute] whether or not there remains for adjudication a request for attorneys' fees." Nor did the trial court enter an order delaying the running of the time to file an appeal until the entry or the order disposing of the fee motion." What it means is the Court of Appeals (Wesley, Lohier and Merriam) lacks jurisdiction to resolve the appeal from the March 1, 2024 FLSA judgment.

If you are uncertain about whether the notice of appeal contains the correct language, make sure it references the judgments you which to challenge on appeal, and if one final judgment was entered, you can identify that judgment in the notice of appeal. If you are unsure whether the notice of appeal is timely, file it early and then have the Court of Appeals place the appeal on hold while motions are pending in the district court.

The only issue properly before the Second Circuit, then, is the attorneys' fees ruling. But if you handle this kind of work, you know that challenging an attorneys' fees ruling on appeal very difficult, though not impossible. The Second Circuit will not second-guess the trial court's judgment about how much time was needed to prosecute the case, as the trial judge knows the procedural history of the case, and all the sub-issues, far more than an appellate court ever will. While the district court reduced the overall fees by 25% and not the requested 50% reduction, that determination fell with the trial court's broad discretion, and the Second Circuit affirms.

Off-campus social media meme ridiculing George Floyd is entitled to First Amendment protection

The Court of Appeals has ruled that a school district in Sullivan County did not have the right to discipline a student who circulated off-campus a racially-insensitive social media meme relating to the murder of George Floyd. The Circuit navigates two of the leading First Amendment cases governing students speech rights and a school district's obligation to teach racial sensitivity. 

The case is Leroy v. Livingston Manor School District, issued on October 30. Plaintiff was a high school student who posted a staged photo of his friends depicting someone (in the role of a police officer) with his knee on the neck of a classmate (in the role of George Floyd), with the caption, "Cops got another." This photo went on social media outside the school campus, after school hours. Plaintiff intended the photo as a joke, but once he saw the backlash on campus, he pulled it from social media. The district suspended plaintiff and barred him from attending various school activities for the rest of the school year. 

Two Supreme Court cases guide this ruling. First, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent  Community Sch. Dist., the Court said in 1969 that students still have speech rights on campus but the district may regulate that speech if necessary to avoid substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. In that case, the Court said the district court could not order high school students to remove their anti-Vietnam War armbands, even though this protest did cause some discomfort on campus. In Mahoney Sch. Dist. v. B.L., the Court held in 2022 that schools have authority to regulate off-campus speech in limited circumstances. Courts have to consider (1) the nature of the speech, (2) when, where and how the student spoke, and (3) the school's interest in regulating the speech. In Mahoney, the Court said a cheerleader, who used profanity in complaining about not making the cheerleading squad, had the right to criticize the school without discipline. The speech in Mahoney did not quite have the gravity of the anti-war speech in Tinker, but speech is speech, serious or not. These balancing tests, like all balancing tests, gives judges some discretion to resolve the case one way or the other.

This is not an easy case for the Second Circuit (Parker, Perez and Robinson), which issued 70 pages of legal analysis, including a concurrence, carefully reviewing the impact plaintiff's speech had on the student community when the nation was focused on police brutality and institutional racism. In response to the meme, the district did have students attend racial awareness programs, invited law enforcement to monitor the campus for a brief period, and generally had to deal with enhanced debate on the George Floyd matter. Plaintiff and his friends were even told to stay home for a few days "for their own safety." So the speech did disrupt the school environment,

But the Second Circuit holds that the discipline against plaintiff violated the First Amendment because (1) the speech did not contain any threats of violence or fighting words, (2) the speech was off-campus, and (3) the school's interest in teaching racial insensitivity does not outweigh plaintiff's speech rights, especially since, in the Mahoney case, the Supreme Court said the student's off-campus social media vulgarities were also entitled to First Amendment protection, and the district in this case found other ways to teach proper values to its students, including an in-school assembly and facilitating a student demonstration. 

This case is significant because of the social media element. There was no internet when the Tinker case issued, and I guess the closest parallel would have been an off-campus student newspaper that made its way onto campus. The Second Circuit notes that, for better or worse, students largely communicate with each other through social media, and they will say or do stupid or silly things that will have some impact on the school environment.

How to object to a magistrate's report and recommendation

In the federal system, district judges (who serve for life) may ask the magistrate judges (who serve a fixed term) to issue a ruling on a motion that the district court can review and either approve, reject, or modify the ruling. That increases attorneys' work, as they first have to present their arguments to the magistrate judge and then challenge that ruling when it reaches the district judge. We also have a set of rules guiding how you can make the objections. This case tells us how it all works, and the Second Circuit clarifies what lawyers can and cannot do in objecting to the magistrate's ruling.

The case is Nambiar v. Central Orthopedic Group, LLP, issued on October 28. I cover the merits of plaintiff's employment discrimination claims at these links. This time around, I talk about the magistrate's report and the district court's review of the same.

Under the rules, if the magistrate's report is objectionable, the lawyer has to file objections with the district judge, which reviews the magistrate's decision de novo, or from scratch without any deference to the magistrate judge. If you don't file an objection, then you waive your right to bring an appeal to the Second Circuit on those issues. A proper objection cannot raise issues that were not presented to the magistrate judge. But some trial courts in the Second Circuit hold that you cannot simply raise the same issues to the district court that you presented to the magistrate judge. The Second Circuit (Merriam, Lynch and Kahn) rejects that approach, noting that this would "place[] a litigant in an impossible position." While the party cannot raise new arguments for the first time in challenging the magistrate's report, the rule that she cannot raise the same arguments in that capacity may leave that party with nothing to say at all. Here is the proper approach:

a litigant objecting to an R&R may not simply rest on the briefs considered by the magistrate judge; she must lodge a specific objection to some specific aspect of the R&R. But the objection not only may, but often must, repeat arguments that were previously raised. When a timely filed objection raises and properly briefs arguments previously rejected by the magistrate judge, the district judge must review those arguments de novo. The District Judge here, understandably following an approach that has gone unchecked for some years, rejected Nambiar's proper objections to certain portions of the R&R on the ground that the same arguments raised in the objection were also made to the Magistrate Judge. That was error. Because Nambiar properly objected to the R&R's findings as to her claims of sex discrimination and aiding and abetting discrimination, the District Judge should have reviewed de novo the Magistrate Judge's recommended disposition of those claims.

Retaliation case fails because management was working on plaintiff's termination prior to her EEOC charge

This retaliation case reminds us that you cannot win your case under Title VII or state law if management was already working toward your termination even before you had engaged in protected activity by, for example, filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC.

The case is Nambiar v. Central Ortopedic Group, LLP, issued on October 28. The disparate treatment portion of the case is discussed at this link. But plaintiff also asserted a retaliation claim because she filed an EEOC charge on March 16, 2016 and was fired several days later. That's good timing for a retaliation claim. But we have a problem. 

The Court of Appeals (Lynch, Merriam and Kahn) finds that plaintiff cannot prove a causal connection between the EEOC charge and her termination because the evidence shows that defendants had already decided to terminate her employment before she filed the EEOC charge. In January 2016, defendants told plaintiff that she had to sign a revised contract (due to performance issues), and one month later, again before the EEOC charge, they told her to sign the contract or she would be fired. She repeatedly refused to sign the revised contract. This back and forth continued prior to the filing of plaintiff's EEOC charge, and five days before the charge was filed, defendants were already looking for her replacement.

What it all means is that "before Nambiar ever mentioned an EEOC complaint, the wheels were already in motion to terminate Nambiar's employment  -- as she was well aware," as the EEOC charge stated that defendants were "forcing her out of her position" and her termination was a "fait accompli" when she met with management on February 25, 2016.

The central case in this area is Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001), which holds that "where timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity, an inference of retaliation does not arise." This is a key principle in the Second Circuit, and it has led to many a retaliation claim's demise, even if the actual decision to fire post-dated the protected activity.

Sexist comments and suspicious timing does not give rise to sex discrimination claim

The Court of Appeals holds that a female doctor cannot win her sex discrimination claim arising from the termination of her employment, even though she asserts that male doctors were treated more favorably and sexist comments about her were thrown around the workplace.

The case is Nambiar v. Central Orthopedic Group, LLP, issued on October 28. This case does not break new ground in the world of sex discrimination law. But we do see how settled Second Circuit rules apply to cases like this. 

In response to plaintiff's prima facie case of sex discrimination, management proved they had received "numerous complaints" about plaintiff, which required the medical practice to take remedial measures. The complaints had to do with plaintiff's "contentious interactions" and "heated conversations" with the staff. Other doctors were aware of patient and staff complaints about her. To reverse summary judgment and force a trial on whether the defendants had discriminated against her, plaintiff has to show these justifications for her termination were a pretext for discrimination. The Second Circuit says plaintiff does not have the evidence.

First, plaintiff argues that two male doctors were treated better than she was. But the comparators are not really comparators. One doctor, who replaced plaintiff, was hired on less favorable terms than plaintiff had been, and his contract (unlike plaintiff) did not include a path to partnership. The other male doctor had to sign a new contract that extended his probationary period and was made partner only after he "cleaned up his act." As a matter of law, these doctors are not comparable to plaintiff. The key cite for this principle is Graham v. Long Island Railroad, 230 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2000).

Second, plaintiff cites sexist comments. That kind of evidence can certainly get you a trial if you can connect the comments to the decision to fire the plaintiff. But she cannot do that, the Court of Appeals (Lynch, Merriam and Kahn) says. 

While a physician partner, Checo, told plaintiff that "other partners" had referred to the pain management department staff as "girls" and that "there is too much drama ... because they are female," and plaintiff "was told" that someone said that patients should not be sent to plaintiff "when she is having her period because ... they are all going to be ... girls together," these gender stereotypes are not enough for trial because plaintiff did not hear them directly, she does not know the context in which the comments were made, or even who said them. Plaintiff does not assert these comments were made close in time to the termination of her employment or that they had anything to do with her termination.

Another physician partner, Silverberg, told plaintiff that patients and staff had complained that she was too unfriendly, too demanding, too aggressive and had to be "sweeter, kinder, and more gentle" since it was a small practice and it relied on referrals. The Second Circuit says these criticisms, which advance gender stereotypes that plaintiff was not sufficiently feminine in the office, are not enough for trial because they came from patients and staff but not from any physician partners. Under this analysis, plaintiff cannot show these critiques factored into the decision to terminate her employment.

Third, plaintiff challenges the timing of her termination, noting that, after seeing thousands of patients, the seven complaints against her were close in time to her termination. But, the Court says, plaintiff cannot show that "defendants colluded to produce or create this evidence," which was the case in Edelman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 141 F.4th 28 (2d Cir. 2025). Nor has plaintiff suggested these criticisms were falsified.

 

 

Hostile work environment survives motion to dismiss

This case involves allegations of racial discrimination. In this blog post, I covered the disparate treatment analysis, which found that plaintiff's complaint, notwithstanding the district court's ruling, does assert such a claim. But the complaint also asserts a hostile work environment claim, and that claim will proceed to discovery as well.

The case is Brown v. Montefiore Health System, Inc., issued on October 23. In the disparate treatment portion of the ruling, the Court of Appeals (Bianco, Wesley and Robinson) held that a series of suspicious adverse actions and circumstances give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. That evidence also supports the hostile work environment claim.

But in addition to those disparate treatment allegations, we have other evidence that also gives rise to a racial harassment case. Under the "totality of the circumstances" test guiding these cases, we have the following allegations:

[The Complaint] alleges that “[Brown] was left out of research assignments, had duties and responsibilities removed from her without notice, [and was] berated and demeaned before her colleagues.” The amended complaint further alleges that Brown was subject to “excessive scrutinization and micromanaging of her work, actions[,] and whereabouts, [] isolation from her co-workers, [the] removal of duties  and responsibilities, [and the] denial of professional opportunities” which, “coupled with the continuous denial of her rightfully earned benefits, [was] all a part of the ongoing discrimination which [] created a very hostile work environment affecting [her] physical, mental and emotional” condition. 

The Court writes, "If proven, the alleged conduct, when considered in its totality and construed in the light most favorable to Brown, could plausibly be sufficiently pervasive or severe to constitute a hostile work environment."

Note that none of these allegations involve explicit racial discrimination, such as racial epithets or jokes. But you can still have a hostile work environment claim without those incidents. As the Court of Appeals writes, "although these alleged instances are not specifically linked to Plaintiff’s status in a protected class (such as with specific alleged comments), it is well-settled that '[f]acially neutral incidents may be included, of course, among the ‘totality of the circumstances’ that courts consider in any hostile work environment claim.'" The case for that proposition is Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 378 (2d Cir. 2002). Citation to Alfano shows this is not a new legal principle in the Second Circuit, but practitioners may overlook it since we associate hostile work environment claims with explicit racist or sexist comments or gestures. In fact, the work environment may be hostile in violation of Title VII if the plaintiff is simply treated poorly because of her race or gender.

In sum, the Court writes, "in reviewing the totality of the circumstances, especially where Brown alleges that she and two other named Black co-workers were treated differently than similarly situated white co-workers in a number of material respects, she has plausibly alleged that the alleged harassment could be related to her status in a protected class, even if such status was not referenced specifically by anyone in connection with the alleged conduct."

Racial discrimination claim is reinstated on appeal, providing guidance on avoiding Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals

The Court of Appeals holds that a race discrimination plaintiff has set forth enough allegations to proceed to discovery, overturning the trial court's finding that the complaint was not good enough to survive a Rule 12 motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals makes some interesting observations about pleading discrimination cases, and if you represent plaintiffs in these disputes, then keep reading.

The case is Brown v. Montefiore Health System, a summary order issued on October 23. Prior to her termination from the hospital, plaintiff worked there for more than 20 years as a dietician. She claims her white supervisor, Pappo, was the discriminator. As summarized by the Second Circuit (Bianco, Wesley and Robinson), here are the primary allegations:

(1) Brown was the only Black employee in MMC’s Clinical Nutrition Department,  (2) Pappo, since being placed in her role as Director of the Department, has hired only one other Black employee, despite numerous hires over the years, (3) Pappo was enthusiastic about that employee’s qualifications upon reviewing her written application materials, but after the applicant arrived for her interview—thus revealing her race—Pappo instead opted to hire a less qualified white male, (4) Pappo subsequently hired that Black applicant for a subordinate position as a “relief” dietician only after receiving pressure from staff, (5) another Black former employee, who was terminated in 2019 and replaced by a white employee, also complained of discrimination by Pappo, including that Pappo “pressured, intimidated, and discriminated against her, failed to properly train her, and openly mocked and scolded her in front of other  employees[,]” which, according to Brown, was the “exact same treatment [she] was subjected to at the hands of [Pappo],” and (6) Brown heard Pappo “disparag[e] communities which have [] largely Black demographic[s] in favor of those with largely white demographic[s].”

All of this asserts a pattern of racial hostility by Pappo, both against plaintiff and against other Black employees. No explicit racial epithets here, but, taking the allegations in the complaint as true, it appears Pappo did not want Black employees working for her. But there is more. Plaintiff alleges that:

Pappo, motivated by this racial animus, engaged in a campaign of harassment to prompt Brown’s termination, including refusing to allow Brown to cover a particular colleague’s work shifts and offering those shifts to white dieticians, refusing to provide Brown with the proper ergonomic workstation to accommodate her medical needs resulting from a work-related injury, initially denying her the opportunity to serve as a preceptor for New York University oncology interns while all other dieticians in the department (who were white) served in that role, and submitting false information regarding Brown’s workers’ compensation case "in hopes that [Brown] would be terminated or resign."

Taken as a whole, these allegations permit the plausible inference that plaintiff was fired because of her race. Again, no racial epithets, but a pattern of mistreatment visited upon plaintiff and other Black employees. The case will proceed to discovery.

This holding may not seem remarkable, but it is. Many cases are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because, no matter how badly the plaintiff was treated, the trial court does not think the allegations permit an inference of racial or sex discrimination. These rulings are often reversed on appeal through summary orders, but not always. Judges are required, under Iqbal, to use their common experience in issuing these rulings, but they often do not see what Black employees, and others protected under Title VII, see: at some point, a pattern of bad treatment may prove intentional discrimination.

In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeals applies the following legal principles relevant to discrimination claims. They all stem from Second Circuit case law, and they may be relevant to your case:

1. Claims under the New York State Human Rights Law are analyzed under New York City HRL standards. The Second Circuit has been saying this for about a year now, but in this case the Court says so without even citing cases in support of that proposition. The NYSHRL does not expressly call for that statutory construction, at least in the context of aligning the state law with the city law, but the state law does say it should be broadly interpreted. The only place to look in fulfilling that objective would be the NYCHRL.

2.  “[e]vidence relating to company-wide practices may reveal patterns of discrimination against a group of employees, increasing the likelihood that an employer’s offered explanation for an employment decision regarding a particular individual masks a discriminatory motive.” Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1990).

3. "with respect to a hostile work environment claim, we have emphasized that, 'because the crucial inquiry focuses on the nature of the workplace environment as a whole, a plaintiff who herself experiences discriminatory harassment need not be the target of other instances of hostility in order for those incidents to support her claim.'” The case for that proposition is Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2000), a case I argued 25 years ago. The Court of Appeals holds that Brown does have a viable hostile work environment case, which I will discuss in a future blog post. 

4. “an inference of discriminatory intent may be derived from a variety of circumstances, including, but not limited to: . . . the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge.” That's from Liebowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487 (2d Cir. 2009). That is something of a catch-all proposition, but a suspicious sequence of events may support an inference of discrimination. I saw this principle surface frequently in the 1990s but not so much lately. But this is still good law.

5. "even if alleged 'instances of disparate treatment may not separately rise to the level of adverse employment actions, [a plaintiff] is permitted to create a mosaic with the bits and pieces of available evidence that, taken together, support a plausible inference of intentional discrimination.'” The cite for that is Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64 (2d Cir. 2023). The "mosaic" language is relatively new, but it's another "totality of the circumstances" doctrine that plaintiffs will use when there are no racial epithets or other race-specific allegations, but instead a series of adverse personnel actions that in their totality altered the work environment for the worse.

6. “Actions taken by an employer that disadvantage an employee for no logical reason constitute strong evidence of an intent to discriminate.” That derives from Stratton v. Dept. of the Aging, 132 F.3d 869 (2d Cir. 1997). I want to talk about this at some length. Stratton was decided nearly 30 years ago, written by then-district judge Denny Chin before he was elevated to the Second Circuit. I recall seeing that footnote at the time and using that language to avoid Rule 12 and summary judgment dismissals. That strategy did not always work, but I don't know why; maybe it's because that language appears in a footnote in Stratton. Maybe judges think that language will allow any case involving bad workplace decisionmaking to reach trial, thereby undermining the employment at-will principle and the doctrine that courts are not "super-personnel" departments, unable to right every injustice in the workplace. Jurors may draw the inference set out in the Stratton footnote, but maybe judges were looking for more evidence than simply inexplicably bad treatment. Excluding the Stratton case itself, where it originated, as well as this case, that principle, so useful to plaintiffs in Title VII cases, has been cited exactly 8 times. It has only been cited by the Second Circuit once previously, in May 2025, in Flanagan v. Girl Scouts of Suffolk County, a summary order reported at 2025 WL 1501751 (May 27, 2025), which reinstated a race discrimination case. (I argued Flanagan and cited Stratton in the reply brief). While this language surfaced from time to time in district court rulings, it has been dormant in the Court of Appeals until this year. Two of the judges on the Flanagan panel sat on Brown's case (Wesley and Bianco), so they must have remembered this language from Flanagan.

This case is a summary order, so its precedential value is limited. But you can still cite summary orders provided you note in your brief that the case is a summary order. Even so, the principles above derive from precedential rulings, which remain good law until the Supreme Court says otherwise.