Preach it!

A street preacher sued a city in Mississippi, challenging the ordinance requiring him and other street preachers to limit their speech activities to a designated protest area. After the city prosecuted him for violating the ordinance, and he was found guilty, he persisted in wishing to preach it outside the designated protest area, finding it unsuitable for reaching the proper audience. Can he challenge the ordinance under the First Amendment when he was previously convicted under the same audience? The Supreme Court says he can.

The case is Olivier v City of Brandon, issued on March 20. The exciting issue is whether the First Amendment allows the city to set up a designated protest area for religious (or political) speech like this. But that's not the issue before the Supreme Court in this case. Instead, the Court considers whether this lawsuit is foreclosed under a 1994 precedent that generally says you cannot sue the police for a civil rights violation if that lawsuit would have the effect of undoing a prior criminal conviction arising from the same conduct. That case was Heck v. Humphrey, one of the most complicated cases handed down by the Supreme Court in the last 35 years, at least in my view.

I had a similar issue about 20 years ago, when I represented a man who wanted to post political signs on his property and was found guilty of violating the town's sign ordinance. We then sued to strike down that ordinance under the First Amendment because he wanted to keep posting the signs. The argument was that he could not bring the suit because he could have challenged the constitutionality of that law in appealing from his criminal conviction. I researched the Heck out of that issue, but the courts ruled in out favor without addressing that question.  

This is not a Heck case, the Supreme Court writes, because plaintiff in this case is trying to enjoin future  enforcement of the speech law; he is not trying to effectively undue the prior criminal conviction arising from his past violation of the speech law. He is not challenging the validity of his prior conviction. Rather, he wants the law declared unconstitutional so he can preach where he wants in the future. While success in this lawsuit would necessarily mean that plaintiff's prior conviction was unconstitutional, we can't read Heck in such a literal sense. Justice Kagan writes that judicial language in court rulings cannot bind future cases in all circumstances. The Court now thinks that certain language in Heck was too broad, at least in application to cases like this one. 

A similar issue arose in Wooley v. Maynard, a 1977 Supreme Court case that said New Hampshire could not prosecute a man who put masking tape over the state slogan on the license plate, "Live Free or Die." Because who is the state to tell me what messages can attach to my vehicle? That plaintiff was also convicted of violating the state law before later suing to challenge its constitutionality. The court said Maynard could bring the case because he sought "prospective relief" and was not essentially challenging the prior conviction. Wooley is the guiding rule in the preacher case, not Heck. 

Due process, even for convicted sex offenders

In this due process case, a convicted sex offender charges the state with failing to secure him appropriate housing upon his release from prison. The Court of Appeals finds he has a case and it reinstates his lawsuit, which the district court had dismissed on a Rule 12 motion for failure to state a claim.

The case is Kotler v. Torres, a summary order issued on March 18. Under New York law, when certain sex offenders are released from custody, that release is put on hold until he finds suitable housing under the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA). This is where defendant Torres comes in. His his job as a parole officer, was to approve plaintiff's housing and facilitate his release from custody. To that end, plaintiff gave him more than dozen potential addresses where he might live. But, plaintiff says, Torres did not follow up on these leads, delaying his release for over a year.

This is a due process case because the court order entitling plaintiff to release from custody states he "shall" be released once proper housing arrangements are made. That mandatory language (shall) creates a property interest under the Due Process Clause. Under SARA, the Department of Corrections takes on an affirmative role in finding suitable housing. Yet, according to plaintiff, while he gave Torres a list of places to live, Torres did not take meaningful steps to make that happen. That gives plaintiff a claim that Torres was deliberately indifferent to his obligations under the court order, enough for a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

What about qualified immunity? That immunity will end the case if the law was not clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. But the Court of Appeals (Walker, Sack and Lee) says the case law was clear at the time: "state officials may not deliberately disregard court orders governing the conditions of confinement." If the law was clear at the time and defendants violated it, then the case will proceed through discovery. Once discovery is closed and the district court has another opportunity to review the case, things may turn out differently depending on what the evidence shows. But for now, plaintiff has pleaded a viable case.  

Court of Appeals vacates Rule 11 sanctions in Starbucks coffee case

In the movie A Civil Action, a lawyer representing the big, bad chemical company moves for Rule 11 sanction against the plaintiff's mass-tort lawyer played by John Travolta. The story takes place in the early 1980s, before Rule 11 became a prominent fixture in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Travolta's character told the judge he had to look up Rule 11 to see what it said. The judge said that he did the same. Rule 11 is now well-known, and lawyers fear being hit with Rule 11 sanctions, which can be costly and wreck your reputation. The lawyer in this case was sanctioned, but the Court of Appeals finds the trial court abused its discretion, and the sanctions are gone.

The case is Sheehan v. Starbucks, a summary order issued on March 17. This consumer deception case alleges that the coffee company misled the public in claiming it was "Ground 100% Arabica Coffee." The argument is that the coffee also contained potassium, thus fooling the unsuspecting consumer. The district court sanctioned the plaintiff for making the frivolous claim that the 100% thing was false.

When a trial court sanctions the lawyer under Rule 11, it must be convinced the lawsuit was completely frivolous and filed in bad faith, and/or without any factual support. Courts are reluctant to impose this punishment to ensure that lawyers will bring innovative lawsuits and zealously represent their clients. The Court of Appeals writes that "judges should refrain from imposing sanctions where such action would stifle the enthusiasm or chill the creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law."

Sanctions were not warranted here, says the Second Circuit (Raggi, Nathan and Furman [D.J.]), even though the trial court determined that the "Ground 100% Arabica Coffee" advertisement was so obviously incorrect as to be frivolous. While the district court had a better interpretation than the plaintiff's lawyer, other courts around the country have said cases like this are not frivolous.

the Seventh Circuit has allowed similar claims about additives in parmesan cheese to proceed past a motion to dismiss, explaining that “certainly a plausible reading” of the phrase “100% Grated Parmesan Cheese” “is that ‘100%’ applies to all three words: it's all cheese; all the cheese is Parmesan, and it's all grated.” Bell v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 982 F.3d 468, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2020). And the First Circuit, in a case featuring nearly identical language to that present here, observed that it would be “by no means unreasonable” for a consumer to read “Freshly Ground 100% Arabica Coffee” to mean “that the package contains only coffee (and Arabica coffee at that), with no nuts (or anything else).” Dumont v. Reily Foods Co., 934 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 2019).

The district court also sanctioned the plaintiff's lawyer for not sufficiently investigating the facts prior to filing the lawsuit. But the record shows he reviewed a report about a study into the potassium levels in the coffee, and he found multiple newspaper articles reporting on these laboratory tests. He then sent coffee samples to a different laboratory for independent testing. This evidence undermines any finding of bad faith by the plaintiff's lawyer. While this evidence was not attached to the lawsuit, plaintiff was not required to "plead evidence" in filing the lawsuit. 

For the plaintiff's lawyer, the Rule 11 sanctions are gone. So is the contempt of court finding that the district court imposed, seemingly an addendum to the Rule 11 order. For the plaintiff's lawyer, even though he lost the case on the merits, yesterday was a very good day. 

 

Another false arrest case bites the dust

For the second time this month, the Court of Appeals has reversed the trial court in finding that false arrest plaintiff cannot sue law enforcement due to qualified immunity -- even though charges against the plaintiff were dropped.

The case is Sarcaza v. City of New York, issued on March 11. Plaintiff was arrested for allegedly assaulting a teenage girl on a New York City bus. While video footage of the encounter was inconclusive, the girl was in distress at the time and later identified the plaintiff from a photo array. The case against plaintiff was dismissed on speedy trial grounds; hence this false arrest lawsuit.While the district court allowed this case to proceed to trial on the basis that the video footage did not show physical contact between plaintiff and the girl, as well as some inconsistencies in the girl's account, the Court of Appeals (Chin and Perez) reverses, on grounds familiar to Section 1983 lawyers who handle these cases.

The police can prove they had probable cause to arrest if the evidence was reasonably trustworthy that the guy committed a crime. If so, then no false arrest lawsuit. The low probable cause standard kills off many such lawsuits. But we also have to consider qualified immunity, which also lets the police off the hook if they had "arguable probable cause," which means that even probable cause did not exist, reasonable jurors might find the officers had a good faith basis to make the arrest anyway.

Here is the takeaway quote: "Unless exculpatory evidence or circumstances that raise doubts as to the alleged victim's veracity arise, probable cause is present where a police officer relies on such victim's identification of the suspect and statement of the alleged crime." In other words, to win a false arrest case against the police, the plaintiff has to essentially show the police had nothing on him, a lack of evidence that makes it clear they were setting up the plaintiff for arrest or just did not know what they were doing. You don't need "hard certainties" or a belief that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed.

Under these principles, plaintiff loses the case even before trial. The Court of Appeals writes:

Based on the undisputed facts in the record, a reasonable police officer in [Detective] Friedman’s position could have found probable cause that Sacaza had touched the Complainant inappropriately. While the Complainant's statements and identifications of Sacaza served as Friedman's principal basis for finding probable cause, the MTA Footage and other information provided objective evidence for a reasonable police officer to arrest and charge Sacaza.

The record contains the following undisputed evidence to support the conclusion that Sacaza sexually assaulted the Complainant: (1) the Complainant reported the alleged assault to her school and the police almost immediately; (2) the Complainant identified Sacaza as her assailant on two separate occasions, including once in-person; (3) Friedman learned that Sacaza was a person of interest in other public lewdness incidents; (4) the MTA Footage shows the Complainant being uncomfortable and looking back several times while Sacaza is positioned directly behind her for more than a minute; (5) the MTA Footage shows that the Complainant felt the need to and did take videos of Sacaza, which she later shared with Friedman; and (6) the MTA Footage shows that the Complainant was so visibly disturbed by Sacaza that a nearby passenger felt the need to console her. Based on this evidence, a reasonable police officer could have believed that Sacaza committed a crime justifying arrest.

 

False arrest case is dismissed on qualified immunity grounds

False arrest cases are often dismissed prior to trial because the police are able to prove they had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Even if the charges against the plaintiff are ultimately dismissed and the criminal process reaches that endpoint, the police can still avoid liability if they had arguable probable cause, a qualified immunity concept warrants dismissal of the case when the police reasonably believed, even if mistakenly, that the plaintiff had committed a crime. In this case, the federal trial court said the jury may rule in the plaintiff's favor on the false arrest claim, but the Court of Appeals nixes the case entirely on qualified immunity grounds.

The case is Jin v. City of New York, issue don March 12. It took the Court of Appeals nearly two years to decide this case, owing to complexity of the issues and the lengthy dissent from Judge Kearse.

It all started when the police arrived at the plaintiff's home after a 911 call reported a domestic violence dispute. The plaintiff was arrested for assault and harassment, but the charges were dropped. Upon arriving at the house, the police arrested plaintiff after her son reported that she had assaulted a family member, who pointed out his injuries to the police and simulated how the plaintiff had assaulted him. Plaintiff denied any wrongdoing and said that she was the assault victim. The police never interviewed the neighbors even though plaintiff said they would exonerate her. 

After the charges against plaintiff were dropped, she sued the police for false arrest. The trial court said plaintiff had enough evidence to win the case, but the Court of Appeals reverses, and the case is over. The Second Circuit (Bianco, Perez and Kearse [dissenting])  notes that the police can make an arrest upon "reasonably trustworthy information" that the plaintiff had committed a crime, and "an identified citizen informant is presumed to be reliable" in this context. So, even if the son was not present for the alleged assault, and had merely reported what the victim had told him, that was enough for probable cause, as the victim did show the police his injuries and explained how the plaintiff had allegedly attacked him. "Reasonable officers could disagree as to whether there was probable cause to arrest based on the reasonably trustworthy information relayed to the Officers," "which was simultaneously corroborated [by the victim] demonstrating the attack and displaying his injuries."

The case is significant for the Court of Appeals' holding that domestic violence cases are held to the same false arrest standards as every other case, and there is no special rule that the police need to be more skeptical when a domestic violence victim reports a crime. The district court said the inherent "relational dynamics" of alleged domestic disputes require additional inquiry by the police. But "the mere fact that a victim, eyewitness, or informant is reporting criminal activity arising from a domestic dispute does not, by itself, raise a doubt as to the witness's veracity sufficient to undermine the presumption of reliability that officers are permitted to attach to such witnesses." 

District court abused its discretion in resolving summary judgment motion under Rule 12 standard

The Court of Appeals has reinstated an employment discrimination lawsuit because, although the defendants moved for summary judgment under Rule 56, the trial court instead dismissed the case under the rules guiding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12. 

The case is Miller v. LaManna, issued on March 9. Plaintiff was a correction officer working in the New York prison system. He claims he was treated differently because he is Black, at least compared with while officers who were not afforded similar mistreatment for engaging in comparable misconduct. Plaintiff also claims he suffered retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

At the close of extensive discovery, the state moved for summary judgment, arguing the evidence generated in discovery proves the plaintiff did not suffer any racial discrimination or retaliation. The summary judgment record was approximately 1,700 pages. But the state also said the complaint that initiated this lawsuit did not state a claim for discrimination. That is the sort of argument defendants normally make at the start of the case, not when discovery is completed. Yet, the district court, rather than resolving the case under summary judgment standards -- determining if the evidence might support a verdict in the plaintiff's favor -- instead determined whether the complaint states a plausible claim; under that inquiry we do not examine any documents beyond the complaint itself. Under the Rule 12 process, the district court said plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim.

The district court abused its discretion, holds the Court of Appeals (Lynch and Menashi), which notes that shortly after the district court dismissed this case under Rule 12, the Court of Appeals held in Lugo v. City of Troy, 114 F.4th 80 (2d Cir. 2024), that the district court cannot resolve a motion to dismiss on standing grounds simply by reading the complaint if there is also a summary judgment record that might support the plaintiff's claims. While Lugo held as such in a standing case, its reasoning applies to this case, the Second Circuit holds, over Judge Sullivan's dissent. Quoting from Lugo, the Second Circuit states that "the administration of justice is best served when the district court applies the standards that are appropriate for the pertinent motion and stage of litigation." Since the stage of litigation when defendants in this case was post-discovery, the proper procedure was summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss. The "Rule 12(d) conversion" in this case an abuse of discretion. 

The case returns to the district court to determine if the summary judgment record demonstrates that plaintiff is entitled to a trial on his discrimination and retaliation claims. 

Supreme Court rules for religious parents in public school gender-transitioning case

Without hearing oral argument, the Supreme Court has ruled that religious parents in California are likely to win their case challenging a state law that bars public schools from telling them about their childrens' efforts to engage in gender transitioning at school, i.e., the students preferred pronoun or name. The ruling is grounded in the First Amendment (freedom of religion) and Fourteenth Amendment (right to raise your children without certain governmental intervention).

The case is Mirabelli v. Bonta, issued on March 2. The law in California provides that parents cannot learn this information without consent from the student. My guess is that most students have already told their parents about their gender-transitioning efforts but that some have not, perhaps because they know their parents will not approve. Whatever the policy justifications for the California law, it showcases the culture wars that are now being resolved the Supreme Court on a regular basis. This case reaches the Court because the Ninth Circuit stayed the trial court's order striking down the California law, barring the schools from misleading parents about their childrens' gender presentation at school and their social transitioning efforts.

The factual scenarios arising from the California law are varied. Some parents just want to know what their children are doing in this regard: changing their preferred name and pronoun. Other parents, however, allege that as a result of the law, they did not know about their daughter's gender dysphoria, and their daughter ultimately attempted suicide before their parents could intervene. These facts make this a new kind of case for the Supreme Court.

While it is a new case, however, the Court lifts the Ninth Circuit's stay and reinstates the trial court's injunction against enforcing the law, but it does so on an expedited basis, without oral argument. The Court applies precedent holding that parents have the First Amendment right to raise their children as they see fit, particularly on religious matters, without governmental interference. That's the Free Exercise Clause. Of course, cases under this Clause never involved gender transitioning, though last term the Court said schools cannot force objecting religious parents to allow their children's exposure to LGBTQ storybooks. That logic, the Court says, supports the parents in this case,

The other line of Supreme Court authority guiding this case is the Fourteenth Amendment's protection, under the substantive due process line of cases, holding that parents and not the government have primary authority in how to raise their children. Those cases of course did not involve LGBTQ rights, but they date to the 1920's, so they are a fundamental right under the Constitution, even if the Constitution does not make explicit reference to these rights, which are implied in light of U.S. history.

The ruling was 6-3. No surprise there. The Republican-appointed justices ruled for the parents, and the Democratic-appointed justices dissented. Justice Kagan asks in dissent how the Court can resolve such unprecedented issues, under the fuzzy substantive due process doctrine, without oral argument and full briefing, which is the normal course of affairs. She notes that substantive due process "has not been of late in the good graces of this court," particularly by the six-justice majority in this case, as its boundaries are not clear and the justices have criticized it in the past in allowing judges to impose their personal views in resolving cases.