Court broadly interprets the Ending Forced Arbitration Act

The Second Circuit has clarified the scope of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA), holding that when the EFAA applies, it prevents enforcement of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement as to the entire lawsuit, not just the sexual-harassment claims.

The case is Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, issued on September 30. This is the second important EFAA case in the Second Circuit in recent weeks. The last ruling was favorable to defendants in limiting the scope of the continuing violations rule in EFAA cases. This ruling is quite favorable to plaintiffs.

Plaintiff worked for Hermes Law beginning in 2017 and eventually became an executive at ClaimDeck, a legal-technology company founded by Hermes Law's owner, Dwayne Hermes. She received stock options representing approximately 10 percent of ClaimDeck. By August 2023, those options had fully vested and were worth more than $1 million. In December 2023 and again in January 2024, plaintiff expressed her intention to exercise the options. She was fired shortly thereafter.

Plaintiff also alleged that she had been subjected to sexual harassment, claiming that defendants encouraged her to flirt with prospective clients, commented repeatedly on her appearance, and, at a business dinner, compared her to a piece of steak. She also alleged an earlier incident in which Hermes allegedly climbed onto a scooter behind her in a compromising position while another employee took photographs.

In her lawsuit, plaintiff asserted a series of claims, including sexual harassment under the New York City and New York State Human Rights Laws, breach of contract, violation of New York Labor Law § 193, tortious interference, and conversion. The latter claims arose from the alleged effort to terminate her before she could exercise her vested stock options. The defendants sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement Diaz-Roa had signed in 2018. The district court refused, holding that the EFAA rendered the agreement unenforceable with respect to the entire case. The defendants appealed.

A few asides. First, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain defendants' immediate appeal from the trial court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration. Had the district court granted that motion, the Second Circuit would have had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. That one-sided jurisdictional rule will not surprise plaintiffs' lawyers, who for the most part do not like arbitration, which gives employers a huge advantage because (1) there is limited discovery, (2) arbitrators are not required to follow the law, (3) there is no jury, (4) the proceedings are not public, (5) there is no right to appeal, (6) state courts are highly deferential to arbitration rules if you try to challenge them in court, (7) the employer usually pays the arbitrator for their time, (8) damages are generally lower, and (9) studies show that plaintiffs are less successful in arbitration than in court before a jury. The EFAA creates an exception to the rule that arbitration clauses are enforceable, but only when the plaintiff asserts a sexual harassment claim. The issue here is whether the non-harassment claims in the same case may also escape arbitration. The answer is yes. 

The EFAA amended the Federal Arbitration Act in March 2022, providing that, when properly invoked by someone alleging a sexual-harassment or sexual-assault dispute, a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not enforceable “with respect to a case” that relates to that dispute. The defendants argued that “case” really meant individual claims. Under their interpretation, plaintiff's sexual-harassment claims could remain in federal court, but her unrelated conversion claim would have to go to arbitration.

Rejecting that interpretation, the Court of Appeals (Walker, Bianco and Perez) notes the ordinary meaning of the word “case.” A case means a lawsuit or judicial proceeding as a whole, while a “claim” refers to a particular demand for relief within that lawsuit. Congress knew how to use the word “claim” and actually used it elsewhere in the EFAA. The Court holds that Congress deliberately chose “case” in Section 402.

The Court also rejected the defendants' argument that this interpretation makes the statute's “relates to” language meaningless. A lawsuit must still have a connection to the sexual-harassment dispute. But once the EFAA applies to that case, the statute does not require courts to conduct a claim-by-claim arbitration analysis. In addition, the Court rejected reliance on the federal policy favoring arbitration. Congress itself amended the FAA through the EFAA and expressly created an exception for cases involving sexual-harassment or sexual-assault disputes. The FAA is a powerful statute, and it has sent countless cases to arbitration, but Congress does have the power to amend it, and it did so in response to the "Me-Too" era.

The Court declined to resolve a separate question concerning whether a plaintiff must merely allege a nonfrivolous sexual-harassment claim or must satisfy the more demanding Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard to invoke the EFAA. The defendants did not properly challenge that issue on appeal, and they did not dispute that plaintiff's allegations satisfied even the higher standard.

Long Island Native American mascot dispute is revived on appeal

You may not be aware of this, but a culture war has been brewing on Long Island in recent years over the use of mascots featuring Native American imagery. The State of New York is trying to phase out "The Chiefs" and "The Warriors" and has issued regulations defining when districts and their employees may utilize or promote such mascots at school events.

The case is Wantagh Union Free School District v. New York State Board of Regents, a summary order issued on October 1. A state regulation says that public schools cannot use such names, logos or mascots except for classroom instruction. That would eliminate school and team mascots with Native American headdresses. Another rule says school officers and employees cannot "utilize or promote" mascots on school property or at a school function. That rule is the subject of this court ruling.

One plaintiff serves on the Wantagh Board of Education. He challenges this rule to the extent it may bar him from wearing Warriors apparel at a district sporting event. The district court dismissed his case, but the Court of Appeals (Walker, Park and Lee) reinstates it for additional analysis. Wearing such clothing is expressive conduct under the First Amendment. The clothing rule also implicates the First Amendment because he sues as a district volunteer, not an employee, which means he may not have to prove his clothing addresses a matter of public concern, a legal term of art that says the government cannot regulate public employee speech if covers political or social matters of interest to the community, like a whistleblower or letter-to-the-editor gadfly. Since plaintiff is an elected member of the Board of Education, the district court must determine whether the "public concern" framework applies to him or if he instead enjoys the same broader rights as any other member of the public who attends a high school football game.

The case also returns to the district court to consider the context of the plaintiff's speech. The Court of Appeals holds that wearing Warriors apparel at a public event may be intended to send a message about the state's restrictions on Native American mascots and also to support the team. This kind of "message" speech may be protected under the First Amendment. The district court has to determine in the first instance whether wearing this clothing is expression on a matter of public concern. If so, the regulation may be struck down as overbroad in violation of the First Amendment

 

 

Second Circuit rewrites the rules for associational standing in Section 1983 cases

The Second Circuit has overruled a 1973 precedent that barred organizations from bringing § 1983 lawsuits on behalf of their members. This ruling makes it easier for organizations to sue on behalf of their members.

The case is Defending Education v. Croton-Harmon Union Free School District, issued on September 15. Defending Education challenged student-speech policies adopted by the Croton-Harmon School District in Westchester County. The organization represented three parents whose children attend Croton-Harmon schools. The parents alleged that the district's policies concerning discrimination, harassment, bullying, gender identity, and student speech violated the First Amendment and chilled their children's speech. After the plaintiff organization lost this appeal last year, on a petition for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals (Calabresi, Parker and Nardini), holds that organizations may assert associational standing under the three-part test from Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 

What is standing? That legal principle gives you the right to bring a lawsuit. Most litigants have standing: something bad happened to me, and I am bringing a lawsuit. Some organizations can also sue on behalf of their members. That's associational standing, and it is much more complicated.  

In Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit more than 50 years ago held that organizations could not sue under § 1983 to vindicate the rights of their members. The trial court in this case therefore dismissed the case for lack of standing. In April 2025, the Second Circuit initially affirmed that dismissal because Aguayo was controlling Circuit precedent.

Defending Education then sought reconsideration, asking the Second Circuit to overrule Aguayo. The Court granted the motion, rendering the first appellate ruling in this case a nullity. The Court noted that when Aguayo was decided, the Second Circuit was the first federal appellate court to hold that membership organizations could not bring § 1983 claims on behalf of their members. More than fifty years later, every other federal circuit that had addressed the question had reached the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Court, meanwhile, had repeatedly recognized associational standing, including in cases involving § 1983 claims.

The Supreme Court's decisions in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and Hunt are implicated here. Under Hunt, an organization can sue on behalf of its members when three requirements are met: (1) the members would have standing to sue individually; (2) the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor the requested relief requires individual members to participate in the lawsuit.

The Second Circuit holds that Aguayo cannot be reconciled with this Supreme Court precedent. It also points to the Supreme Court's recent affirmative action decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, 600 U.S. 181 (2023), which applied the Hunt framework to an association asserting constitutional claims under § 1983.

The Court Appeals thus overrules Aguayo's associational-standing rule, as well as later Second Circuit decisions that relied on that rule. What it means is that organizations are no longer categorically barred from bringing § 1983 cases on behalf of their members in the Second Circuit. The case returns to the trial court to determine whether the organization satisfies Hunt's requirements. The Second Circuit expressly to decide whether the organization would ultimately satisfy the requirements for a preliminary injunction.

Second Circuit says border agents can search cellphones without suspicion

The Second Circuit has held that federal agents can search your cellphone when you enter the United States without a warrant or reasonable suspicion..

The case is United States v.Alisigwe, issued on September 17. Under this ruling, the government may conduct a manual search of a traveler’s cellphone at the international border without any individualized suspicion. That is what happened here.

Alisigwe was a lawful permanent resident whom authorities suspected of using fraudulent identification documents to open bank accounts. In 2019, when Alisigwe returned to the United States through Idlewild Airport, Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection officers stopped him for an inspection. An officer scrolled through Alisigwe's phone, and photographed material in his photo gallery, which contained names, birth dates, Social Security numbers, bank-account information and addresses belonging to other people. Two years later, officers again stopped Alisigwe at the airport and searched his phone. This time they photographed a Whats App message concerning one of the people whose identity had allegedly been stolen. When Alisigwe moved to suppress the cellphone evidence, the district court rejected the motion, reasoning that cellphone searches at the border required reasonable suspicion but that the officers had reasonable suspicion in this case.

The Second Circuit (Menashi, Lee [concurring] and Gonzalez [D.J.]) agreed that the evidence could be used, but for a different reason. The majority invokes the border-search exception to the Fourth Amendment. Ordinarily, a warrantless search requires an exception to the warrant requirement. But as for border searches, the Supreme Court holds that the government's interest in determining who and what enters the country permits routine searches without probable cause, a warrant, or reasonable suspicion.

The Second Circuit had previously distinguished between routine and non-routine border searches. Searches of luggage and other belongings generally are routine; highly intrusive searches of the person, such as strip searches and body-cavity searches, can require reasonable suspicion. The majority holds that a cellphone falls on the “property” side of the equation. The court recognizes that cellphones contain much personal information. But it reasoned that the government's border interest is not limited to physical contraband. Digital information can constitute contraband, and information on a cellphone may help determine whether a person is entitled to enter the country.

Judge Lee concurred in the judgment. She agreed that the particular searches in this case did not require a warrant or probable cause. But she disagreed with the majority's broader holding that all international travelers' cellphones may be searched without any individualized suspicion. She notes that a cellphone is not a suitcase and can contain medical information, financial records, personal messages, internet searches, location information and other highly private material. Judge Lee questioned whether the traditional rationale for border searches should extend to this comprehensive modern device. She also noted that Alisigwe did not challenge the district court's finding that reasonable suspicion actually existed. As Judge Lee sees it, the court did not need to decide whether suspicionless cellphone searches are constitutional.

2d Circuit interprets the Ending Forced Arbitration Act (Newton v. LVMH Part III)

The Court of Appeals has issued an important ruling on the scope of the Ending Forced Arbitration Act (EFAA), holding that a high-profile sexual harassment plaintiff cannot avoid arbitration on her sexual harassment and retaliation claims even if some of the hostile conduct took place after the EFAA took effect in March 2022.

The case is Newton v. LVMH, issued on September 21. Plaintiff -- whose testimony before Congress helped lead to the EFAA's enactment -- asserts that she endured sexual harassment prior to March 2022, and that following enactment of the EFAA, the sex discrimination and retaliation continued through her termination in December 2022. Under the EFAA, plaintiff can avoid arbitration on all her claims, including those that accrued prior to March 2022, if they are part of a continuing violation, an equitable principle that allows you to sue over actions that would be otherwise time-barred. 

"However, to trigger the doctrine, the timely and untimely acts must be 'sufficiently related' such that they constitute part of the same 'unlawful employment practice.'” The Court of Appeals (Bianco, Menashi and Brindisi [D.J.]) cites McGullam v. Cedar Graphics, Inc., 609 F.3d 70, 75, 77 (2d Cir. 2010), for this proposition. Until now, McGullam was the leading case on this issue. The Court adds:

To determine whether the requisite relationship between timely and untimely acts has been shown, we consider a variety of factors, including “the commonality of the environment in which the incidents took place (and whether a change in environment is due to intervening action by the employer), the nature of the incidents, and the temporal discontinuity between the incidents.” 

The continuing violation doctrine does not apply here because the pre- and post-EFAA acts of retaliation "are not sufficiently related such that they are 'part of the same course of discriminatory conduct," as "the 'who' and the 'how' of the alleged harassment and retaliation differed between the two relevant time periods." 

Prior to the EFAA's enactment, plaintiff primarily suffered discrimination from colleagues Doran (sexual harassment) and Firestone (who perpetrated the retaliation). The post EFAA retaliation was perpetrated by her supervisor, Pratt. Moreover, pre-EFAA, the Title VII violations involved pure sexual harassment. The post-EFAA violations involved retaliation that differed materially from the pre-EFAA retaliation. Pre-EFAA, plaintiff alleged, the company undertook a sham investigation into her sexual harassment complaint, giving her bad performance reviews, and other acts of workplace hostility. Post-EFAA, she alleges that LVMH engaged in a different pattern of retaliation, including requiring her to get pre-approval before she spoke publicly at panels or conferences, micromanaging her work matters, ignoring her and terminating her employment. There is not enough overlap between -pre- and post-EFAA allegations of retaliation to trigger the continuing violations rule. 

Plaintiff successfully pleads retaliation claim (Newton v. LVMH Part II)

The Court of Appeals has provided further guidance on how to determine if a Title VII retaliation plaintiff pleads a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse action, such as termination. We do not just look at the timing of the adverse action but its context.

The case is Newton v. LVMH, issued on September 21. I covered the protected activity holding at this link. The protected activity took place in August 2022, when plaintiff declined to meet with her supervisor to discuss settling her pending claims. Plaintiff was fired in December 2022. That four-month gap is enough to plead a prima facie case. The Second Circuit has issued numerous rulings stating that a certain time period is enough to assert causation. Here is how the Court (Bianco, Menashi and Brindisi [D.J.]) frames the inquiry in this case:

the time between the refusal and the termination is as much as four months. We have previously held that similar amounts of time are sufficient to suggest causation. See, e.g., Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have previously held that five months is not too long to find the causal relationship.”); Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2014) (five months); Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-Op Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 555 (2d Cir. 2001) (four months). 

Importantly, “[w]here temporal proximity is not the only evidence that bears on a causal connection, we have recognized that the lapse in time between the protected activity and adverse action can be longer.” Banks v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242, 277-29 78 (2d Cir. 2023). That additional evidence of causation can arise in the context of an ongoing discrimination lawsuit brought by the employee. . . . Moreover, in looking at “the facts as a whole,” we can also consider intervening patterns of “antagonism” or a “drumbeat of retaliatory animus” that do not themselves necessarily rise to a level of an adverse employment action.

Plaintiff does not merely rely on temporal proximity but the pattern of antagonism that followed the filing of her lawsuit, including her humiliating, public termination. Ultimately, "the combination of temporal proximity and these antagonistic actions lead us to conclude that Newton has plausibly alleged causation." 

Plaintiff engaged in protected activity in declining to meet with supervisor about settling her pending sexual harassment claims (Newton v. LVMH Part I)

The Court of Appeals has reinstated a Title VII lawsuit that alleged that management retaliated against a lawyer for a prominent international firm after she filed a sex discrimination lawsuit and later on declined to discuss settlement with her superior. The Court further holds that plaintiff has sufficiently plead that her protected activity in declining to discuss settlement led to a series of adverse actions, including her termination.

The case is Newton v. LVMH, issued on September 21. This blog post will cover whether plaintiff engaged in protected activity. 

Plaintiff sued LVMH in 2019 in state court and again in December 2023 in federal court, alleging that she was subjected to sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of state, federal, and city law. (The state court action was sent to arbitration and the Title VII action asserted claims that plaintiff accrued after the Ending Forced Arbitration Act (EFAA), which bars arbitration in sexual harassment cases, took effect.

In August 2022, following what plaintiff claimed was a series of retaliatory acts, including exclusion from a company retreat, disdainful looks at a company retreat, being berated over her job performance, and a time-consuming assignment given while she was on vacation, her boss, Pratt, asked if plaintiff would consider settling her claims. Plaintiff declined the invitation. Afterward, from August 2022 through December 2022, she suffered additional adverse actions, including a requirement that she get pre-approval before she agreed to speak at any panels or conferences (plaintiff was a high-profile public speaker about sexual harassment), exclusion from important communications, being ignored at weekly one-on-one meetings with Pratt, exclusion from an employee's farewell dinner, termination in a publicly humiliating manner, and denied her personal effects, a bonus, and a matching charitable contribution.

The Court of Appeals (Bianco, Menashi and Brindisi (D.J.]) holds that plaintiff engaged in protected activity in refusing to meet with her boss to discuss settlement. This is a new holding for the Second Circuit, which reasons:

If initiating a claim constitutes an assertion that the plaintiff was wronged, refusing to end a pursuit of that same claim with a settlement can—depending on the context—constitute a continuation of the same assertion. The relevant question is whether the employer understood or could reasonably have understood that the plaintiff’s refusal was an assertion of her continued opposition to the employer’s unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII. If so, the refusal is a protected activity.

To trigger the "opposition clause" under Title VII, "such opposition can potentially include not only the filing of a discrimination lawsuit itself, but also other statements made, activities pursued, or positions taken by a plaintiff during the course of that discrimination lawsuit—such as a deposition, settlement discussions, a trial, or an appeal." 

By August 2022, when plaintiff refused to meet with Pratt, she had been vigorously pursuing her legal claims against the company and spoke out before Congress in support of the EFAA. In this context,  "Newton has plausibly alleged that when she refused to meet with Pratt to discuss settlement, he could have reasonably understood that refusal as communicating her continued belief that she had been wronged by [alleged sexual harasser] Doran and LVMH’s discriminatory conduct, and that she wanted acknowledgement and legal redress for those wrongs. That constitutes opposition and, thus, protected activity." The Court states in a footnote that not every refusal to settle constitutes protected activity. "What an employer can reasonably understand such a refusal to communicate depends on the full context of the refusal."

Importantly, the Court further holds it was not fatal that plaintiff did not affirmatively tell Pratt that her refusal to discuss settlement was a means to continue protesting her discrimination. Plaintiff asserts that objection was implicit. The Court reasons:

the Supreme Court has recognized that conduct or communications that reveal opposition, even implicitly, can constitute protected activity. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 277 (2009) (“Countless people were known to ‘oppose’ slavery before Emancipation, or are said to ‘oppose’ capital punishment today, without writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government. And we would call it ‘opposition’ if an employee took a stand against an employer’s discriminatory practices not by ‘instigating’ action, but by standing pat, say, by refusing to follow a supervisor’s order to fire a junior worker for discriminatory reasons.”); accord Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 479 (2011) (concluding that opposition under the NYCHRL does not require an explicit statement that the plaintiff is a victim of discrimination).