The Court of Appeals holds that three Program Integrity Officers who worked for the Orange County Sheriff cannot sue for First Amendment/political affiliation retaliation because they held political jobs, which gave the Sheriff discretion to replace them after they supported the Sheriff's political opponent in the primary election.
The case is Cowart v. Arteta, a summary order issued on October 4. This case highlights an issue that I've raised as a CLE lecturer over the years: that much of constitutional law is judge-made law, and the judges love their multi-part tests, again, created by the courts, in working through the constitutional puzzle. The First Amendment protects the right of speech and political association, but its plain language does not help the courts resolve cases like this. The federal courts, as they have done in all constitutional cases, have therefore created a balancing test. In cases like this, that test pits the individual speech/association right against an elected governmental official's need to implement their policies.
In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), the Supreme Court created a test for political association cases: public employees can be dismissed from employment based on their political affiliations without violating the First Amendment if “the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” The Court did not detail what constitutes "appropriate requirement." For that inquiry, we look to the Second Circuit, which in Vezzetti v. Pellegrini, 22 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 1994), created an eight-factor test. These factors
are “useful in deciding whether a position” is subject to the Elrod-Branti exception: whether the employee (1) is exempt from civil service protection, (2) has some technical competence or expertise, (3) controls others, (4) is authorized to speak in the name of policymakers, (5) is perceived as a policymaker by the public, (6) influences government programs, (7) has contact with elected officials, and (8) is responsive to partisan politics and political leaders.
Further complicating matters, none of these eight factors is dispositive. We look to the totality of the circumstances. No case is going to be so one-sided that the court can easily decide the matter. Defendants will point to some of the factors, and plaintiffs will point to the other factors, and each side will say the balance tips in their favor. But you can see from the eight factors that elected officials and their appointees have wide latitude in hiring and promoting political loyalists despite the First Amendment's protection against associational discrimination.
Here, the Court of Appeals (Merriam, Livingston and Schwartz) says, plaintiffs each held a position for which political affiliation was an appropriate reason to fire them. They conducted officer integrity checks and internal investigations into allegations of officer corruption and/or misconduct, interviewed witnesses and targets of internal investigations, completed and filed classified and confidential reports with the Sheriff, reviewed office policies and forms and ensured compliance with professional police and corrections professional standards, maintained working relationships with Sheriff and Corrections command staff and other agencies, and completed special assignments. This is important work, but was it inherently political in nature? Yes, says the Court of Appeals.
The Sheriff was entitled to replace plaintiffs with people who shared his political views or philosophy. Or his management style. Plaintiffs did not have civil service protection, they were empowered to speak for the Sheriff, their jobs required expertise, and the job description make clear that a PIO has “wide latitude for independent judgment in carrying out” duties “in accordance with established office policies.”