Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Fake case citations sends attorney to the grievance committee

We've all been reading about lawyers getting sanctioned or otherwise thrown into hot water over fake case citations. This was not a problem prior to artificial intelligence. While AI can do legal research for you, it sometimes invents fake cases or uses real cases for false propositions that do not appear in the case. That may have happened here, and the Court of Appeals is taking action against the lawyer.

The case is Ricketts v. Westwood Condominium Association, a summary order issued on November 18. The plaintiff is representing himself pro se. He brings this case under Title VII, the Fair Housing Act and the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act. The case got dismissed under Rule 12 for failure to state a claim. 

Plaintiff did not timely file a notice of appeal from the district court judgment, and that issue takes up the bulk of the Second Circuit's ruling, which finds the notice of appeal was filed too late and the court thus lacks appellate jurisdiction. In this world, the federal notice of appeal is the one deadline that cannot be violated unless you have a damned good reason for it. 

What makes the case notable is the fake case citations. I have not seen this in a Second Circuit ruling prior to now, but this was bound to happen sooner or later. The pro se plaintiff cited cases that would have allowed him to proceed with the appeal. But the Second Circuit finds these citations were bogus. The Court (Walker, Jacobs and Bianco) writes:

Additionally, our review of Ricketts’s opening brief revealed evidence that Ricketts cited to a non-existent case. In particular, Ricketts cites “Serebin v. Healthsource Corp.,” represented to be a 1998 decision of the Seventh Circuit. Appellant’s Br. at 6, 34. However, we could not locate a decision by that name, and the citation for that case led us to a different, unpublished case from the Sixth Circuit irrelevant to the issue for which “Serebin” was cited.

Elsewhere, Ricketts cited cases for propositions that they do not support. See, e.g., id. at 22 (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 986 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1993) for the proposition that “an attorney’s representation regarding authority to accept service is binding absent extraordinary circumstances,” even though no such proposition is contained in that case); id. at 33 (citing Horgan v. Simmons, 704 F. Supp. 2d 814, 818 (N.D. Ill. 2010), and McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009), for the proposition that “[a]sthma has long been recognized as a disability under the ADA where it substantially limits the major life activity of breathing," although neither case involved asthma.

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that lawyers certify that their briefs are relying on valid legal authority. The Court of Appeals refers the plaintiff to the Second Circuit's Grievance Penal for further investigation.

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

No en banc review over challenge to NY's mandatory vaccination law

Last year, the Court of Appeals rejected a constitutional challenge to New York's elimination of any religious exemptions from its mandatory school vaccination law. Previously, like most other states, New York allowed parents to opt out of the vaccinations for religious reasons. The losing parties petitioned the Second Circuit for an en banc ruling, where all the active judges could take up the issue. The Court declines the invitation, but I am willing to bet this case will reach the Supreme Court.

The case is Miller v. McDonald. The en banc denial issued on November 17. This case challenges New York's elimination of religious exemptions from its mandatory school vaccination law. Judges Park,  Bianco, and Menashi dissented from the en banc denial, arguing that the court's decision conflicts with recent Supreme Court precedent protecting parents' rights to direct their children's religious upbringing.

Three Amish schools objected to New York's compulsory vaccination requirement on religious grounds. Hence this lawsuit, Before 2019, the New York Public Health Law permitted exemptions for parents whose sincere religious beliefs conflicted with vaccination. Following measles outbreaks in Brooklyn and Rockland County, the legislature eliminated that exemption, leaving only medical exemptions. By coincidence, the New York Times reports today that the U.S. lost its measles elimination status after more than 25 years.

The Amish schools refused to comply with the vaccination rule, explaining their religious beliefs prohibit vaccination and that communal schooling promotes their faith and way of life. In 2021, the Department of Health audited the schools and imposed fines totaling $118,000 for a single day of noncompliance, calculated at $2,000 per student per day.

The schools argued that eliminating the religious exemption violates the Free Exercise Clause. The Second Circuit did not see it that way and applied rational-basis review under Employment Division v. Smith, from 1990. The Supreme Court later vacated the Second Circuit ruling and remanded for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025). On remand, the panel again affirmed, concluding that Mahmoud applied to cases involving ideological indoctrination in public-school curricula, not vaccination requirements designed to protect public health.

In dissent from the en banc denial, Judge Park argued that the panel misunderstood Mahmoud and Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972). Under those decisions, strict scrutiny applies when government action substantially interferes with parents' ability to direct their children's religious upbringing or threatens to undermine religious beliefs they seek to instill. The vaccination law creates such conflict, Park said, because Amish parents must either vaccinate their children in violation of their religious beliefs or withdraw them from communal schooling, which is indispensable to their religious development. Homeschooling is not an adequate alternative because it separates children from their religious community.

In his own dissent, Judge Menashi agreed that Mahmoud and Yoder require strict scrutiny. He also identified an independent constitutional problem: the statute is not generally applicable because it permits medical exemptions while prohibiting religious exemptions. Under Fulton v. Philadelphia and Tandon v. Newsom, a law triggers strict scrutiny when it treats comparable secular conduct more favorably than religious exercise. Medically-unvaccinated children and religiously-unvaccinated children pose comparable risks of disease transmission. New York cannot avoid that comparison by defining its interest as reducing unvaccinated students to the greatest extent medically possible. Menashi also observed that the decision creates a circuit split, citing First and Tenth Circuit decisions recognizing that medical exemptions may undermine a vaccination mandate's public-health objectives just as religious exemptions would.

When this reaches the Supreme Court, one issue will be the continued viability of the Court's ruling in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), that upheld mandatory vaccinations. Judge Park suggests Jacobson is no longer good law because it predates the complex constitutional tests the Court has since adopted in religious discrimination cases. Judge Park states that "Indeed, it is doubtful that Jacobson applies to free exercise challenges at all," and quotes Justice Gorsuch stating in 2020 that "Jacobson hardly supports cutting the Constitution loose during a pandemic," as "that decision involved an entirely different mode of analysis, an entirely different right, and an entirely different kind of restriction."

Monday, November 16, 2026

Another COVID vaccine termination case fails under the Equal Protection Clause

The Court of Appeals has sustained the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by five former NYPD officers who challenged New York City's COVID-19 vaccination mandate under the Equal Protection Clause.

The case is McCartney v. City of New York, a summary order issued on November 16. Plaintiffs served in the NYPD's elite Bomb Squad and Emergency Service Unit. After refusing to receive COVID-19 vaccinations required by an October 2021 executive order, they were fired or forced to retire. This scenario was common around the country and in New York. People did not want the vaccine, and their terminations led to multiple lawsuits alleging religious freedom and other rights violations. In this case, plaintiffs argued that the City selectively enforced its vaccination requirements because it imposed the mandate on municipal employees while failing to enforce a separate mandate against private-sector employees and exempting professional athletes and entertainers.

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1980). LeClair is an important case that does not cited all that often. A selective-enforcement claim -- truly among the more esoteric claims that you can bring under the Constution -- requires plaintiffs to establish that they were treated differently from similarly situated individuals and that the differential treatment resulted from an impermissible discriminatory motivation, an intent to punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad-faith intent to injure.

The Court of Appeals (Menashi, Schwartz and Kahn) holds that plaintiffs lose because they did not allege that the City selectively enforced the vaccination requirement against them compared with other City employees. Instead, they challenged the City's decision to impose a mandate on municipal employees but not the general public. That amounted to a facial challenge to an allegedly underinclusive regulation, not a selective-enforcement claim. The Court cautioned that expanding LeClair to cover such challenges would improperly blur the distinction between facial and as-applied constitutional claims.

Even assuming City employees were similarly situated to the general public concerning the risk of transmitting COVID-19, the different treatment was justified by legitimate governmental interests. Here is where equal protection jurisprudence gets tricky. Some people are more equal than others, and there are special considerations guiding the treatment of some public workers but not others. Here, City employees provide essential services, and the City has a heightened interest in protecting their health and ensuring the continued operation of municipal services. The Court emphasized that government employers enjoy greater latitude in regulating their employees than the government exercises over the public generally.

Friday, November 13, 2026

2d Amendment victory at the 2d Circuit

Second Amendment litigation is now a regular occurrence in the Second Circuit, as the Court of Appeals continues to interpret the Supreme Court's ruling in New York State Rifle & Piston v. Bruen from 2022, which created a new framework for evaluating the constitutionality of gun laws, making it more difficult to regulate firearms, as courts have to determine if today's gun laws are in alignment with gun restrictions that were in place when the Constitution was enacted; if not, the gun law violates the Second Amendment.

The case is Mills v. City of New York, issued on November 10. Clarifying how courts must apply the Bruen case, the Court of Appeals (Raggi, Livingston and Park) revives several Second Amendment challenges to New York City firearms regulations, holding that restrictions on the number of guns a person may carry, purchase, or register implicate the Second Amendment. The decision clarifies that plaintiffs challenging gun regulations do not have to demonstrate a complete or permanent deprivation of their Second Amendment rights to get past the first step of the Supreme Court's framework in Bruen.

Plaintiffs challenged restrictions including a rule limiting licensees to carrying one handgun at a time, a 90-day waiting period between handgun purchases, and a former regulation limiting the number of handguns that could be registered to a carry license to two. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding the challenged regulations did not implicate conduct protected by the Second Amendment under the first step of Bruen. The Second Circuit vacates the dismissal of several constitutional challenges.

Under Bruen, courts first determine whether the regulated conduct falls within the plain language of the Second Amendment. If it does, the government must establish at the second step that the regulation is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Second Circuit says that the first step is a textual inquiry: the question is whether the regulation restricts the right to keep or bear arms, not whether the regulation is sensible, longstanding, or likely constitutional. Those considerations belong at the second step.

The Court holds that the Second Amendment does not protect only against permanent or complete deprivations of the right to possess firearms. Temporary and partial restrictions can also implicate constitutional rights. The Court adds that plaintiffs do not have to establish at step one that the challenged regulations are effectively prohibited by the Second Amendment. They need only plausibly allege that the regulations restrict conduct covered by its language. The government then bears the burden of establishing historical justification.

The challenge to the City's one-handgun carry rule returns to the district court docket. The district court reasoned that because individuals could still defend themselves with one handgun, the regulation did not interfere with their constitutional rights. Not so fast, says the Second Circuit. The Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms, and does not limit individuals to carrying only the minimum number of weapons that a court might consider necessary for self-defense. More than one gun in the house is okay. Or even more than that.

The Court also revives the challenge to the 90-day purchase restriction. Although the City said the waiting period deterred straw purchases, the Second Circuit said this justification belongs at step two of Bruen. The regulation delays the acquisition of additional firearms and meaningfully undermines the right to keep and bear arms. The Court also reinstated plaintiff's challenge to the former two-handgun registration limit. Because carrying an unregistered handgun was criminalized, the restriction effectively prevented plaintiff from carrying most of his lawfully owned handguns.

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

Rare habeas corpus win at the Court of Appeals

The Second Circuit has upheld a district court ruling that a criminal defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at his murder trial. This rare habeas corpus win involves a murder conviction from 1995

The case is Jones v. Carlos, issued on November 10. The problem with habeas petitions is that in the mid-1990's, Congress made it more difficult to challenge state court convictions in federal court, which must defer to the state courts even if the state courts, in hindsight, got the constitutional issues wrong. The holding is that a criminal defense lawyer cannot ignore the one disinterested eyewitness who might undermine the prosecution’s. In this case, Jones did not receive adequate representation because his attorney did not investigate or interview a witness whose account contradicted the prosecution’s theory of the case. 

The victim, Eddie Harp, was shot and killed outside a New Haven hospital in October 1992. The prosecution's case rested on Tyrone Spears, an admitted participant in the shooting who received a reduced sentence in exchange for testifying against Jones. Spears testified that he, Jones, and another man, Pepper, participated in the killing. Another eyewitness, Sheila McCray, a hospital nurse who knew the victim, told the police shortly after the shooting that she saw only two shooters. She provided descriptions of both men that did not match Jones, and when shown a photographic lineup containing Jones's photograph, she specifically said he was not one of the shooters. McCray had no criminal record or connection to the alleged perpetrators.

McCray should have testified at trial on Jones's behalf, the Court of Appeals says. Jones's attorney, from the Public Defender's office, knew about McCray and her statements but he never interviewed her or tried to line her up for trial. Since the family could not afford a private investigator, the jury never heard from McCray. Her testimony could have made the difference at trial, the Second Circuit (Parker, Lee and Sullivan in dissent) holds. 

The Second Circuit found counsel's performance constitutionally deficient. McCray's account supported the defense theory that there were only two shooters and that Jones was not one of them. Jones's lawyer did not offer a good reason for failing to investigate, suggesting that  witnesses sometimes say things lawyers do not want to hear was insufficient. As the court explained, uncertainty about what a witness might say is precisely why an attorney must investigate. Unexpected witness testimony happens at trial, and lawyers have to take their chances.

Friday, November 6, 2026

Constitutional challenge to NYS election law is moot

 The Second Circuit has dismissed as moot an appeal challenging New York's independent-expenditure disclosure requirements as applied to political advertisements criticizing socialism and the Democratic Socialists of America

The case is American Future Fund v. New York State Board of Elections, issued on November 6.  American Future Fund (AFF) wanted to broadcast advertisements criticizing socialism and the DSA. New York's independent-expenditure law, Election Law § 14-107, requires organizations making certain political expenditures to register with the Board of Elections and regularly disclose specified information. The statute applies to expenditures advocating for or against a "clearly identified candidate." New York regulations identify various factors for determining whether a communication advocates for or against a candidate.

The State argued that AFF's advertisements referencing the DSA could trigger the disclosure requirements because Zohran Mamdani, the only citywide candidate affiliated with the DSA in the 2025 mayoral election, was an identifiable candidate. Mamdani, as you know, won that election and is now the Mayor,

AFF brought a pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge, arguing that the regulations were unconstitutionally vague and improperly swept issue advocacy into the definition of independent expenditures. It sought both declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. It also moved for a preliminary injunction allowing it to broadcast the advertisements while the litigation proceeded.

While the district court denied preliminary relief, finding that AFF had not demonstrated a  likelihood of success on its constitutional claims. AFF appealed. The Second Circuit (Sullivan and Wesley, with Menashi in dissent) dismissed the appeal as moot. The majority says the injury asserted in the preliminary injunction motion concerned AFF's ability to broadcast its advertisements in the weeks preceding the 2025 mayoral election. Because that election had passed, the court could no longer provide effective relief from the particular injury underlying the motion.

The court also rejected the exception for controversies capable of repetition yet evading review. That principle allows you to challenge a rule or regulation where the timeline proceeds too quickly and the courts cannot rule quickly enough to fully resolve the case. Although election-related disputes may qualify for that exception, the majority noted that AFF's lawsuit remains pending in the district court, which can still adjudicate the constitutional challenges, and any final judgment could be reviewed on appeal.

In dissent, Judge Menashi says the appeal is not moot because AFF sought permission to broadcast its advertisements throughout the pendency of the litigation, not merely before the 2025 election. The advertisements did not identify any particular candidate or election and could be broadcast without modification in future election cycles. Alternatively, Judge Menashi concludes the controversy qualified as capable of repetition yet evading review. Election-related restrictions frequently arise too close to an election to permit complete judicial review, and AFF reasonably expected to encounter the same enforcement threat again.

The dissent also reached the First Amendment merits, concluding that AFF was likely to win because its advertisements constituted issue advocacy rather than express advocacy concerning a particular candidate. The Supreme Court has permitted disclosure requirements for communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of clearly identified candidates, but has not approved comparable regulation of communications merely addressing political issues.


Thursday, November 5, 2026

2d Department strikes down Nassau County law on transgender athletes

The culture wars continue to rage on Long Island. In Nassau County, the legislature passed a law prohibiting transgender women from playing team sports with those who were born as women. The New York Civil Liberties Union sued Nassau County, arguing that the law conflicts with the state law prohibition against discrimination on the basis of transgender status.

The case is Long Island Roller Rebels v. County of Nassau, issued by the Second Department on November 4. The Appellate Division strikes down the local law and says that state law guides this case. The plaintiff wins.

As background, the Roller Rebels are an adult womens' roller derby league in Nassau County that includes transgender women, intersex women, and gender-expansive women. They seek to use Nassau County facilities in playing other roller derby teams but were barred from doing so because the league has at least three transgender players. 

The case reached the Appellate Division after a State Supreme Court Justice ruled last year the local law was legal. The lower court said that biological males, regardless of transitioning, have greater athleticism and speed, strength, muscle mass, stronger hearts and greater bone density, and the local law aims to provide a safe environment for biological females. The court added that allowing transgender women to participate might be dangerous and create liability costs for the county. Since federal regulations allow schools to maintain separate teams for women and men in contact sports like roller derby. The court added that Title IX -- the sex discrimination law guiding sports -- prohibits biological men from playing sports with biological women, and that the county law is modeled after a law in Florida. On this logic, federal law preempts the state law on this issue, making the county prohibition against transgender women playing in the roller derby league legal. The lower court added that "The County does not deny transgender individuals access to the Athletic facilities."

 The Second Department rejects this reasoning in full and holds that the County law conflicts with State law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of transgender status. I do not see an analysis of federal statutes such as Title XI in the Appellate Division ruling. Unless the New York Court of Appeals takes on this case, this ruling means that transgender roller derby players may use Nassau County facilities for this competition.