Court finds Village of Pomona discriminated against Jewish organization

We start the new year with a religious discrimination case in which the Court of Appeals finds that a village in Rockland County discriminated against a Jewish organization by passing zoning laws that thwarted the organizations plans for a development that would include a housing complex.

The case is Congregation Rabbinical College of Tarticov v. Village of Pomona, issued on December 20. After the plaintiff organization purchased 100 acres of land, it told the planning board that it wanted to build a religious school for children and a large synagogue. The village began amending its laws in a way that would hamper the development project. Was this discriminatory, or good-faith zoning amendments to protect the village's small-town flavor? We have a long procedural history, not surprising to anyone who is familiar with local planning boards that closely analyze development plans, particularly large ones. In the end, plaintiff sued the village under the Constitution and federal religious discrimination laws. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff, and the village appeals.

The Court of Appeals (Wesley, Chin and Kaplan [D.J.]) mostly agrees with the district court. Under constitutional standards set forth by the Supreme Court, we review religious discrimination claims through circumstantial evidence. Here is the standard:

Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” This evidence may include “the series of events leading up to a land use decision, the context in which the decision was made, whether the decision or decisionmaking process departed from established norms, statements made by the decisionmaking body and community members, reports issued by the decisionmaking body, whether a discriminatory impact was foreseeable, and whether less discriminatory avenues were available.

The Court of Appeals first notes that one set of zoning amendments in 2001 were not intended to be discriminatory. This ruling overturns the district court's contrary analysis. The district court interpreted certain public comments by taxpayers and public officials to reflect discriminatory intent. But the Second Circuit reviews those comments in context and finds the district court's findings of discriminatory intent were clearly erroneous. It is rare for an appellate court to reject the district court's factual findings. The Court of Appeals similarly rejects the district court's findings of discriminatory intent for a second set of laws that the village passed in 2004. The Court of Appeals is somewhat apologetic about these holdings, noting that the district court carefully reviewed the record and that suburban residents and public officials are faced with significant pressures when developmental projects are proposed in their communities. But it's difficult to prove religious discrimination in the zoning context. "There simply is not enough evidence to permit a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the Village acted with discriminatory intent in adopting the 2001 and 2004 local laws. Instead, the evidence suggests that legitimate land use concerns precipitated the passage of these laws."

The zoning amendments of 2007 are a different story. Plaintiff still wanted its development project. The village in 2007 passed dormitory and wetlands laws that interfered with development plans. The district court said this was discriminatory, and the Court of Appeals agrees, summarizing the district court's analysis as follows:

The district court held that the 2007 Dormitory and Wetlands Laws were motivated by discriminatory animus based on the following evidence: (1) villager comments made at a January 22, 2007 public hearing on the draft 2007 Dormitory Law, (2) the absence of studies indicating the necessity or utility of the 2007 Wetlands Law combined with the Village’s knowledge that there were wetlands on the property and the timing of the law’s adoption, (3) the exception for single-family homes in the 2007 Wetlands Law, (4) the campaign promise of Sanderson and Yagel and Louie to stop the threat of the TRC development, (5) statements made by Sanderson, Louie, and Yagel “indicative of [Pomona’s] prejudice against Tartikov and Orthodox/Hasidic Jews,”253 (6) statements made by members of the community “express[ing] animus against Orthodox/Hasidic Jews,” (7) the board’s rejection of proposals to increase the maximum height of dormitories and number of dining facilities allowed in the 2007 Dormitory Law, and (8) the Village’s “behavior with respect to other proposed projects.” 

The Court of Appeals finds the record supports these findings. One notable finding is that public comments may be used against municipal boards if the court finds the comments influenced the board's adverse decision. That is settled law. The Second Circuit writes:

It is impossible for us to glean precisely how the board weighed the villagers’ comments. But that is not our task on appeal. It is clear from Sanderson’s statement that the comments influenced at least his decisionmaking process. Some of those comments were susceptible to an inference of religious animus and hostility toward the group that would be affected negatively by the 2007 Dormitory Law.

Viewing the record as a whole, including “the series of events” leading up to the adoption of the 2007 Dormitory Law, the “context in which the decision[s]” regarding the law were made, and “statements made by the decisionmaking body and community members,” we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in finding that religious animus was a “significant factor in the position taken by . . . those to whom the decision-makers were knowingly responsive.” And this is so notwithstanding that a proposal to add 4,500 new residents and multiple apartment buildings to a small village of single family houses with a population of 3,200 almost certainly would have provoked opposition regardless of any religious element.