District court upholds $100,000 in punitive damages on sexual harassment claim

This sexual harassment case went to trial in federal court in Connecticut in November 2021. The plaintiff prevailed at trial, winning $10,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The trial court upholds the verdict and the punitive damages, rejecting the defendant's post-trial motions.

The case is Champagne v. Columbia Dental, PC, 2022 WL 168967, issued by Judge Bryant on January 19. We don't have a summary of the facts adduced at trial on the hostile work environment, but the trial court does list the allegations in the complaint, which I assume the plaintiff proved at trial:

Here, Stanko threw and punched items in the office, and yelled and cursed during the course of Plaintiff's employment. He also addressed Plaintiff as his `hot assistant' and his `daytime wife,' and massaged her shoulder several times. He engaged in arguably misogynistic conduct, namely forcefully grabbing her hand to force a tube into a patient's mouth, and jamming a drill into her hand, puncturing her glove, and angrily telling her to hold it in place. Plaintiff complained to district manager Ochrim who did not address or attempt to remedy the issue. Plaintiff told Ochrim that because of Stanko's behavior, she could not go back to work with him. In response, Ochrim advised Plaintiff that if she did not work with Stanko then she would not have a job. On another occasion, Plaintiff complained and Ochrim focused on her parental status responding, `ok, but it's a job' and `you do have kids.' Plaintiff mentioned to other employees that because of Stanko's conduct her `anxiety was through the roof.'

While the district court held on the motion to dismiss that "None of these instances taken alone give rise to the conclusion that Plaintiff's work environment was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that was sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile or offensive work environment," when taken in the aggregate, the jury could find she subjectively perceived the environment to be hostile and that her mistreatment was based on her gender." And that's what happened, as proven by the verdict, which includes a successful constructive discharge claim, which plaintiffs rarely win because the legal standard is so high that these claims are usually dismissed on the summary judgment motion. Again, we don't have the trial evidence in this ruling, but the harassment must have been awful for plaintiff to quit and for the jury to find that she had no choice but to resign. Defendant does not even challenge the constructive discharge verdict on the post-trial motion. That concession in many ways is fatal to the post-trial motion: if the trial loser concedes an important part of plaintiff's successful verdict, it is hard to show the verdict in other respects was unjust.

Post-trial, the employer wants the court to take away the verdict, arguing that the jury had no factual basis to find that plaintiff had complained about the sexual harassment, a necessary prerequisite to winning any such claim. Since plaintiff testified that she told the office manager about the harassment, as well as the scheduling supervisor of dental assistants, it does not matter if plaintiff did not follow the reporting procedure to the letter. Here is where the trial judge expresses outrage over the defendant's argument:

Defendant's argument that Plaintiff's informing four of its employees about Dr. Stanko's harassment, two of which were office managers and one of which, Jolanta Ochrim, had responsibility for "safety," constitutes insufficient notice, is callous in the extreme. What Defendant is arguing is that no matter how egregious the sexual harassment, and no matter who the victim informed, a plaintiff's hostile work environment claim must fail if the technicalities of the employer's sexual harassment policy are not followed to the letter, and, in fact, failure to grant Defendant judgment as a matter of law in such a case would constitute "manifest injustice." The Court refuses to countenance such a result, especially considering Defendant's failure to even provide its sexual harassment policy to Dr. Stanko or train him on it.

 Defendant also wants the court to reject the punitive damages award. No dice, says the court. 

First, Defendant's ignoring of Plaintiff's complaints of sexual harassment to four different employees of Defendant, at least two of whom had supervisory responsibilities and one of whom was responsible for, inter alia, "safety," could have been seen by the jury as malicious or recklessly indifferent to Plaintiff's rights, especially since the reports occurred over a six-month period from October 2016 to March 2017. Second, the argument that Defendant's sexual harassment policy immunized it from an award of punitive damages rings hollow, especially in this case where Defendant failed to even provide it to the very person who inflicted the hostile work environment on Plaintiff. Third, the argument that Defendant is not liable for punitive damages because it, or its supervisory employees, did not know that an actual hostile work environment could constitute a violation of Title VII is meritless.

As for the amount of the punitive damages award -- $100,000 -- that falls within the reasonable range of punitives for cases like this. In Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 271 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2001), the Court of Appeals upheld a $100,000 punitive damages award in a sexual harassment case. 

 

Here, Stanko threw and punched items in the office, and yelled and cursed during the course of Plaintiff's employment. See [Dkt. 15 at ¶¶ 19-20]. He also addressed Plaintiff as his ‘hot assistant’ and his ‘daytime wife,’ and massaged her shoulder several times. He engaged in arguably misogynistic conduct, namely forcefully grabbing her hand to force a tube into a patient's mouth, and jamming a drill into her hand, puncturing her glove, and angrily telling her to hold it in place. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22 & 30. Plaintiff complained to district manager Ochrim who did not address or attempt to remedy the issue. Id. at ¶¶ 40-41. Plaintiff told Ochrim that because of Stanko's behavior, she could not go back to work with him. In response, Ochrim advised Plaintiff that if she did not work with Stanko then she would not have a job. Id. ¶ at 29. On another occasion, Plaintiff complained and Ochrim focused on her parental status responding, ‘ok, but it's a job’ and ‘you do have kids.’ Id. at ¶ 43. Plaintiff mentioned to other employees that because of Stanko's conduct her ‘anxiety was through the roof.’ Id. at ¶ 32.

*2 None of these instances taken alone give rise to the conclusion that Plaintiff's work environment was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that was sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile or offensive work environment. However, when taken in the aggregate, a reasonable fact finder could determine that the Plaintiff subjectively perceived the environment to be hostile and that her mistreatment was based on her gender.

Champagne v. Columbia Dental, P.C., No. 3:18-CV-01390 (VLB), 2022 WL 168967, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Jan. 19, 2022)

Stanko threw and punched items in the office, and yelled and cursed during the course of Plaintiff's employment. See [Dkt. 15 at ¶¶ 19-20]. He also addressed Plaintiff as his ‘hot assistant’ and his ‘daytime wife,’ and massaged her shoulder several times. He engaged in arguably misogynistic conduct, namely forcefully grabbing her hand to force a tube into a patient's mouth, and jamming a drill into her hand, puncturing her glove, and angrily telling her to hold it in place. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22 & 30. Plaintiff complained to district manager Ochrim who did not address or attempt to remedy the issue. Id. at ¶¶ 40-41. Plaintiff told Ochrim that because of Stanko's behavior, she could not go back to work with him. In response, Ochrim advised Plaintiff that if she did not work with Stanko then she would not have a job. Id. ¶ at 29. On another occasion, Plaintiff complained and Ochrim focused on her parental status responding, ‘ok, but it's a job’ and ‘you do have kids.’ Id. at ¶ 43. Plaintiff mentioned to other employees that because of Stanko's conduct her ‘anxiety was through the roof.’ Id. at ¶ 32.

*2 None of these instances taken alone give rise to the conclusion that Plaintiff's work environment was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that was sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile or offensive work environment. However, when taken in the aggregate, a reasonable fact finder could determine that the Plaintiff subjectively perceived the environment to be hostile and that her mistreatment was based on her gender.

Champagne v. Columbia Dental, P.C., No. 3:18-CV-01390 (VLB), 2022 WL 168967, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Jan. 19, 2022)