Supreme Court narrowly interprets Americans with Disabilities Act for disabled retiree

The Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the Americans with Disabilities Act in holding the law does not prohibit employers from providing disabled retirees with lesser health-insurance benefits than their non-disabled counterparts. 

The case is Stanley v. City Sanford, issued on June 20. Plaintiff was a firefighter. When the city hired her in 1999, it offered the same health insurance benefits for retirees with 25 years of service and those who retired earlier due to disability. But that policy changed in 2003, when the city provided health insurance up to age 65 only for retirees with 25 years of service, but those who retired earlier due to disability only got 24 months of health insurance. 

While the policy provides lesser health insurance benefits to disabled retirees, it does not violate the ADA because, under the terms of the statute, plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability when the policy was applied against her in 2018, when she took a disability-related retirement. The Court, in a 7-2 vote (Justice Kagan voted with the conservatives), reaches this holding through a straight textualist interpretation of the ADA, an approach the Court has been taking in recent Title VII and other discrimination statutes. 

The plain language of the ADA covers qualified individuals with a disability. The statute speaks in the present tense, referring to current employees, making it unlawful to "discriminate against" someone who "can perform the essential functions" of the job she "holds or desires." Writing for the Court, Justice Gorsuch writes that "Those present-sense verbs signal that [the ADA] protects individuals who, with or without reasonable accommodation, are able to do the job they hold or seek at the time they suffer discrimination." However, the Court says, "the statute does not reach retirees who neither hold nor desire a job at the time of an alleged act of discrimination." Other portions of the ADA also appear to cover present employees, not former employees. In contrast, Title VII contains provisions that expressly protect former employees. 

A plurality of the Court identifies ways that former employees may win a case like this, but none of these scenarios help the plaintiff here. One way to sue is if the employer adopts the policy when the plaintiff was both disabled and qualified for her position when the employer adopted the discriminatory retirement-benefits policy. That did not happen here. Another option would allow people to sue if they were affected by the policy change when they were still qualified individuals, even if they are retired when they bring suit. Again, that does not apply to this case. A third option would take place when an individual is subject to a discriminatory compensation decision. That does not help plaintiff because the complaint does not assert enough facts that would bring her within this statutory protection.