Thursday, June 9, 2011

Pro se plaintiff wins battle of the wills in Second Circuit

In this case, the Second Circuit sides with a pro se litigant who was caught up in a battle of wills with a federal judge in Connecticut, who dismissed his racial discrimination case because plaintiff could not find a lawyer before time ran out.

The case is Leftridge v Connecticut State Trooper, decided on May 12. Leftridge sued the police, claiming that he was pulled over on the highway because of his race. The district court denied his motion for appointment of counsel, since you have not right to counsel in civil cases, only criminal cases. Then, plaintiff kept renewing his motion for the appointment of counsel, but the judge kept denying that motion, even after plaintiff's doctor wrote a letter to the court stating that the stress of litigation was affecting plaintiff's mental health and that he should not be representing himself. Again, the trial court has no duty to follow the doctor's wishes.

But then the district court went too far. After the doctor wrote his letter, the judge entered an order stating that the case would be dismissed if he did not hire counsel by June 29, 2009, and that "given the present circumstances, this case should be administratively closed without prejudice to reopening by an attorney for the plaintiff." When plaintiff on June 22, 2009 asked for more time to hire a lawyer because he was trying to raise money for attorneys' fees, the court denied that application. The court a few days later denied plaintiff's motion to reopen the case. June 29, 2009 came and went, and that was the end of the case.

The Court of Appeals (Kearse, Calabresi and Wesley) revives the case. Leftridge wins the appeal pro se. It was legal for the trial court to deny plaintiff's request for the appointment of counsel, but there was no legal basis for the court threaten to dismiss the case if plaintiff could not find a lawyer. The Court concludes, "If an adult individual wishes to conduct his case pro se, an order requiring him instead to retain counsel to represent him violates § 1654 [the statute that allows individuals to represent themselves pro se]. An order dismissing the action of such a pro se plaintiff for failure to retain counsel is a legal error and cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions. Accordingly, in the present case, the district court's July 2 Order refusing to reopen the case solely because Leftridge had not obtained counsel, thereby precluding him from pursuing his case pro se, constituted an abuse of discretion." Wrapping things up, the Second Circuit provides guidance to district courts in case this ever happens again:

Clearly the court did not abuse its discretion by giving Leftridge time to retain counsel, although it would have been preferable for the court to have said that the action was stayed, rather than closed; and the court should have specified that if Leftridge did not retain counsel (by such deadline as the court imposed) he nonetheless had the option of proceeding pro se. And once Leftridge was unable to retain counsel before the June 29 deadline and asked that the case be reopened in order to allow him to proceed pro se, he should have been allowed to proceed pro se. The inability of an individual litigant to obtain counsel is not a basis for denying him his statutory right to pursue his case pro se.

Monday, June 6, 2011

New York City may exclude certain religious groups from public buildings

This could be the most complicated civil rights case in the Second Circuit this year. The Court of Appeals decides whether New York City's prohibition against groups using public school buildings after hours for religious worship services violates the Establishment Clause. In a 2-1 vote, the Second Circuit upholds the rule and says there is no constitutional violation.

The case is Bronx Household of Faith v. City of New York, decided on June 2. This case has reached the Court of Appeals a few times before, gaining new life thanks to recent Supreme Court rulings that gave religious groups equal rights under the First Amendment to use school buildings in certain circumstances. Those Supreme Court rulings prompted the district court to issue an injunction prohibiting the City from enforcing the rule. While noting that the Supreme Court has not provided clear guidance on this issue (which is why the Second Circuit spent 1.5 years deliberating on this case), the Court of Appeals (Leval, Calabresi in the majority, Walker in dissent) vacates the injunction.

Rule 5.11 prohibits the use of public schools for "religious worship services." Plaintiff wanted to use the school after hours for "Christian worship services." As other organizations get to use the schools for their own purposes, Bronx Household of Faith brought this lawsuit. The Court of Appeals says the rule is not unconstitutional. While the Supreme Court has held in recent years that religious organizations can use public buildings to promote their point of view (placing them on equal ground with non-religious organizations who also use the buildings), Judge Leval says those cases do not apply because plaintiff wants to use the building for "worship services." This is a subtle distinction, one that does not persuade Judge Walker and will probably send this case to the Supreme Court. Here is why the Court of Appeals sided with the City:

The prohibition against using school facilities for the conduct of religious worship services bars a type of activity. It does not discriminate against any point of view. The conduct of religious worship services, which the rule excludes, is something quite different from free expression of a religious point of view, which the Board does not prohibit. The conduct of services is the performance of an event or activity. While the conduct of religious services undoubtedly includes expressions of a religious point of view, it is not the expression of that point of view that is prohibited by the rule.

...

What is prohibited by this clause is solely the conduct of a particular type of event: a collective activity characteristically done according to an order prescribed by and under the auspices of an organized religion, typically but not necessarily conducted by an ordained official of the religion. The conduct of a “religious worship service” has the effect of placing centrally, and perhaps even of establishing, the religion in the school.


In other words, it's the "worship services" angle that rubs the Court of Appeals the wrong way. A religious meeting for purposes of expressing religious devotion through prayer and singing is one thing. Religious services are quite another. Again, this is a fine line. Judge Leval tries to explain it in everyday terms: "There is an important difference between excluding the conduct of an event or activity that includes expression of a point of view, and excluding the expression of that point of view. Under rules consistent with the purposes of the forum, schools may exclude from their facilities all sorts of activities, such as martial arts matches, livestock shows, and horseback riding, even though, by participating in and viewing such events, participants and spectators may express their love of them. The basis for the lawful exclusion of such activities is not viewpoint discrimination, but rather the objective of avoiding either harm to persons or property, or liability, or a mess, which those activities may produce."

The Court then determines that the exclusion is reasonable under the Establishment Clause. The reasonableness analysis is deferential to governmental authorities, but the City is held to this easy standard because the Court of Appeals found that the City's rule does not otherwise violate the First Amendment. The exclusion is reasonable because the City has a "strong basis" to believe that the rule was necessary to avoid an Establishment Clause violation. Among other reasons, the Court finds, "the performance of worship services is a core event in organized religion. ... When worship services are performed in a place, the nature of the site changes. The site is no longer simply a room in a school being used temporarily for some activity. The church has made the school a place for the performance of its rites, and might well appear to have established itself there. The place has, at least for a time, become the church."

Friday, June 3, 2011

Ricci returns to the Second Circuit

After the district court in a reverse-discrimination suit approved a settlement that provided retroactive seniority benefits to 63 black, hispanic and female New York City Department of Education employees, the Supreme Court issued its well-known ruling in Ricci v. DeStefano, which made it much more difficult for municipalities to resolve disparate impact claims without a "strong basis in evidence" to believe it will be subject to disparate impact liability without this remedy. Ricci originated in the Second Circuit, and now it comes back as binding precedent in another case.

The case is U.S. v. New York City Department of Education, decided on May 5. The decision is over 100 pages long, owing to the new and complex standard outlined by the Supreme Court in Ricci (the New Haven firefighters case) and the equally complex puzzle of resolving disparate impact claims where the remedy impacts the employment rights of others not before the court.

In Ricci, the Supreme Court said that, “under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.” In the case before the Second Circuit, the Court throws out the settlement.

The City was originally sued for allegedly using civil service exams that allegedly led to a disparate impact against blacks and Hispanics and also used discriminatory recruiting practices. The case settled in 1999, over the objections of white employees who "objected to four paragraphs that provided permanent appointments and retroactive competitive seniority to 63 black, Hispanic, Asian, or female individuals." In 2001, the Second Circuit vacated the settlement because the white employees should have been allowed to intervene in the lawsuit. They then brought two reverse-discrimination lawsuits against the City. Among other rulings, the district court held that some of the retroactive seniority provided by the settlement agreement was lawful.

The case now returns to the district court. The extensive and painstaking litigation that produced the settlement must be reviewed anew under Ricci. Judge Calabresi writes:

Where, as here, the employer instead provides individualized race- or gender-conscious benefits as a remedy for previous disparate impact, the employer must satisfy the requirements of Ricci, not Johnson and Weber [two prior Supreme Court affirmative action cases], in order to avoid disparate-treatment liability. Under Ricci, the employer must show a strong basis in evidence that, at the time the race- or gender-conscious action was taken, the employer was faced with disparate-impact liability and that the race- or gender-conscious action was necessary to avoid or remedy that liability.


That's life under our appellate system. The trial court works his fingers to the bone applying Supreme Court precedent before new cases come down that change the analysis. The Second Circuit says this is not really an affirmative action case, which is why Johnson and Weber do not apply. This is a Ricci case, where the City tries to avoid a disparate impact judgment and, in so doing, might have handed a disparate treatment case to someone else burdened by the remedy under the settlement. The district court has to look at the case again under Ricci.

Tuesday, May 31, 2011

Plaintiffs cannot sue to enforce housing regulation

Disabled plaintiffs in New Haven sued the Housing Authority of New Haven for instituting and failing to correct policies that violated their right to certain reasonable accommodations. The Court of Appeals affirms the district court's order dismissing the case because the regulations under which plaintiffs bring this action cannot be enforced under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.

The case is Taylor v. New Haven Housing Authority, decided on May 4. The Second Circuit's ruling is quite short, particularly for a published opinion. The Court of Appeals (Kearse, Miner and Chin) is so impressed with the district court's thorough reasoning that the Second Circuit simply adopts Judge Arterton's reasoning in pinpoint fashion, stating, "We adopt the district court's carefully considered and thorough discussion of these issues. See, Taylor v. Housing Authority of New Haven, 267 F.R.D. 36, 40-47, 52-54 (D. Conn. 2010)." Why reinvent the wheel?

The district court ruling tells the story. Plaintiff claimed that the housing authority failed to provide them reasonable accommodations under a regulation that requires private landlords to, i.e., encourage families to locate an available accessible dwelling unit and approve a family request for certain rent exceptions. Plaintiffs' claim draws from a regulation, not an actual statute. There is a difference. You may have to go to law school and take an administrative law class to really understand this, but regulations cannot give rise to a private claim distinct from that conferred by the statute itself. In addition, under Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), "language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not crate a right that Congress has not." In other words, agencies that create the regulations intended to enforce statutes "may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer itself."

This case failed in the district court because the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 -- a federal statute -- speaks broadly in terms of access to benefits but does not speak in terms of specific components of a benefit, program or activity. So, even though the regulations that enforce that statute, may provide that level of specificity, they do not create a private cause of action. The regulations are certainly there for a reason, to provide guidance in the provision of Section 8 benefits, and they certainly may help the disabled in their public housing. But the regulations at issue here, 24 C.F.R. sec. 8.28(a), cannot give rise to this lawsuit.

Wednesday, May 25, 2011

How not to write a Rule 68 offer

All federal litigators should know about Offers of Judgment under Rule 68. The defendant offers to settle the case, and if plaintiff wins the case but recovers less than the Rule 68 offer, then plaintiff pays the defendants' costs and forfeits certain attorneys' fees. A shrewd Rule 68 offer makes the plaintiff think twice about litigating the case any further. Of course, this all requires that the defendant's lawyer serve a proper Rule 68 offer.

The case is Barbour v. City of White Plains, 07 Civ. 3014 (RPP), 2011 WL 2022884, decided by district judge Patterson on May 24. Three plaintiffs sued police officers under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 for civil rights abuses. Shortly before trial, defense counsel served on plaintiffs a Rule 68 offer, amounting to $10,000 for each plaintiff. Plaintiffs took the money, and their attorneys moved for attorneys' fees as prevailing parties. They recover nearly $300,000 in fees. How did this happen?

Most Rule 68 offers state that the settlement offer includes attorneys' fees. Not this one. The offer also did not specify that it included costs. It should have, if that was the defendants' intent. Citing Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), Judge Patterson writes, "if defendants had intended its offers to include costs and attorneys fees, it offers of judgment should have so stated." Not only that, but the judgment signed by Judge Patterson said that judgment was entered in each plaintiffs' favor, "with the costs accrued, including reasonable attorneys' fees, in an amount to be determined by the Court."

Defendants' counsel claimed to be surprised when plaintiffs next moved for attorneys' fees. He argued that the Rule 68 offer was not intended to compensate plaintiffs for all their time expended on the case, and that, at best, the attorneys' fees should have come out of the $10,000 judgment for each plaintiff. No dice, Judge Patterson says. That's an unreasonable interpretation of the Rule 68 offer, all the more so because defendants' counsel drafted the offer. He should have been more careful. Judge Patterson cites a SDNY case from 1989 that's on all fours: "Defendant's counsel simply erred in failing to protect against an acceptance of the offer followed by a request for costs, including attorneys' fees."

This amounts to a poorly-drafted Rule 68 offer that costs the defendants nearly $300,000, in part due to the huge expenditure of time that plaintiffs' counsel reasonably spent in litigating the case and preparing for trial that was only weeks away from the offer. What should have been a $30,000 settlement costs defendants nearly ten times that amount. If defense lawyers are reading this, let this be a lesson to ya. Be careful in writing up those Rule 68 offers.

Tuesday, May 24, 2011

Circuit remands attorneys' fees case yet again

In December 2010, the Court of Appeals resolved an attorneys' fees appeal, remanding the case to the district court to reconsider the fee application because the prevailing attorney did not provide the court with contemporaneous time records, a requirement under Second Circuit precedent.

In that case, Scott v. City of New York, the Second Circuit noted that, in New York State Association for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1983), it held that "all applications for attorneys' fees ... should normally be disallowed unless accompanied by contemporaneous time records indicating, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done." This language was a problem for Thomas Puccio, Esq., the attorney in Scott, who was entitled to more than $500,000 in fees for his work on a collective action case under the Fair Labor Standards Act. For some reason, his time records were not contemporaneously maintained, and in remanding the case to the district court, you wondered if counsel would get no money at all. The Court of Appeals in December 2010 provided the governing standard for the district court:

While we can imagine rare circumstances where an award of fees might be warranted even in the total absence of contemporaneous records — such as where the records were consumed by fire or rendered irretrievable by a computer malfunction before counsel had an opportunity to prepare his application — the circumstances justifying such an exception would have to be found by the awarding court and laid out in sufficient detail to permit review of the justification on appeal.


This is a tough standard to meet. Did counsel's office burn down? Did his computer malfunction? No. I thought counsel would get no attorneys' fees, and that $515,000 would fly out the window, but district judge Scheindlin again awarded counsel his attorney's fees on remand. In Scott v. City of New York, 2011 WL 867242 (SDNY March 9, 2011), the district court stated that "there must be an exception under Carey based on my personal observation of Puccio and his contribution to this extraordinarily lengthy and complex litigation." Here is the crux of Judge Scheindlin's reasoning:


Puccio, who is primarily a criminal defense attorney, is a highly respected member of the bar. Puccio, and his outstanding reputation as a skilled litigator and effective advocate, are well known to this Court. It would be fundamentally unfair and inequitable to deprive Puccio of an already deeply discounted fee award where this Court personally observed the vital and integral role he played in this protracted FLSA action.

I personally observed Puccio function as lead trial counsel in a trial that lasted sixteen days, from 10:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. each day. Puccio was present for the entire trial and he gave the closing argument. When a modest travel allowance is added, the trial alone accounts for approximately 120 hours of in-court work. In addition, Puccio was present for most of the numerous in-person and telephone conferences that preceded the trial. I also received many letters and faxes from Puccio throughout the course of the litigation.

While Puccio has not presented this Court with the type of exception noted by the Second Circuit - e.g., a fire or a computer malfunction - fundamental concepts of fairness mitigate against the denial of any fee under the circumstances presented here. I surely appreciate the need for a bright line rule requiring the submission of contemporaneous time records. And I am loathe to create a “personal observation” exception. Nonetheless, given Puccio's extensive involvement in the case for more than six years, his severely reduced fee award, his predominantly criminal practice, and his role as lead trial counsel, no fee would be fundamentally unfair. In sum, despite the fact that Puccio did not submit contemporaneous time records in support of his fee application, I conclude that the deeply discounted original fee award of $515,179.28 is reasonably supported by the record in this case and my personal observation of Puccio's efforts throughout this litigation.


This is common sense, but is it appropriate under the Second Circuit's test in this very case? Not really, the Second Circuit held on May 24, taking up the case again. The Court of Appeals reminds us that the failure to provide contemporaneous time records may be excused only in extreme cases. The district court's equitable ruling in counsel's favor will not cut it, as that kind of judgment is not fair to lawyers who are not well-known to the court or do not otherwise have stellar reputations.

On the other hand, the Second Circuit (Miner, Katzmann and Hall) finds that the district court may award fees in a case like this if it is clear from the record that counsel did try the case and also attended court conferences. To that end, while the "personal observation" exception does not work under the Second Circuit's stringent standard, Judge Scheindlin was in the right ballpark. The Second Circuit says, "an award based entirely on the district court judge's personal observation and opinions of the applying attorney ... is contrary to Carey and must be vacated." Yet, we know the lawyer did try the case. So, the Court of Appeals says, "entries in the official court records (e.g., the docket, minute entries, and transcriptions of proceedings) may serve as reliable documentation of an attorney's compensable hours in court at hearings and at trial and in conferences with the judge or other court personnel. Where the court's docket reflects that Puccio was in the courtroom participating in trial or was in chambers in conference with the judge and other counsel, these entries, comparable to contemporaneous time records, may be effective substitutes for Puccio's own contemporaneous records." But the Second Circuit says it does not want an attorneys' fees award based on the kind of conjecture that the district court engaged in, i.e., awarding fees based on 120 hours of trial time.

The case is remanded once again to the district court to recalculate counsel's attorneys' fees. It looks like counsel will not get the $515,000 in attorneys fees that the district court had originally awarded him. The award will be limited to counsel's work that is reflected in the district court's docket entries. But he will get something out of this case, and something is always better than nothing.

Monday, May 23, 2011

Second Circuit revives age discrimination claim

The Court of Appeals will vacate summary judgment in an employment discrimination case if the employer's reasons for firing the plaintiff are pretextual (or knowingly false) and there is something discriminatory about the case. In this case, an age discrimination case is revived because there was pretext all over the place, along with some ageist jokes.

The case is O'Reilly v. Marina Dodge, a summary order decided on May 19. O'Reilly was a salesman in the service department for Marina Dodge. This 58 year-old was replaced by a 36 year-old. Management said that "Mr. Kaiser would be a better option than [O’Reilly] as a result of its prior experiences with Mr. Kaiser and Plaintiff O’Reilly’s continued disorganization, lackadaisical approach to his job performance, failure and refusal to embrace new initiatives to increase profitability, and his negative attitude about the workplace.” Here is why O'Reilly wins the appeal:

1. There is no contemporaneous evidence of plaintiff's poor job performance. No negative performance reviews or write-ups and, instead, management praised his performance and gave him performance bonuses. The only evidence of poor performance comes in the form of affidavits submitted by management in support of the summary judgment motion.

2. Defendant said that plaintiff had a negative and lackadaisical attitude, but the evidence suggests that he was always a good worker for many years despite his disorganization. The Second Circuit (Parker, Pooler and Lohier) says, "Supervisor Lootens stated that “profitability expectations” became greater in 2006 and 2007, and that a more 'organized' worker would be better, but Lootens does not explain why O’Reilly was able to meet the previous profitability goals but not the new goals. Indeed, there is no evidence that O’Reilly ever was disciplined for not bringing in enough work or for being disorganized, nor is there evidence that he was spoken to about these matters. A reasonable jury could find that these post hoc explanations were pretextual."

In the context of O'Reilly's alleged bad attitude, the Court of Appeals takes into account the ageist jokes in the workplace that suggested co-workers thought he was senile and forgetful and made fun of his bald head. The Court writes, "Although it may be a close factual call, a reasonable jury could find that the employees – including President Gabriele and Supervisor Lootens, who participated directly in the decision to fire O’Reilly – were relying on stereotypes of older people when they 'teased' O’Reilly."

3. And speaking of ageist stereotypes, defendant said it fired plaintiff because he resisted new initiatives. In fact, the evidence suggests that O'Reilly did take the lead on some new initiatives and, in any event, this critique may be stereotypical. The Court writes, "Marina Dodge’s claim that O’Reilly resisted 'new initiatives' while at Marina Dodge must be evaluated in light of the arguably ageist jokes O’Reilly suffered at Marina Dodge. A common stereotype of elderly people is that they resist change and new approaches. A reasonable jury could find that Marina Dodge’s claim that O’Reilly resisted 'new initiatives' was a pretext for Marina Dodge’s desire for a younger employee to interact with customers and was based on Marina Dodge’s unfounded assumption that a younger (36-year old) employee would better implement 'new initiatives' than an older (almost-59-year old) employee."

Finally, defendant raised an argument that is common to these cases: that it did not engage in age discrimination because older people still worked there after plaintiff was fired. The Court of Appeals is not buying it. "Although people above age 59 worked at Marina Dodge after O’Reilly was fired, none worked in the Service Department. A reasonable jury could find that Marina Dodge did not (and does not) believe that older people are unsuited for all work at Marina Dodge – but that Marina Dodge believed that such people are unsuited for high-pressure sales work in the Service Department, including convincing customers to pay for more (and more expensive) maintenance or repairs. Age discrimination is illegal, regardless of whether it is targeted at certain jobs."