When is management required to start the interactive process under the Americans with Disabilities Act?

In 2008, the Court of Appeals made it easier for employees to get a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act even when they don't specifically request an accommodation. The employer has to start the interactive process if it knows the employee has a disability and needs an accommodation. But that doctrine has its limits, and this case highlights that.

The case is Dolac v. County of Erie, a summary order issued on November 12. The district court said plaintiff cannot state a claim under the ADA. The Court of Appeals agrees that plaintiff cannot state a prima facie case because all she did was give her employer three notes from a nurse practitioner stating "off work DBL," "continue DBL," and "continue disability." 

In a prior case, Costabile v. NYC Health & Hosp., 951 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2020), the Court of Appeals said that while the plaintiff sent his employer medical notes that updated management about his condition and suggested he needed leave, the Court could not "reasonably infer from the general allegation that the updates adequately informed Defendants about the nature of Plaintiff's condition such that Defendants should have known he was disabled and that Plaintiff was thereby excused from the requirement that he request an accommodation." I would guess that Costabile is the employer's go-to case on issues like this, when plaintiffs invoke Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2008), the case I mentioned in the first paragraph about management's obligation to start the interactive process when it knows plaintiff is disabled and needs an accommodation.

This case is like Costabile, the Court of Appeals (Jacobs, Pooler, Gujarati [D.J.]) says. Dolac's missives to management were not enough to trigger the interactive process. Here is the reasoning:

Here, Dolac alleges she sent three notes and the exhibits appear to indicate she refused to engage in further communication. In her briefing, Dolac argues that she was suffering from extreme stress and therefore could not communicate with her employer. But she cites to no cases that support her proposition that she did not have to communicate with her employer. Her interpretation would put the onus on the employer to determine whether its employee was suffering from a disability and then inquire as to what accommodation the employee would seek—actions not required by either the statute or case law.

The moral of the story is that, if possible, the employee must be explicit in asking management for an accommodation. If she fails to do so, a good lawyer may cite Brady in litigation to show that management should have known all along that an accommodation was needed. But Brady does not save every case.