Friday, August 7, 2026

Excessive force claim returns to the district court for further review

In this case, the plaintiff found himself back in jail after violating parole. While in jail, he claims, CO's beat him up, Hence this lawsuit asserting excessive force. The trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment, but the officers appealed to the Second Circuit, which teaches us again what happens when your civil rights lawsuit raises an esoteric issue that the courts have not definitively resolved in prior cases.

The case is Farrington v. Poole, issued on August 6. Excessive force claims come in two forms. If you are convicted of a crime and incarcerated at state prison, then it's an Eighth Amendment case, where you have to show the officer inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain that would amount to cruel and unusual punishment. To win such a claim, the plaintiff must show the officer subjectively and objectively intended to inflict such harm. But if you are a pretrial detainee, not yet convicted of anything, your excessive force claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, which carries a more lenient standard for the plaintiff, who only has to show the force was purposely or knowingly employed in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

Here's the problem: plaintiff was once convicted of a crime, but he was eventually released from jail on parole. But he violated parole, pleading guilty to that violation at the parole hearing. So he returned to jail, but not state prison. He instead went to the Albany County Jail, where he claims the officers subjected him to excessive force. Parole violators who bring these claims are in a constitutional gray area. Some courts say their claims are governed under the more lenient Fourteenth Amendment. Other courts say these are really Eighth Amendment cases because they have already been convicted of a crime in the past. 

The Second Circuit (Cabranes, Livingston and Menashi) holds that, since plaintiff pled guilty to a parole violation, this is an Eighth Amendment case, not a Fourteenth Amendment case. In resolving the summary judgment motion in plaintiff's favor, the trial court said this was really a Fourteenth Amendment case, as it was not brought to the trial court's attention that plaintiff actually pled guilty to the parole violation. Since plaintiff's case must be resolved under the Eighth Amendment, the case returns to the district court to review the motion for summary judgment again under the more defendant-friendly legal standard. 

The Court of Appeals does not definitively decide whether inmates accused of violating parole who also claim excessive force are Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment plaintiffs. That issue will be decided in some future case. The Court does not have to resolve that issue here because plaintiff's case is clearly an Eighth Amendment case, as he pled guilty to parole violation. In concurrence, Judge Menashi surveys the district court rulings in this area and says that even those accused of violating parole, even if they are not yet convicted of violating parole, are Eighth Amendment plaintiffs, as they have already been convicted of some crime in the past, which is why they ultimately got parole to start with. 

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