In 2019, the State Legislature amended the New York State Human Rights Law to make it less burdensome for employment discrimination plaintiffs to win their cases. Prior to that, the state HRL was usually an afterthought and an add-on claim to the federal causes of action that most plaintiffs cited in federal court. The HRL is now stronger than federal law in many ways. But in portions of the amended statute, the language was not clear about the plaintiff's evidentiary burden. This ruling by the Appellate Division Second Department provides some guidance, holding that the state law aligns with the New York City Human Rights Law, long recognized as one of the most liberal antidiscrimination laws in the country.
The case is Wright v. White Plains Hosp. Medical-Center, issued on April 23. Plaintiff alleged she was fired because of her pregnancy. Supreme Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Prior to 2019, the Second Department notes, "The standards for establishing unlawful discrimination under the NYSHRL previously were the same as those governing title VII cases." When the HRL was amended, however, the State Legislature advanced this statutory construction: the HRL should “be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article, have been so construed.” That's good language for plaintiffs. What does it mean?
The Appellate Division says this language means "the NYSHRL now aligns with the standards of the New York City Human Rights Law." In addition, "Under the NYCHRL, unlawful discrimination must play 'no role' in an employment decision. Thus, a defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be analyzed under both the familiar framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and under the newer mixed-motive framework, which imposes a lesser burden on a plaintiff opposing such a motion."
Also, “A defendant must make ‘a prima facie showing that there is no evidentiary route that could allow a jury to believe that discrimination played a role in their challenged actions.’ A plaintiff may defeat summary judgment by coming forward either with evidence that the defendant’s stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination or with evidence that discrimination was one of the motivating factors for the defendant’s conduct.”
This language looks to be more favorable for employment discrimination plaintiffs than the prior state HRL. So that's good for plaintiffs. But it does not help this plaintiff. The Second Department, which uses this case as a vehicle to explain the contours of the amended law, finds (with limited factual analysis) that plaintiff still cannot win the case because "the plaintiff offered nothing but speculation that the decision to terminate her employment was motivated, even in part, by unlawful discrimination."
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