Disability discrimination plaintiff can win under City Human Rights Law but not federal law

The Court of Appeals has held that a disability discrimination plaintiff may proceed against her former employer under the New York City Human Rights Law, even if she cannot prevail under federal law. This case reminds us that, since the City HRL relaxes the plaintiff's liability burden, cases may win under that statute even if they fail under the more stringent Americans with Disabilities Act.

The case is Parker v. Israel Discount Bank, issued on June 27. I represented the plaintiff on appeal. Plaintiff was a computer security specialist who suffered a hand injury and requested a workplace accommodation. She was terminated from her position shortly thereafter. Defendant claimed she was fired for performance deficiencies. Plaintiff disputed those allegations and pointed to the questionable sequence of events leading up to her termination. The district court granted summary judgment for the bank on plaintiff's claims brought under federal, state and city law. Parker then appealed.

Here is where things got interesting. In its first ruling in this case, affirming summary judgment on the federal claim, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff cannot prevail under the ADA. But the Court also vacated summary judgment on the claims brought under the State and City Human Rights Laws, ruling that the trial court abused its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over the state and city claims after it dismissed the federal claim. Recall that the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. 1367 directs federal courts to remand the dangling state and city claims if the federal claim is dismissed, though trial courts have some authority to retain those claims as well. In vacating summary judgment on the state and city claims, the Second Circuit did not rule that plaintiff may prevail under these statutes; it merely said these cases can only be reviewed by a state court now that the federal claim is gone. The most likely scenario would be that, upon remand to state court, the bank would file a motion to dismiss on the basis that the same analysis that led to dismissal of the federal claim would compel dismissal of the state and city claims. That is not a rock-solid argument, as the city law claim in particular operates under a different legal framework, but arguments like that are commonplace when the city law claim is kicked over to state court after a federal judge dismisses the federal claim.

Since it did not want State Supreme Court to review this claim on the merits on remand, the bank next moved for reargument, claiming there was no abuse of discretion in retaining (and then dismissing) the state and city law claims since plaintiff did not even make that argument on appeal and, in any event, the same evidence that compelled dismissal of the federal claim would justify dismissing the state and city claims. In opposition the the bank's motion, we argued that case law supports the position that the district court abused its discretion in retaining and then dismissing the state and city claims after it dismissed the ADA claim, as the state and city claims are better suited for State Supreme Court, since they carry different standards of proof for the plaintiff. We also argued that plaintiff can prevail in State Supreme Court under the state and city laws, as they have a more lenient burden of proof in discrimination cases.

The Court of Appeals (Calabresi, Kahn and Carney) resolved the motion for re-argument by doing something unexpected: it did not re-examine its initial finding that the trial court abused its discretion in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the state and city claims. Instead, the Second Circuit resolved the state and city claims on the merits, reviving the city law claim completely and remanding it for trial. Defendant's motion for reargument backfired.

The Court first held the state law claim was properly dismissed, as it follows the same evidentiary burden as the federal claim, since plaintiff was fired before the new and improved State HRL was enacted in 2019. (I argued that some state law claims predating the 2019 amendments still advocated the "motivating factor" and not the "but for" causation test, but the Second Circuit probably thought those cases were outliers and that the "but for" test was the real test pre-2019). So the state law claim is gone for good.

But the Court of Appeals also held that the district court improperly dismissed the city law claim because, under the more pro-plaintiff standards guiding the City HRL, plaintiff has enough evidence to prevail at trial. The key principle guiding this holding is that "a plaintiff can defeat summary judgment merely by 'produc[ing] some evidence to suggest that at least one reason is false, misleading, or incomplete.'” The cite for that is Cadet-Legros v. N.Y.U. Hosp. Ctr., 21 N.Y.S.3d 221, 226 (1st Dept. 2015). Federal law does not recognize this principle. As the Second Circuit sees it, pre-2019 state law claims did not recognize that principle, either. The Court holds that plaintiff has presented a "triable issue as to whether IDB’s reasons for terminating her were 'incomplete' and whether discrimination was 'one of a number of mixed motives' for her termination." The city law claim is revived and will go to trial.

The Second Circuit, in other words, used the motion for reargument (filed by defendant) to rule in plaintiff's favor on the merits. While the Court did not specify why it said plaintiff can prevail at trial on the City HRL, I believe it was plaintiff's testimony that, when she requested a reasonable accommodation, her supervisor "became angry and threatened me that I was not going to survive" at the bank. That admission highlights an improper motive to fire the plaintiff because she requested a reasonable accommodation.