Supreme Court says excessive force victim cannot sue federal jailers under the Constitution

The Supreme Court has ruled that an inmate in federal custody cannot assert an excessive force claim against his jailers because federal law does not recognize a damages claim for cases like this.

The case is Goldey v. Fields, issued very quietly on June 30, a few days after the Court issued its headline decisions this term. In you sue state or local officials for excessive force, you can do so under Section 1983, the civil rights act that provides for an assortment of damages. But if you sue federal officers for a civil rights violation, there is no Section 1983. Rather, you bring a Bivens action, named after a Supreme Court case from 1971 that identified such claims in limited circumstances. 

Here's the problem: the Court has authorized such cases in a handful of cases, such as employment discrimination and certain police misconduct cases. Each time the Supreme Court gets another Bivens case, it shoots it down. In this case, the Court notes, after permitting only three such cases to proceed from 1971 through the late 1970s, "After 1980, we have declined more than 10 times to extend Bivens to cover other constitutional violations. Those many post-1980 Bivens 'cases have made clear that, in all but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.'”

In this case, the Fourth Circuit said plaintiff could sue prison officials at a federal facility for excessive force. But that ruling collides with the Supreme Court's test for these cases:

To determine whether a Bivens claim may proceed, the Court has applied a two-step test. First, the Court asks whether the case presents “a new Bivens context”—that is, whether the case “is different in a meaningful way” from the cases in which this Court has recognized a Bivens remedy.  

Second, if so, we then ask whether there are “special fac- tors” indicating that “the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” That analysis is anchored in “separation-of-powers principles.”

The Supreme Court has never recognized a claim like this under Bivens. While Congress has legislated in the area of prisoner litigation, it has never passed a law providing for money damages in excessive force claims. "In addition, extending Bivens to allow an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force could have negative systemic consequences for prison officials and the 'inordinately difficult undertaking' of running a prison." And, there is another way, beyond a civil rights lawsuit, for aggrieved federal prisoners to recover a remedy, though the Court does not identify such a remedy here. The Court is probably referring to an internal grievance process which may in theory validate the inmate's complaint but will not allow him to recover any damages.

This analysis convinces the Court, even without briefing or oral argument, that the plaintiff cannot litigate this case in court. It is up to Congress to deal with excessive force in federal prisons. I seriously doubt the current Congress will pass any such law. While you may be outraged that the Court has disposed of this case in summary fashion, note that the three liberal Justices have signed onto it without dissent. That's how difficult it is these days to litigate a Bivens claim