Second Circuit clarifies prior ruling on reasonable accommodations in religious discrimination cases

The Court of Appeals has clarified a prior ruling interpreting Title VII's requirement that the plaintiff prove she was denied a reasonable accommodation because of her religion. The clarification does not alter the ultimate ruling in this case, but it offers a more plaintiff-friendly rule for other cases.

The case is Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System, issued on September 15. My summary of the original ruling, issued on July 15, is here. In that post, I wrote:

The Second Circuit holds that its prima facie test for failure-to-accommodate claims is no longer good law following the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores. The Circuit thus vacated summary judgment entered in favor of a court officer who was fired after refusing to comply with the Unified Court System's COVID-19 vaccine mandate.

. . . 

“An employer who has actual knowledge of the need for an accommodation does not violate Title VII by refusing to hire an applicant if avoiding that accommodation is not his motive,” just as “an employer who acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed.”

The Supreme Court thus rejected one requirement of our old rule (that a plaintiff inform an employer of the need for an accommodation) and clarified that what a plaintiff must plead and, ultimately, prove (that the employer was motivated in part by the desire to avoid offering a religious accommodation). The Supreme Court explained that a “request for accommodation, or the employer’s certainty that the practice exists, may make it easier to infer motive,” but it “is not a necessary condition of liability.”

In other words, the plaintiff has to show that management was motivated to deny the accommodation due to her religion. In the clarification issued on September 15, the Court adds a footnote stating that "Plaintiff must show the accommodation was denied because of religion, but she does not have to prove traditional discriminatory animus or hostility toward religion." Here is the footnote in full:

In stating that Abercrombie abrogated the absence of a “motive” requirement in our prior test, we do not suggest that a new, heightened discriminatory motive requirement exists in failure-to-accommodate cases. That is to say, an employee asserting a failure-to-accommodate claim need not show that an employer’s denial of an accommodation was motivated by discriminatory animus against religion. But, consistent with Abercrombie, the employee does have to show that the denial was “because” of the employee’s religion as opposed to, say, the employee’s failure to timely provide sufficient information.

Another change to the original opinion is a footnote that references the Supreme Court's ruling in Muldrow, which made it easier for plaintiffs to prove an adverse action in discrimination cases. Muldrow dispenses with the requirement that plaintiffs show the personnel action was a "material" change in his employment. Instead, the plaintiff must show "some harm." In the new footnote, the Court of Appeals declines to find whether or not the denial of a reasonable accommodation would constitute an adverse action under Muldrow.