Monday, November 16, 2026

Another COVID vaccine termination case fails under the Equal Protection Clause

The Court of Appeals has sustained the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by five former NYPD officers who challenged New York City's COVID-19 vaccination mandate under the Equal Protection Clause.

The case is McCartney v. City of New York, a summary order issued on November 16. Plaintiffs served in the NYPD's elite Bomb Squad and Emergency Service Unit. After refusing to receive COVID-19 vaccinations required by an October 2021 executive order, they were fired or forced to retire. This scenario was common around the country and in New York. People did not want the vaccine, and their terminations led to multiple lawsuits alleging religious freedom and other rights violations. In this case, plaintiffs argued that the City selectively enforced its vaccination requirements because it imposed the mandate on municipal employees while failing to enforce a separate mandate against private-sector employees and exempting professional athletes and entertainers.

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1980). LeClair is an important case that does not cited all that often. A selective-enforcement claim -- truly among the more esoteric claims that you can bring under the Constution -- requires plaintiffs to establish that they were treated differently from similarly situated individuals and that the differential treatment resulted from an impermissible discriminatory motivation, an intent to punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad-faith intent to injure.

The Court of Appeals (Menashi, Schwartz and Kahn) holds that plaintiffs lose because they did not allege that the City selectively enforced the vaccination requirement against them compared with other City employees. Instead, they challenged the City's decision to impose a mandate on municipal employees but not the general public. That amounted to a facial challenge to an allegedly underinclusive regulation, not a selective-enforcement claim. The Court cautioned that expanding LeClair to cover such challenges would improperly blur the distinction between facial and as-applied constitutional claims.

Even assuming City employees were similarly situated to the general public concerning the risk of transmitting COVID-19, the different treatment was justified by legitimate governmental interests. Here is where equal protection jurisprudence gets tricky. Some people are more equal than others, and there are special considerations guiding the treatment of some public workers but not others. Here, City employees provide essential services, and the City has a heightened interest in protecting their health and ensuring the continued operation of municipal services. The Court emphasized that government employers enjoy greater latitude in regulating their employees than the government exercises over the public generally.

Friday, November 13, 2026

2d Amendment victory at the 2d Circuit

Second Amendment litigation is now a regular occurrence in the Second Circuit, as the Court of Appeals continues to interpret the Supreme Court's ruling in New York State Rifle & Piston v. Bruen from 2022, which created a new framework for evaluating the constitutionality of gun laws, making it more difficult to regulate firearms, as courts have to determine if today's gun laws are in alignment with gun restrictions that were in place when the Constitution was enacted; if not, the gun law violates the Second Amendment.

The case is Mills v. City of New York, issued on November 10. Clarifying how courts must apply the Bruen case, the Court of Appeals (Raggi, Livingston and Park) revives several Second Amendment challenges to New York City firearms regulations, holding that restrictions on the number of guns a person may carry, purchase, or register implicate the Second Amendment. The decision clarifies that plaintiffs challenging gun regulations do not have to demonstrate a complete or permanent deprivation of their Second Amendment rights to get past the first step of the Supreme Court's framework in Bruen.

Plaintiffs challenged restrictions including a rule limiting licensees to carrying one handgun at a time, a 90-day waiting period between handgun purchases, and a former regulation limiting the number of handguns that could be registered to a carry license to two. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding the challenged regulations did not implicate conduct protected by the Second Amendment under the first step of Bruen. The Second Circuit vacates the dismissal of several constitutional challenges.

Under Bruen, courts first determine whether the regulated conduct falls within the plain language of the Second Amendment. If it does, the government must establish at the second step that the regulation is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Second Circuit says that the first step is a textual inquiry: the question is whether the regulation restricts the right to keep or bear arms, not whether the regulation is sensible, longstanding, or likely constitutional. Those considerations belong at the second step.

The Court holds that the Second Amendment does not protect only against permanent or complete deprivations of the right to possess firearms. Temporary and partial restrictions can also implicate constitutional rights. The Court adds that plaintiffs do not have to establish at step one that the challenged regulations are effectively prohibited by the Second Amendment. They need only plausibly allege that the regulations restrict conduct covered by its language. The government then bears the burden of establishing historical justification.

The challenge to the City's one-handgun carry rule returns to the district court docket. The district court reasoned that because individuals could still defend themselves with one handgun, the regulation did not interfere with their constitutional rights. Not so fast, says the Second Circuit. The Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms, and does not limit individuals to carrying only the minimum number of weapons that a court might consider necessary for self-defense. More than one gun in the house is okay. Or even more than that.

The Court also revives the challenge to the 90-day purchase restriction. Although the City said the waiting period deterred straw purchases, the Second Circuit said this justification belongs at step two of Bruen. The regulation delays the acquisition of additional firearms and meaningfully undermines the right to keep and bear arms. The Court also reinstated plaintiff's challenge to the former two-handgun registration limit. Because carrying an unregistered handgun was criminalized, the restriction effectively prevented plaintiff from carrying most of his lawfully owned handguns.

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

Rare habeas corpus win at the Court of Appeals

The Second Circuit has upheld a district court ruling that a criminal defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at his murder trial. This rare habeas corpus win involves a murder conviction from 1995

The case is Jones v. Carlos, issued on November 10. The problem with habeas petitions is that in the mid-1990's, Congress made it more difficult to challenge state court convictions in federal court, which must defer to the state courts even if the state courts, in hindsight, got the constitutional issues wrong. The holding is that a criminal defense lawyer cannot ignore the one disinterested eyewitness who might undermine the prosecution’s. In this case, Jones did not receive adequate representation because his attorney did not investigate or interview a witness whose account contradicted the prosecution’s theory of the case. 

The victim, Eddie Harp, was shot and killed outside a New Haven hospital in October 1992. The prosecution's case rested on Tyrone Spears, an admitted participant in the shooting who received a reduced sentence in exchange for testifying against Jones. Spears testified that he, Jones, and another man, Pepper, participated in the killing. Another eyewitness, Sheila McCray, a hospital nurse who knew the victim, told the police shortly after the shooting that she saw only two shooters. She provided descriptions of both men that did not match Jones, and when shown a photographic lineup containing Jones's photograph, she specifically said he was not one of the shooters. McCray had no criminal record or connection to the alleged perpetrators.

McCray should have testified at trial on Jones's behalf, the Court of Appeals says. Jones's attorney, from the Public Defender's office, knew about McCray and her statements but he never interviewed her or tried to line her up for trial. Since the family could not afford a private investigator, the jury never heard from McCray. Her testimony could have made the difference at trial, the Second Circuit (Parker, Lee and Sullivan in dissent) holds. 

The Second Circuit found counsel's performance constitutionally deficient. McCray's account supported the defense theory that there were only two shooters and that Jones was not one of them. Jones's lawyer did not offer a good reason for failing to investigate, suggesting that  witnesses sometimes say things lawyers do not want to hear was insufficient. As the court explained, uncertainty about what a witness might say is precisely why an attorney must investigate. Unexpected witness testimony happens at trial, and lawyers have to take their chances.

Friday, November 6, 2026

Constitutional challenge to NYS election law is moot

 The Second Circuit has dismissed as moot an appeal challenging New York's independent-expenditure disclosure requirements as applied to political advertisements criticizing socialism and the Democratic Socialists of America

The case is American Future Fund v. New York State Board of Elections, issued on November 6.  American Future Fund (AFF) wanted to broadcast advertisements criticizing socialism and the DSA. New York's independent-expenditure law, Election Law § 14-107, requires organizations making certain political expenditures to register with the Board of Elections and regularly disclose specified information. The statute applies to expenditures advocating for or against a "clearly identified candidate." New York regulations identify various factors for determining whether a communication advocates for or against a candidate.

The State argued that AFF's advertisements referencing the DSA could trigger the disclosure requirements because Zohran Mamdani, the only citywide candidate affiliated with the DSA in the 2025 mayoral election, was an identifiable candidate. Mamdani, as you know, won that election and is now the Mayor,

AFF brought a pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge, arguing that the regulations were unconstitutionally vague and improperly swept issue advocacy into the definition of independent expenditures. It sought both declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. It also moved for a preliminary injunction allowing it to broadcast the advertisements while the litigation proceeded.

While the district court denied preliminary relief, finding that AFF had not demonstrated a  likelihood of success on its constitutional claims. AFF appealed. The Second Circuit (Sullivan and Wesley, with Menashi in dissent) dismissed the appeal as moot. The majority says the injury asserted in the preliminary injunction motion concerned AFF's ability to broadcast its advertisements in the weeks preceding the 2025 mayoral election. Because that election had passed, the court could no longer provide effective relief from the particular injury underlying the motion.

The court also rejected the exception for controversies capable of repetition yet evading review. That principle allows you to challenge a rule or regulation where the timeline proceeds too quickly and the courts cannot rule quickly enough to fully resolve the case. Although election-related disputes may qualify for that exception, the majority noted that AFF's lawsuit remains pending in the district court, which can still adjudicate the constitutional challenges, and any final judgment could be reviewed on appeal.

In dissent, Judge Menashi says the appeal is not moot because AFF sought permission to broadcast its advertisements throughout the pendency of the litigation, not merely before the 2025 election. The advertisements did not identify any particular candidate or election and could be broadcast without modification in future election cycles. Alternatively, Judge Menashi concludes the controversy qualified as capable of repetition yet evading review. Election-related restrictions frequently arise too close to an election to permit complete judicial review, and AFF reasonably expected to encounter the same enforcement threat again.

The dissent also reached the First Amendment merits, concluding that AFF was likely to win because its advertisements constituted issue advocacy rather than express advocacy concerning a particular candidate. The Supreme Court has permitted disclosure requirements for communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of clearly identified candidates, but has not approved comparable regulation of communications merely addressing political issues.


Thursday, November 5, 2026

2d Department strikes down Nassau County law on transgender athletes

The culture wars continue to rage on Long Island. In Nassau County, the legislature passed a law prohibiting transgender women from playing team sports with those who were born as women. The New York Civil Liberties Union sued Nassau County, arguing that the law conflicts with the state law prohibition against discrimination on the basis of transgender status.

The case is Long Island Roller Rebels v. County of Nassau, issued by the Second Department on November 4. The Appellate Division strikes down the local law and says that state law guides this case. The plaintiff wins.

As background, the Roller Rebels are an adult womens' roller derby league in Nassau County that includes transgender women, intersex women, and gender-expansive women. They seek to use Nassau County facilities in playing other roller derby teams but were barred from doing so because the league has at least three transgender players. 

The case reached the Appellate Division after a State Supreme Court Justice ruled last year the local law was legal. The lower court said that biological males, regardless of transitioning, have greater athleticism and speed, strength, muscle mass, stronger hearts and greater bone density, and the local law aims to provide a safe environment for biological females. The court added that allowing transgender women to participate might be dangerous and create liability costs for the county. Since federal regulations allow schools to maintain separate teams for women and men in contact sports like roller derby. The court added that Title IX -- the sex discrimination law guiding sports -- prohibits biological men from playing sports with biological women, and that the county law is modeled after a law in Florida. On this logic, federal law preempts the state law on this issue, making the county prohibition against transgender women playing in the roller derby league legal. The lower court added that "The County does not deny transgender individuals access to the Athletic facilities."

 The Second Department rejects this reasoning in full and holds that the County law conflicts with State law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of transgender status. I do not see an analysis of federal statutes such as Title XI in the Appellate Division ruling. Unless the New York Court of Appeals takes on this case, this ruling means that transgender roller derby players may use Nassau County facilities for this competition.

 

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

Inmate wins disability discrimination appeal

You know, inmates have rights, too. This one filed a lawsuit over the jail's failure to accommodate his disability, among other violations. Much of the case is gone, but the Second Circuit revives his claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 

The case is Long v. Annucci, a summary order issued on November 3. Long, an inmate at Cape Vincent Correctional Facility, has severe osteoarthritis, degenerative changes to his lower back, and plantar fasciitis. His medical conditions caused chronic pain and difficulty walking. A prison doctor recommended orthopedic treatment and custom footwear, but Dr. David Dinello, a regional medical director, repeatedly deferred those recommendations, suggesting physical therapy and other less advanced treatments instead.

Long was required to complete Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment (ASAT) and Aggression Replacement Treatment (ART) programs to qualify for early release. But because of his medical problems, he was initially exempted from programming. In June 2015, he was transferred to the ASAT dormitory, where he allegedly had to walk long distances to obtain meals and medication.

In February 2016, Long requested reasonable accommodations, including specialized boots, orthotics, a shoe lift, and shorter walking distances to prison facilities and services. The following day, DOCCS transferred him to the infirmary, where he received certain mobility accommodations, including grab bars and accessible bathroom facilities. But prison officials denied his requests for specialized footwear and orthotics, which Long said were needed to participate in prison programming.

Long sued under the Eighth Amendment, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. On the Eighth Amendment claims, the Court of Appeals (Lee, Wesley and Jacobs) rejects Long's deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Dinello. A prisoner asserting inadequate medical care must establish both an objectively serious medical need and subjective deliberate indifference, requiring at least culpable recklessness. The Court said Long failed to establish the subjective component. Long did not dispute that Dinello believed several of his treatment decisions were medically justified. And the doctor who recommended orthopedic treatment acknowledged that physical therapy was an acceptable treatment and that Long received standard and accepted care throughout his incarceration.

Nor does Long have any basis for the conditions-of-confinement claims against three prison officials. Long cannot prove they were personally involved in the violation under Tangreti v. Bachmann, a Second Circuit ruling from a few years ago that, interpreting the famous Iqbal case, says you have to identify the wrongdoers by name in the lawsuit.. Two counselors established that they had no authority over Long's placement in the ASAT dormitory or his removal from it. The superintendent's involvement was limited to investigating grievances and affirming grievance committee decisions.

On his claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the district court misapplied the reasonable-accommodation framework. An accommodation must provide effective access to prison programs and activities. Although an accommodation need not be perfect or the inmate's preferred choice, effectiveness is essential. While the trial court said DOCCS had reasonably accommodated Long by transferring him to the infirmary. that only addressed some of plaintiff's needs. Long said that without specialized footwear, he could not meaningfully participate in early-release programming.

The Court found that Long satisfied his initial burden of identifying a facially reasonable accommodation. He had previously used specialized footwear and experienced substantial pain when walking without it. Significantly, DOCCS eventually approved his request for orthotic shoes in May 2016.

The Court also rejected the district court's characterization of the footwear request as merely a demand for specific medical treatment. Long was not claiming that DOCCS denied him medical care. Rather, he argued that the denial prevented him from accessing prison services and programs because of his disability. That is an actionable ADA and Rehabilitation Act theory.

Once Long established a facially reasonable accommodation, the burden shifted to DOCCS to demonstrate undue hardship. The district court had not properly conducted that inquiry. The case returns to the district court to apply the correct legal standard on the statutory disability discrimination claims. 

What do we learn here? While prison officials are not required to provide an inmate's preferred accommodation, they must demonstrate that the accommodation actually works or establish that the requested alternative would impose an undue hardship. The Court does pay homage to the principle that prison security, administrative concerns, and the orderly delivery of medical services are legitimate considerations in evaluating undue hardship. But those considerations must be addressed through the proper legal framework rather than simply assuming that whatever accommodations prison officials provided were reasonable.


Wednesday, October 28, 2026

Police officer has a viable retaliation case under the First Amendment

The Court of Appeals holds that a police officer may challenge a promotion denial that he claims was in retaliation for speaking out against possible supervisory misconduct.

The case is Beatty v. Vafeades, a summary order issued on October 26. Plaintiff was was a sergeant with police department in Nassau County. In 2017, he saw his supervisor working behind the counter at a bagel shop and eventually came to believe Vafeades owned and operated the business with two other police officers who were subordinate to Vafeades. Was this a conflict of interest? Maybe. Plaintiff reported this to Inspector Glenn Quinn, the department's second-in-command, who in turn told the Police Commissioner Charles Gennario, about it.

Months later, Vafeades replaced Gennario as Police Commissioner. Beatty says Vafeades retaliated against him for reporting the bagel-shop arrangement. Among other things, Beatty claimed that he was passed over for a promotion.

The district court dismissed the case, holding that plaintiff's speech was unprotected under the First Amendment because he did not speak as a citizen but an employee. That would make this a Garcetti case, named after the Supreme Court's 2006 ruling that public employees who speak as an employee and not as a citizen may be disciplined for their speech. The Second Circuit (Parker, Nathan, and Kaplan [D.J.]) reverses and returns this case to the Eastern District of New York for an exciting trial.

Whether plaintiff spoke as a citizen or employee turns on whether the speech ordinarily falls within the scope of the employee's responsibilities. Courts examine the employee's actual, day-to-day responsibilities rather than simply rely on formal job descriptions. We turn to Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2015), where the court said a police officer who complained to commanding officers about a precinct-wide arrest spoke as a citizen, as reporting supervisory misconduct was not part of his ordinary job duties. That reasoning applies here. 

Beatty's responsibilities as a sergeant involved supervising police officers. He was not responsible for monitoring the conduct of his own supervisors, much less investigating their outside business arrangements. The department's job description confirmed that supervisory officers were accountable for the proper performance of officers under their supervision. The fact that Beatty had a general obligation to report violations of departmental rules did not change the analysis. The Matthews precedent rejected the argument that a general duty to report misconduct determines whether an employee speaks pursuant to his official duties. Otherwise, public employers could undermine First Amendment protections simply by imposing broadly worded reporting obligations on their employees.

Plaintiff also wins the appeal because his speech had a citizen analogue. Plaintiff raised the issue in person with commanding officers at police headquarters. While defendants argued that this was different from an anonymous civilian's written complaint about the same subject to the Village's human resources department, the department manual expressly permitted members of the public to lodge complaints at police headquarters with the ranking supervisory officer on duty. Complaints could be made in person, in writing, or by telephone. Since an ordinary citizen had access to the same or a similar reporting channel, plaintiff spoke as a citizen, as well.


Friday, October 23, 2026

Religious-based objection to selling bridal clothing for same-sex wedding violates state law

The First Department has sustained a State Division of Human Rights finding that a wedding business violated state law in refusing to sell a bridal jumpsuit for a same-sex wedding. The ruling rejects the business's objection that servicing the wedding would have violated their religious principles and the First Amendment.

The case is SDHR v. D. Auxilly NYC LLC, issued on October 22. Once the business proprietor realized the complainant wanted a same-sex marriage, Galbraith, the business owner, said it would not sell her the bridal jumpsuit, that making such an outfit would violate her sincerely held religious belief. The SDHR also found the business told complainant to reconsider the wedding entirely. The SDHR held a hearing in this case, and ruled against Auxilly, awarding the complainant $5,000 in damages for pain and suffering and a civil penalty in the amount of $20,000.

State law prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations. While the Supreme Court has held in several high profile cases that businesses can deny servicing same-sex weddings under the First Amendment, that only applies when the services involve expressive conduct, like decorating a wedding cake or a website to celebrate the wedding. You may find these holds to be a stretch, but the Supreme Court has taken a broad definition of protected speech in these cases. But the First Department holds that selling a wedding garment is not expressive activity under the First Amendment, even if it might be adjusted for sizing. The business's order said at oral argument that the jumpsuit was a matter of expression, but the panel, to put it nicely, did not see it that way.  As the SDHR wrote in its appellate brief,

Galbraith, according to the parties’ stipulation of facts, is a designer and seller of “bridal and special occasion attire under the D. Auxilly brand.” However, her work, although tailored to fit the client, contains no speech element. It does not relate a “unique story” about the wearer using her original words and artwork. Although the clothing may reflect Galbraith’s considerable skill and talents, they are goods offered for sale to the general public. Galbraith’s sincerely held religious beliefs preclude same-sex marriage, but the commerce she partakes of is subject to the Human Rights Law’s requirements 

We also have ourselves a jurisdictional issue. The business was in New York, but the complaint lived in Missouri. New York law applies because the impact of the discriminatory violation transpired in New York.  

Thursday, October 22, 2026

Plaintiff wins retaliation appeal against Trump's 2016 campaign

The Appellate Division has reinstated a retaliation case filed against Donald Trump's 2016 campaign, which alleges that, after its former director of Hispanic engagement sued the campaign for sex discrimination, the campaign filed an arbitration demand against her, seeking $1.5 million in damages. 

The case is Denson v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., issued on October 22. While plaintiff signed an NDA upon working for the campaign, a federal court later struck down the NDA as invalid and unenforceable. In this round, plaintiff argues the arbitration demand was filed in retaliation for her discrimination lawsuit. In an affidavit, the campaign's Chief Operating Officer, Glassner, asserted a good faith belief that the arbitration demand was legitimate. That was enough for State Supreme Court to dismiss this retaliation case.

The First Department reverses, and the case returns to Supreme Court for trial. The reason is that Glassner's subsequent deposition did not conclusively prove the campaign filed the arbitration claim in good faith. The Court reasons that Glassner's testimony was all over the place but not specific enough to prove as a matter of law that the campaign had a legitimate basis to proceed against plaintiff after she filed her lawsuit:

plaintiff identified sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the proffered reason was pretextual. Among other things, Mr. Glassner averred that defendant commenced the arbitration against plaintiff because it believed that plaintiff’s complaint contained “certain” disparaging and “sensationalist allegations” which “far exceeded what she was required to allege in order to state viable” discrimination causes of action against it. During his deposition two years later, however, Mr. Glassner testified that it was his personal decision to file the arbitration because he believed that every substantive paragraph of plaintiff’s complaint violated the NDA. Mr. Glassner could not describe how he distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate allegations for purposes of enforcing the NDA and could not specify which allegations were actually unnecessary for plaintiff to pursue this litigation.

Plaintiff also wins the appeal because the defendant cannot show how it suffered any real damages from her lawsuit, suggesting the $1.5 million demand was an arbitrary tactic to silence the plaintiff.

What we learn from this case is that not all affidavits in support of a summary judgment motion are enough to dismiss the case. Plaintiffs should determine whether the affidavit is sufficiently vague to permit discovery that would explore the factual basis for the otherwise untested allegations in the affidavit.

 

 

Wednesday, October 21, 2026

Anti-Biden Twitter critic loses federal civil rights suit alleging conspiracy to close his account

The plaintiff here was an active Twitter-poster who criticized President Biden's COVID-19 policies, challenging the shutdowns and school closures. Twitter eventually suspended him under its five-strikes-yer-out rule after determining he was tweeting misinformation about the virus. This lawsuit against the former FDA commissioner and Pfizer executives alleges that the suspension violated a federal civil rights conspiracy law. Plaintiff loses.

The case is Berenson v. Gottlieb, a summary order issued on October 20. Plaintiff says that Twitter shut him down after gaining over 200,000 followers in conspiracy with the Biden administration. Federal law does prohibit conspiracies to violate civil rights. That statute is 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3). But 1985(3) has significant limitations. It only applies when the conspiracy would violate your rights in a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause, such as a racial or class-based discriminatory motivation. Also, religious and gender discrimination. The Supreme Court has also Section 1985 might not protect political groups unless that discrimination was racially motivated. The Court of Appeals seems to protect plaintiffs who suffer conspiracies due to their political party affiliation but not because they are political opponents of the defendants.

Plaintiff loses because he asserts in the complaint that he is a Biden opponent and critic, not that he is suffering discrimination due to his political party. Also, the Second Circuit (Leval, Wesley and Bianco) holds,  he does not belong to a protected class under Section 1985(3). He belongs to a political class, not a racial, gender, or religious class. While he argues that he does belong to a racial or religious class because a disproportionate number of evangelical Christians and African-Americans support him, along with political conservatives, the Second Circuit rejects this argument as an effort to incorporate a disparate impact angle to the framework, which the Second Circuit denied in Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2012).

Friday, October 16, 2026

2d Department sustains sexual harassment finding against Boston Market

The Appellate Division has sustained a finding from the New York State Division of Human Rights that found a female employee was sexually harassed at Boston Market in Orange County. The Second Department also holds the damages and penalties were proper under the New York State HRL. The liability finding broadly interprets the Human Rights Law in that Boston Market was liable because the harasser was the plaintiff's supervisor.

The case is In the Matter of the New York State Division of Human Rights v. Boston Market Corp, issued on October 14. 

Bless Clarke was hired by Boston Market in July 2017 as a cashier, food server, and crew member, working there until April 2020. Nicholas Foreman,worked at the restaurant from October to approximately November 19, 2019. Employees recognized Foreman as the manager even though his formal managerial status was unclear. In the presence of Assistant General Manager Robert Smith, Foreman made sexually inappropriate comments to Clarke. Smith giggled at these comments but did nothing to stop them. Foreman also sometimes pinched Clarke’s leg, prompting her to tell him not to touch her. Clarke additionally observed Foreman appearing intoxicated at work and reported this to Smith, who said he would notify General Manager Michele Carbon.

On November 18, 2019, Foreman began following Clarke at work. She attempted to avoid him by moving into the dining room, but he hugged her, pinned her arms, and forcibly kissed her on the mouth. Clarke struck Foreman, ran to the bathroom, and began crying. Clarke reported the assault to Smith, who contacted Carbon. Carbon instructed Smith to send Foreman home. Smith told Clarke to remain in the bathroom while Foreman was directed to leave. Ten minutes later, Clarke emerged and discovered that Foreman was still present. He apologized and claimed he had been “just trying to take the sickness” out of her, referring to her cold. Foreman was sent home. The following day, Carbon reviewed security-camera footage of the incident and terminated Foreman's employment.

Following the harassment and assault, Clarke experienced paranoia, depression, anxiety, and panic attacks that continued at least through December 2021. She avoided public places because she feared encountering Foreman and experiencing another panic attack. She also had difficulty eating. In May 2021, she began counseling, during which she discussed the sexual harassment.

On these facts, the SDHR found Boston Market liable for sexual harassment, awarding Clarke $75,000 for pain and suffering and fining Boston Market $50,000. The Second Department, which defers to the SDHR's factual findings in these cases, holds there is substantial evidence to support the liability findings and that the damages and fine are not excessive. 

The Appellate Division does not analyze the factual record or explain how the SDHR reached its determination, but what strikes me about this case is that the SDHR prevailed even though Carbon appeared to take remedial action after learning about the sexual harassment, firing Foreman the next day after reviewing the security camera footage. But, according to SDHR's appellate brief, Boston Market lost the case because the SDHR found that Foreman was a supervisor. The brief states, "The Division found Boston Market liable for Mr. Foreman’s sexual harassment of Ms. Clarke. It reasoned that because Mr. Foreman is a supervisor, 'that harassment is attributable to Boston Market.'” SDHR appears to interpret the amended New York State HRL to permit liability in this circumstance, a departure from the prior statute (and Title VII), which required the plaintiff to show that management condoned or supported the harassment. What also clinched victory for the SDHR was that the restaurant did not stop Foreman when he had harassed Clarke on prior occasions.

To the extent an SDHR brief in the Appellate Division represents a policy pronouncement useful for other cases, here is the SDHR's analysis, departing from the First Department's interpretation of the NYSHRL as well as the Supreme Court's leading Title VII cases on this issue, Faragher and Ellerth:

the Division submits that the language of EXEC. LAW §296(1)(h), in conjunction with its legislative history and the evolution of a stricter liability standard in case law construing the state Human Rights Law in the wake of Faragher and Ellerth, weigh against the interpretation that the First Department has given this new subsection respecting vicarious liability as dependent on supervisory status. The provision of the New York City Code requiring that, in order for an employer to be liable under the City Human Rights Law, either the wrongdoer must be a supervisor or the employer condoned the discriminatory act has never had a statutory counterpart in the state Human Rights Law. 

 The Commissioner's order in this case will help plaintiffs win their cases provided the plaintiff's supervisor committed the harassment, regardless of management's response. It reads:

Effective August 12, 2019, the Human Rights Law was also amended to ensure that the provisions of the law be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws have been so construed. The amendment further mandated that exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of the law shall be construed narrowly in order to maximize deterrence of discriminatory conduct. See Human Rights Law § 300. As a result of these amendments, the case law that developed under the prior “severe or pervasive” standard is no longer applicable to harassment cases. Harassment claims are now analyzed more like claims under the New York City Human Rights Law than federal law. See Wellner v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 2019 WL 4081898 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)


Complainant has proven that she was sexually harassed by Foreman, who engaged in inappropriate behavior towards her throughout his employment with Boston Market by making comments about her body and undergarments and touching her legs. On November 18, 2019, Foreman attacked Complainant by hugging her and kissing her on the lips while she resisted him. Foreman’s conduct subjected Complainant to inferior terms and conditions of employment because of her sex and constituted sexual harassment under the Human Rights Law. Because Foreman was a supervisor, that harassment is attributed to Boston Market.


 

Thursday, October 15, 2026

Welcome to New York Times v. Sullivan

A Republican Congressman sued NBC over a Rachel Maddow's comment that he had accepted material from a Russian agent without notifying the authorities. That comment was apparently false, but Maddow got the "news" from a Politico article. The congressman, Devan Nunes, sued NBC for defamation. The lawsuit fails because Nunes cannot prove actual malice.

The case is Nunes v. NBC Universal, a summary order issued on October 15. Defamation cases in the United States are difficult to win when the plaintiff is a public figure, like a Congressman. This is because the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) said public figures have to prove actual malice. This heightened standard, said the Court, ensures public debate will not be quashed by fear of a lawsuit, and that people may get their facts wrong on public issues so long as they do not knowingly repeat false information or rely on untrustworthy news sources.

Plaintiff wanted the Second Circuit (Calabresi, Lee and Nardini) to disregard the actual malice test. There is a movement afoot to accomplish just that, and some conservatives on the Supreme Court had suggested it is time to do so. But we are not there yet, and actual malice is embedded in our constitutional system as much as the Dormant Commerce Clause and Sovereign Immunity. Besides, New York law recognizes the actual malice test. Either way, plaintiff has to prove actual malice.

Summary judgment was proper on this claim because plaintiff cannot show that Rachel Maddow knowingly repeated a falsehood. In relying on the Politico article, she acted reasonably under the constitutional order, as Politico is not the Weekly World News. The Second Circuit writes, 

"In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s reliance on a responsible source negates a finding of “the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice.” “Similarly, this Court has held that where reporters’ false statements in an article were based on reliable sources, the defendant could hardly be accused of gross negligence, much less actual malice.” Nunes provided no evidence at the summary judgment stage that provided any basis for a reasonable inference that Maddow or Gnazzo should have regarded the Politico article as unreliable. 

 

Wednesday, October 14, 2026

Employees get paid when they are required to show up early but there is no work to perform

The Second Circuit has reinstated a wage-and-hour lawsuit alleging that a supermarket required employees to arrive 15 minutes before their shifts but did not pay them when managers were late unlocking the stores. The court holds that the Fair Labor Standards Act can require employers to compensate employees for waiting time when they are required to report for work at a designated time but management prevents them from actually starting work. 

The case is Santos v. Lidl US, LLC, issued on October 13. Santos worked as a store clerk at Lidl grocery stores on Long Island. Her opening shift was scheduled to begin at 5:00 a.m., but Lidl required her and other employees to arrive 15 minutes earlier. Sometimes, the stores remained locked because opening managers did not arrive until 5 a.m. or later. Picture the employees standing around in the parking lot and outside the front door at 4:45 a.m. waiting for a supervisor to show up and let them into the store. 

Employees could not clock in until they entered the stores. When managers were late, employees had to wait outside without pay despite having reported to work at the time Lidl required. This happened approximately once a week, costing plaintiff 15 minutes of wages. During five weeks, the unpaid time also resulted in lost overtime compensation.

Plaintiff sued under the FLSA and New York Labor Law, seeking unpaid wages on behalf of herself and other employees. The district court dismissed the claims, reasoning that the Portal-to-Portal Act excluded the waiting time from compensable work. The Court of Appeals revives the case.

The Second Circuit (Robinson, Rakoff [D.J.], and Sullivan in dissent) notes that the Portal-to-Portal Act generally excludes time spent on activities preliminary or subsequent to an employee’s principal job duties. But the statute does not categorically exclude all waiting time before a shift. DOL regulations distinguish between employees who are “engaged to wait” and those who are “waiting to be engaged.” An employee who voluntarily arrives early and waits for work generally is not entitled to compensation for that time. By contrast, an employee who must report at a particular hour, is ready and willing to work, and cannot begin working for reasons beyond the employee’s control may be entitled to compensation.

Plaintiff plausibly alleges compensable waiting time. At the pleading stage, the court had to accept her allegations that Lidl required her to arrive at 4:45 a.m. and that she sometimes could not enter the store because her manager had not arrived. At the same time, the court rejected Lidl’s argument that the claim was too trivial to be actionable under the FLSA’s de minimis doctrine. Under Second Circuit precedent, courts consider the difficulty of recording the time, the aggregate amount of compensation at stake, and the regularity of the activity. Because Santos alleged 15 minutes of unpaid time each week, the court could not conclude from the complaint that the time was insignificant or too difficult to record. Employers cannot automatically disregard regularly occurring, readily ascertainable working time merely because each individual period is short.

Wednesday, October 7, 2026

Plaintiff loses retaliation case on appeal

A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation and still lose at summary judgment. That is what happened to an Office of Mental Health employee whose discrimination complaint was followed by a series of disciplinary actions. The plaintiff loses because defendant had documented her performance problems before she ever filed the complaint.

The case is Rahman v. Carlin, a summary order issued on October 6. Plaintiff worked for OMH. On April 29, 2019, she filed complaints with the State Division of Human Rights and the EEOC, alleging discrimination over her failure to receive a promotion and equal pay. She claimed the discrimination was based on her race, color, and national origin. She later sued, claiming defendants retaliated against her because she filed that complaint.

The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Second Circuit (Jacobs, Merriam and Schwartz) affirms. Plaintiff identified several allegedly retaliatory actions, including two interrogations, paid administrative leave, a disciplinary notice, and an unsatisfactory performance evaluation. She also argued that earlier performance evaluations were also adverse actions. The Second Circuit stated that, under Section 1983 plaintiff must show a materially adverse employment action, while the NYSHRL reaches conduct reasonably likely to deter someone from opposing discrimination. More on these dueling legal standards at the end of this blog post.

Plaintiff loses because her performance problems predated her discrimination complaint. The record showed concerns about her work performance before April 29, 2019. An April 17 email discussed concerns about her knowledge of workplace policies, failure to check email, responsiveness, and interactions with a supervisor. Later evaluations and disciplinary measures continued to cite documented performance problems. Nor could plaintiff identify any comparators who were treated differently. And the challenged actions were not sufficiently close in time to her April 2019 complaint to support an inference of retaliation.

The Court says the retaliation test under Section 1983 requires a showing that plaintiff suffered a material adverse action, in contrast to state law's dissuasion test. Is that correct? The Second Circuit cites Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64 (2d Cir. 2023), for this proposition, but Buon was a disparate treatment case, not a retaliation case. Disparate treatment cases apply a different standard, one that is less favorable for plaintiffs than the dissuasion test in retaliation cases. What is more, Buon predates the Supreme Court's ruling in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), which rejected the materiality test applied in Buon for a more forgiving test, requiring that plaintiffs in disparate treatment cases only show "some harm," not material or significant harm. The analysis in Buon is outdated. This apparent error would not have made a difference in the outcome of this appeal, as the Court of Appeals also rejected plaintiff's case under the dissuasion test under state law. 


Monday, October 5, 2026

Plaintiff loses political affiliation case

The Court of Appeals holds that three Program Integrity Officers who worked for the Orange County Sheriff cannot sue for First Amendment/political affiliation retaliation because they held political jobs, which gave the Sheriff discretion to replace them after they supported the Sheriff's political opponent in the primary election.

The case is Cowart v. Arteta, a summary order issued on October 4. This case highlights an issue that I've raised as a CLE lecturer over the years: that much of constitutional law is judge-made law, and the judges love their multi-part tests, again, created by the courts, in working through the constitutional puzzle. The First Amendment protects the right of speech and political association, but its plain language does not help the courts resolve cases like this. The federal courts, as they have done in all constitutional cases, have therefore created a balancing test. In cases like this, that test pits the individual speech/association right against an elected governmental official's need to implement their policies.

In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), the Supreme Court created a test for political association cases: public employees can be dismissed from employment based on their political affiliations without violating the First Amendment if “the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” The Court did not detail what constitutes "appropriate requirement." For that inquiry, we look to the Second Circuit, which in Vezzetti v. Pellegrini, 22 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 1994), created an eight-factor test. These factors  

are “useful in deciding whether a position” is subject to the Elrod-Branti exception: whether the employee (1) is exempt from civil service protection, (2) has some technical competence or expertise, (3) controls others, (4) is authorized to speak in the name of policymakers, (5) is perceived as a policymaker by the public, (6) influences government programs, (7) has contact with elected officials, and (8) is responsive to partisan politics and political leaders. 

Further complicating matters, none of these eight factors is dispositive. We look to the totality of the circumstances. No case is going to be so one-sided that the court can easily decide the matter. Defendants will point to some of the factors, and plaintiffs will point to the other factors, and each side will say the balance tips in their favor. But you can see from the eight factors that elected officials and their appointees have wide latitude in hiring and promoting political loyalists despite the First Amendment's protection against associational discrimination.

Here, the Court of Appeals (Merriam, Livingston and Schwartz) says, plaintiffs each held a position for which political affiliation was an appropriate reason to fire them. They conducted officer integrity checks and internal investigations into allegations of officer corruption and/or misconduct, interviewed witnesses and targets of internal investigations, completed and filed classified and confidential reports with the Sheriff, reviewed office policies and forms and ensured compliance with professional police and corrections professional standards, maintained working relationships with Sheriff and Corrections command staff and other agencies, and completed special assignments. This is important work, but was it inherently political in nature? Yes, says the Court of Appeals.

The Sheriff was entitled to replace plaintiffs with people who shared his political views or philosophy. Or his management style. Plaintiffs did not have civil service protection, they were empowered to speak for the Sheriff, their jobs required expertise, and the job description make clear that a PIO has “wide latitude for independent judgment in carrying out” duties “in accordance with established office policies.”

Friday, October 2, 2026

Court broadly interprets the Ending Forced Arbitration Act

The Second Circuit has clarified the scope of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA), holding that when the EFAA applies, it prevents enforcement of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement as to the entire lawsuit, not just the sexual-harassment claims.

The case is Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, issued on September 30. This is the second important EFAA case in the Second Circuit in recent weeks. The last ruling was favorable to defendants in limiting the scope of the continuing violations rule in EFAA cases. This ruling is quite favorable to plaintiffs.

Plaintiff worked for Hermes Law beginning in 2017 and eventually became an executive at ClaimDeck, a legal-technology company founded by Hermes Law's owner, Dwayne Hermes. She received stock options representing approximately 10 percent of ClaimDeck. By August 2023, those options had fully vested and were worth more than $1 million. In December 2023 and again in January 2024, plaintiff expressed her intention to exercise the options. She was fired shortly thereafter.

Plaintiff also alleged that she had been subjected to sexual harassment, claiming that defendants encouraged her to flirt with prospective clients, commented repeatedly on her appearance, and, at a business dinner, compared her to a piece of steak. She also alleged an earlier incident in which Hermes allegedly climbed onto a scooter behind her in a compromising position while another employee took photographs.

In her lawsuit, plaintiff asserted a series of claims, including sexual harassment under the New York City and New York State Human Rights Laws, breach of contract, violation of New York Labor Law § 193, tortious interference, and conversion. The latter claims arose from the alleged effort to terminate her before she could exercise her vested stock options. The defendants sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement Diaz-Roa had signed in 2018. The district court refused, holding that the EFAA rendered the agreement unenforceable with respect to the entire case. The defendants appealed.

A few asides. First, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain defendants' immediate appeal from the trial court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration. Had the district court granted that motion, the Second Circuit would have had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. That one-sided jurisdictional rule will not surprise plaintiffs' lawyers, who for the most part do not like arbitration, which gives employers a huge advantage because (1) there is limited discovery, (2) arbitrators are not required to follow the law, (3) there is no jury, (4) the proceedings are not public, (5) there is no right to appeal, (6) state courts are highly deferential to arbitration rules if you try to challenge them in court, (7) the employer usually pays the arbitrator for their time, (8) damages are generally lower, and (9) studies show that plaintiffs are less successful in arbitration than in court before a jury. The EFAA creates an exception to the rule that arbitration clauses are enforceable, but only when the plaintiff asserts a sexual harassment claim. The issue here is whether the non-harassment claims in the same case may also escape arbitration. The answer is yes. 

The EFAA amended the Federal Arbitration Act in March 2022, providing that, when properly invoked by someone alleging a sexual-harassment or sexual-assault dispute, a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not enforceable “with respect to a case” that relates to that dispute. The defendants argued that “case” really meant individual claims. Under their interpretation, plaintiff's sexual-harassment claims could remain in federal court, but her unrelated conversion claim would have to go to arbitration.

Rejecting that interpretation, the Court of Appeals (Walker, Bianco and Perez) notes the ordinary meaning of the word “case.” A case means a lawsuit or judicial proceeding as a whole, while a “claim” refers to a particular demand for relief within that lawsuit. Congress knew how to use the word “claim” and actually used it elsewhere in the EFAA. The Court holds that Congress deliberately chose “case” in Section 402.

The Court also rejected the defendants' argument that this interpretation makes the statute's “relates to” language meaningless. A lawsuit must still have a connection to the sexual-harassment dispute. But once the EFAA applies to that case, the statute does not require courts to conduct a claim-by-claim arbitration analysis. In addition, the Court rejected reliance on the federal policy favoring arbitration. Congress itself amended the FAA through the EFAA and expressly created an exception for cases involving sexual-harassment or sexual-assault disputes. The FAA is a powerful statute, and it has sent countless cases to arbitration, but Congress does have the power to amend it, and it did so in response to the "Me-Too" era.

The Court declined to resolve a separate question concerning whether a plaintiff must merely allege a nonfrivolous sexual-harassment claim or must satisfy the more demanding Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard to invoke the EFAA. The defendants did not properly challenge that issue on appeal, and they did not dispute that plaintiff's allegations satisfied even the higher standard.

Thursday, October 1, 2026

Long Island Native American mascot dispute is revived on appeal

You may not be aware of this, but a culture war has been brewing on Long Island in recent years over the use of mascots featuring Native American imagery. The State of New York is trying to phase out "The Chiefs" and "The Warriors" and has issued regulations defining when districts and their employees may utilize or promote such mascots at school events.

The case is Wantagh Union Free School District v. New York State Board of Regents, a summary order issued on October 1. A state regulation says that public schools cannot use such names, logos or mascots except for classroom instruction. That would eliminate school and team mascots with Native American headdresses. Another rule says school officers and employees cannot "utilize or promote" mascots on school property or at a school function. That rule is the subject of this court ruling.

One plaintiff serves on the Wantagh Board of Education. He challenges this rule to the extent it may bar him from wearing Warriors apparel at a district sporting event. The district court dismissed his case, but the Court of Appeals (Walker, Park and Lee) reinstates it for additional analysis. Wearing such clothing is expressive conduct under the First Amendment. The clothing rule also implicates the First Amendment because he sues as a district volunteer, not an employee, which means he may not have to prove his clothing addresses a matter of public concern, a legal term of art that says the government cannot regulate public employee speech if covers political or social matters of interest to the community, like a whistleblower or letter-to-the-editor gadfly. Since plaintiff is an elected member of the Board of Education, the district court must determine whether the "public concern" framework applies to him or if he instead enjoys the same broader rights as any other member of the public who attends a high school football game.

The case also returns to the district court to consider the context of the plaintiff's speech. The Court of Appeals holds that wearing Warriors apparel at a public event may be intended to send a message about the state's restrictions on Native American mascots and also to support the team. This kind of "message" speech may be protected under the First Amendment. The district court has to determine in the first instance whether wearing this clothing is expression on a matter of public concern. If so, the regulation may be struck down as overbroad in violation of the First Amendment

 

 

Wednesday, September 30, 2026

Second Circuit rewrites the rules for associational standing in Section 1983 cases

The Second Circuit has overruled a 1973 precedent that barred organizations from bringing § 1983 lawsuits on behalf of their members. This ruling makes it easier for organizations to sue on behalf of their members.

The case is Defending Education v. Croton-Harmon Union Free School District, issued on September 15. Defending Education challenged student-speech policies adopted by the Croton-Harmon School District in Westchester County. The organization represented three parents whose children attend Croton-Harmon schools. The parents alleged that the district's policies concerning discrimination, harassment, bullying, gender identity, and student speech violated the First Amendment and chilled their children's speech. After the plaintiff organization lost this appeal last year, on a petition for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals (Calabresi, Parker and Nardini), holds that organizations may assert associational standing under the three-part test from Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 

What is standing? That legal principle gives you the right to bring a lawsuit. Most litigants have standing: something bad happened to me, and I am bringing a lawsuit. Some organizations can also sue on behalf of their members. That's associational standing, and it is much more complicated.  

In Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit more than 50 years ago held that organizations could not sue under § 1983 to vindicate the rights of their members. The trial court in this case therefore dismissed the case for lack of standing. In April 2025, the Second Circuit initially affirmed that dismissal because Aguayo was controlling Circuit precedent.

Defending Education then sought reconsideration, asking the Second Circuit to overrule Aguayo. The Court granted the motion, rendering the first appellate ruling in this case a nullity. The Court noted that when Aguayo was decided, the Second Circuit was the first federal appellate court to hold that membership organizations could not bring § 1983 claims on behalf of their members. More than fifty years later, every other federal circuit that had addressed the question had reached the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Court, meanwhile, had repeatedly recognized associational standing, including in cases involving § 1983 claims.

The Supreme Court's decisions in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and Hunt are implicated here. Under Hunt, an organization can sue on behalf of its members when three requirements are met: (1) the members would have standing to sue individually; (2) the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor the requested relief requires individual members to participate in the lawsuit.

The Second Circuit holds that Aguayo cannot be reconciled with this Supreme Court precedent. It also points to the Supreme Court's recent affirmative action decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, 600 U.S. 181 (2023), which applied the Hunt framework to an association asserting constitutional claims under § 1983.

The Court Appeals thus overrules Aguayo's associational-standing rule, as well as later Second Circuit decisions that relied on that rule. What it means is that organizations are no longer categorically barred from bringing § 1983 cases on behalf of their members in the Second Circuit. The case returns to the trial court to determine whether the organization satisfies Hunt's requirements. The Second Circuit expressly to decide whether the organization would ultimately satisfy the requirements for a preliminary injunction.

Thursday, September 24, 2026

Second Circuit says border agents can search cellphones without suspicion

The Second Circuit has held that federal agents can search your cellphone when you enter the United States without a warrant or reasonable suspicion..

The case is United States v.Alisigwe, issued on September 17. Under this ruling, the government may conduct a manual search of a traveler’s cellphone at the international border without any individualized suspicion. That is what happened here.

Alisigwe was a lawful permanent resident whom authorities suspected of using fraudulent identification documents to open bank accounts. In 2019, when Alisigwe returned to the United States through Idlewild Airport, Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection officers stopped him for an inspection. An officer scrolled through Alisigwe's phone, and photographed material in his photo gallery, which contained names, birth dates, Social Security numbers, bank-account information and addresses belonging to other people. Two years later, officers again stopped Alisigwe at the airport and searched his phone. This time they photographed a Whats App message concerning one of the people whose identity had allegedly been stolen. When Alisigwe moved to suppress the cellphone evidence, the district court rejected the motion, reasoning that cellphone searches at the border required reasonable suspicion but that the officers had reasonable suspicion in this case.

The Second Circuit (Menashi, Lee [concurring] and Gonzalez [D.J.]) agreed that the evidence could be used, but for a different reason. The majority invokes the border-search exception to the Fourth Amendment. Ordinarily, a warrantless search requires an exception to the warrant requirement. But as for border searches, the Supreme Court holds that the government's interest in determining who and what enters the country permits routine searches without probable cause, a warrant, or reasonable suspicion.

The Second Circuit had previously distinguished between routine and non-routine border searches. Searches of luggage and other belongings generally are routine; highly intrusive searches of the person, such as strip searches and body-cavity searches, can require reasonable suspicion. The majority holds that a cellphone falls on the “property” side of the equation. The court recognizes that cellphones contain much personal information. But it reasoned that the government's border interest is not limited to physical contraband. Digital information can constitute contraband, and information on a cellphone may help determine whether a person is entitled to enter the country.

Judge Lee concurred in the judgment. She agreed that the particular searches in this case did not require a warrant or probable cause. But she disagreed with the majority's broader holding that all international travelers' cellphones may be searched without any individualized suspicion. She notes that a cellphone is not a suitcase and can contain medical information, financial records, personal messages, internet searches, location information and other highly private material. Judge Lee questioned whether the traditional rationale for border searches should extend to this comprehensive modern device. She also noted that Alisigwe did not challenge the district court's finding that reasonable suspicion actually existed. As Judge Lee sees it, the court did not need to decide whether suspicionless cellphone searches are constitutional.

Wednesday, September 23, 2026

2d Circuit interprets the Ending Forced Arbitration Act (Newton v. LVMH Part III)

The Court of Appeals has issued an important ruling on the scope of the Ending Forced Arbitration Act (EFAA), holding that a high-profile sexual harassment plaintiff cannot avoid arbitration on her sexual harassment and retaliation claims even if some of the hostile conduct took place after the EFAA took effect in March 2022.

The case is Newton v. LVMH, issued on September 21. Plaintiff -- whose testimony before Congress helped lead to the EFAA's enactment -- asserts that she endured sexual harassment prior to March 2022, and that following enactment of the EFAA, the sex discrimination and retaliation continued through her termination in December 2022. Under the EFAA, plaintiff can avoid arbitration on all her claims, including those that accrued prior to March 2022, if they are part of a continuing violation, an equitable principle that allows you to sue over actions that would be otherwise time-barred. 

"However, to trigger the doctrine, the timely and untimely acts must be 'sufficiently related' such that they constitute part of the same 'unlawful employment practice.'” The Court of Appeals (Bianco, Menashi and Brindisi [D.J.]) cites McGullam v. Cedar Graphics, Inc., 609 F.3d 70, 75, 77 (2d Cir. 2010), for this proposition. Until now, McGullam was the leading case on this issue. The Court adds:

To determine whether the requisite relationship between timely and untimely acts has been shown, we consider a variety of factors, including “the commonality of the environment in which the incidents took place (and whether a change in environment is due to intervening action by the employer), the nature of the incidents, and the temporal discontinuity between the incidents.” 

The continuing violation doctrine does not apply here because the pre- and post-EFAA acts of retaliation "are not sufficiently related such that they are 'part of the same course of discriminatory conduct," as "the 'who' and the 'how' of the alleged harassment and retaliation differed between the two relevant time periods." 

Prior to the EFAA's enactment, plaintiff primarily suffered discrimination from colleagues Doran (sexual harassment) and Firestone (who perpetrated the retaliation). The post EFAA retaliation was perpetrated by her supervisor, Pratt. Moreover, pre-EFAA, the Title VII violations involved pure sexual harassment. The post-EFAA violations involved retaliation that differed materially from the pre-EFAA retaliation. Pre-EFAA, plaintiff alleged, the company undertook a sham investigation into her sexual harassment complaint, giving her bad performance reviews, and other acts of workplace hostility. Post-EFAA, she alleges that LVMH engaged in a different pattern of retaliation, including requiring her to get pre-approval before she spoke publicly at panels or conferences, micromanaging her work matters, ignoring her and terminating her employment. There is not enough overlap between -pre- and post-EFAA allegations of retaliation to trigger the continuing violations rule.